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Precognition can be defined as an anomalous correlation between current cognitive activity 
and a future event. Using behavioural and physiological measures, a number of previous 
studies have reported evidence for unconscious precognition during a variety of task 
conditions. The current thesis presents five experiments that were designed to test for 
unconscious precognition in the visual attention system while participants were engaged in a 
short term visual memory task. Each trial consisted of a study and test phase. In the study 
phase, participants were required to memorise an array of four stimuli while their eye 
movements were recorded. After a brief retention interval, a probe stimulus was presented 
for a yes/no recognition test. Two conditions were employed and were randomly determined. 
In the old condition, the probe was a stimulus viewed during study, termed the target. In the 
new condition, the probe was a novel stimulus. Experiments tested for the presence of 
precognition by examining whether there was a difference in the degree to which visual 
attention was allocated to items during the study phase of old and new trials. Two further 
studies were also carried out involving simulations that aimed to establish the extent to 
which a previously described artefact, termed the expectation bias, may impact on the 
results. 
 
Experiment 1 suggested that participants spent more time attending to target stimuli in old 
compared to new trials, a result that appeared to provide evidence for precognition. 
However, the data was considered unreliable due to inadequate randomisation. An exact 
replication of Experiment 1 was carried out in Experiment 2 with adequate randomisation, 
but failed to find evidence for precognition. Experiment 3A was a further attempt to replicate 
the preliminary results of Experiment 1 using more extensive randomisation procedures 
while Experiment 3B explored the potential role of the probe stimulus in generating a 
precognitive effect. However, no support for the precognitive hypothesis was found in either 
experiment. A fully balanced design was employed in Experiment 4 in order to control for 
potential confounds such as position and saliency effects. The results supported the 
precognitive hypothesis and suggested that less attention was allocated to targets in the old 
condition. An exploratory analysis also examined the relationship between several 
standardised stimulus variables and the apparent precognitive effect observed in Experiment 
4. The results revealed a suggestive relationship between the size of the effect and item 
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ratings of familiarity and visual complexity. Simulations of an expectation bias in 
Experiments 5A and 5B together with post-hoc examination of the data from the current 
series of experiments suggest that this artefact is not a plausible explanation for the observed 
effects. The thesis ends with a discussion of several methodological issues that may impact 
on both the interpretation of positive results and the conclusions that may be reached from 
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Broadly speaking, extra-sensory experiences appear to convey information that could not 
ordinarily have been obtained. It is perhaps easiest to illustrate this central characteristic by 
way of an example. The following was taken from the spontaneous case collection of Louisa 
E. Rhine (1961): 
 
One summer several industrialists went for a fishing trip into the wilds of 
Canada. Among them was the district manager of a sheet and tin plate company. For 
about two weeks they had been in the deep woods, cut off from all news sources.  
The night before they were to return home, the district manager had a dream, 
so clear, so vivid, he could not sleep afterward. In it, he writes, “one of our 
locomotive cranes that was unloading a car of scrap iron, together with the car, was 
on the track near the back of a river alongside the water tower which served the 
locomotives. For some unaccountable reason, as the huge magnet swung around 
with a heavy load of scrap, it suddenly toppled over the river bank. The operator, 
whom I called by name, jumped clear of the crane and landed below it as it came 
bounding, tumbling and bouncing down the river bank, and he finally disappeared 
from view as the crane came to rest twenty feet below at the water’s edge. I 
particularly noted the number of the crane and the number and positions of the 
railroad cars, and was able to tell how the crane operator was dressed. Furthermore, I 
noticed the approximate damage done to the crane. I did not know, however, what 
had finally happened to the operator. He had disappeared under or behind the crane 
after it had come to rest. In other words, I was observing the accident from 
somewhere in or across the river.  
“Upon my return to the mill the following day, the first man I met was the 
master mechanic. He told me to come with him to inspect the crane of my dream, to 
talk with the operator who had emerged from the accident without a scratch. The 
operator explained his lack of injury by the fact that the crane had fallen over in 
front of him as he made his last jump and as it made its last bounce. The record 
showed the smallest detail to be as I had dreamed it, with one exception. The 




The experience just described might be categorised as ‘extra-sensory’ because it appears to 
convey information about a future event that could not ordinarily have been obtained. Here, 
the dream is assumed to have foretold an apparently unforeseeable event. Of course, 
experiences that take place outside of controlled laboratory conditions are prone to error and 
the extra-sensory appearance of such reports may reflect processes that can be described by 
current scientific knowledge. Accordingly, one approach to the scientific study of such 
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experiences, termed anomalistic psychology (Zusne & Jones, 1982), proposes that the action 
of various cognitive and perceptual biases can give rise to an experience that only appears to 
violate our common sense notions of causality. This approach has produced a body of 
evidence suggesting that biases in memory, reasoning, probability judgement and perception 
can contribute to the formation of a belief that a paranormal event has taken place when, in 
fact, it has not (Blagrove, French & Jones, 2006; French, 2003; French & Wilson, 2006; 
Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). An alternative approach is 
to ask whether the paranormal appearance of some extra-sensory experiences reflects an 
underlying process that is, in fact, paranormal and therefore not yet fully described by 
science. This central question is addressed by parapsychology, a field that attempts to test for 
psi - the putative anomalous process underlying such reports. It should be noted that the 
hypotheses tested by anomalistic psychology and parapsychology are not mutually 
exclusive; it is possible that a proportion of reported extra-sensory experiences are due to 
perceptual and cognitive biases while a remainder are genuinely anomalous. Scientific study 
of these experiences, and their underlying causes, can therefore proceed in a way that 
involves both fields working in parallel.  
 
Extra-sensory experiences have been classified in various ways. One method has been to 
group them according to phenomenological criteria. For example, Rhine (1961) grouped 
experiences into four major categories according to the ‘form’ of the reported experience, 
which she labelled as intuitive impressions, hallucinations, realistic dreams and unrealistic 
dreams.  Intuitive impressions were characterised as feelings of familiarity, a sudden ‘just 
knowing’, conspicuous emotions or compulsive behaviour, all of which seemed to provide 
information about some external event by apparently extra-sensory means. Typically, 
intuitive impressions were not experienced with any accompanying sensory imagery that 
would have provided more contextual detail. On the other hand, experiences placed in the 
category of hallucinations mostly conveyed information in the form of sensory perceptions. 
Here, simple hallucinatory sensations were reported in a variety of modalities but more 
complex hallucinations were sometimes reported involving so-called ‘apparitions’ of 
relatives recently deceased or in physical crisis some distance away from the percipient at 
the time of the experience. Realistic dreams were characterised by detailed and seemingly 
accurate information about apparently inaccessible events while unrealistic dreams were 
interpreted as symbolic representations of such events. The dream report provided at the start 
of this chapter is an example of an extra-sensory experience categorised as a realistic dream. 
Naturally, unrealistic dreams would be relatively more prone to misinterpretation, 
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confirmation bias and other cognitive biases that artificially create correspondences when 
none are present, and Rhine (1961) readily acknowledged this problem. However, the aim of 
Rhine’s classification scheme was not one of authenticating the paranormal nature of such 
reports. Rather, it was an attempt to derive testable hypotheses about the processes that may 
underlie such reports based on trends that may have emerged from analysis of their content 
and character. 
 
A more popular approach to the classification of extra-sensory experiences has been to group 
them into subtypes based on the circumstances during which the information appears to have 
been obtained. Thalbourne (2003, 2004) summarises this classification scheme, defining 
each subtype according to an ostensible correlation between the information conveyed by the 
experience and a target event that appears to be inaccessible to the percipient. The 
experience is labelled as telepathic when the target event is assumed to be mental in nature. 
For example, the following case was categorised as a telepathic experience in Radin (1997a): 
  
 In the middle of the night, out of a deep sleep, Fred suddenly jerked upright 
into a sitting position. He clutched his chest, gasping for breath. His wife, abruptly 
awakened by her husband’s sudden movement, anxiously asked, “What’s wrong?”. 
A few moments later, when Fred was able to breathe normally again, he told his wife 
he was alright, but he had a feeling that something terrible had happened. They 
glanced at the clock: 2:05 a.m. 
Fifteen minutes later, as they settled back to sleep, the phone rang. Fred’s 
father was on the line. “I have bad news”, he said. “Your mother just had a heart 
attack. We were sleeping when she suddenly sat bolt upright, clutched her chest, 
and…she passed away.” Fred was shocked. “When did this happen?” he asked. 
“About fifteen minutes ago, just after 2:00 a.m.,” replied his father. (p. 24)  
  
Here, since the experience appeared to convey information about the thoughts, feelings and 
sensations of another person, the report is labelled as telepathy. However, when the target 
event is assumed to be physical, the experience is labelled as clairvoyance. For example, 
Rhine (1961) tells of the case involving Emmanuel Swedenborg, an eighteenth century 
Swedish scientist and mystic, who in 1759 was able to describe the details of a fire that had 
suddenly broken out near his home some three hundred miles away. Regardless of the 
authenticity of such reports, it is assumed that since the information conveyed by the 
experience appears to have originated from the physical environment rather than from the 
mind of another person, the experience is labelled as clairvoyance
1
.  
                                                          
1
 It should be noted, however, that classifying the target event as being either ‘mental ‘or ‘physical’ 
does not imply an ontological distinction. For example, under physicalism, ‘mental’ target events may 
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Temporal criteria determine whether the experience is labelled as retrocognitive (the target 
event occurred before the experience), contemporaneous (the target event occurred at the 
same time as the experience), or precognitive (the target event occurred after the experience). 
For example, the dream report provided at the start of this chapter could be categorised as 
precognitive because the corresponding real-world event was reported to have occurred after 
the dream had been experienced. Terms can also be combined to categorise a particular 
experience according to both the presumed substantive nature of the target event and its 
temporal relationship to the experience. For example, an experience labelled as precognitive 
telepathy is one that ostensibly correlates with a mental target event arising after the 
experience took place. However, in practice it is often unclear whether the information 
conveyed by an extra-sensory experience originated from the mind of another person, a 
physical object or event, or a combination of both. For example consider the following case 
from Gurney, Myers and Podmore (1886): 
 
I was walking along in a country lane at A, the place where my parents then 
resided. I was reading geometry as I walked along...when in a moment I saw a 
bedroom known as the White Room in my home, and upon the floor lay my mother, 
to all appearance dead. The vision must have remained some minutes, during which 
time my real surroundings appeared to pale and die out; but as the vision faded, 
actual surroundings came back, at first dimly, and then clearly. I could not doubt that 
what I had seen was real, so instead of going home, I went at once to the house of 
our medical man and found him at home. He at once set out with me for my home, 
on the way putting questions I could not answer, as my mother was to all appearance 
well when I left home. I led the doctor straight to the White Room, where we found 
my mother actually lying as in my vision. This was true even to minute details. She 
had been seized suddenly by an attack of the heart, and would soon have breathed 
her last but for the doctor’s timely advent. I shall get my mother and father to read 
and sign this. (p. 194)  
 
In this case, are we to categorise the experience as a case of clairvoyance or telepathy? On 
the one hand, it appears as if the percipient had direct extra-sensory access to information 
about the physical circumstances surrounding the medical emergency, in which case the 
report might be labelled as clairvoyance. On the other hand, one might also suppose that the 
percipient had access to information about the thoughts, feelings and perceptions of the 
mother who must have been aware of the physical circumstances surrounding her medical 
emergency, in which case the experience may be categorised as telepathy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
be ontologically equivalent to ‘physical’ target events. However, under dualism, ‘mental’ and 
‘physical’ target events may be ontologically distinct.  
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The use of temporal criteria is less problematic in this respect since it is relatively 
straightforward to determine when a target event occurred relative to the experience, if 
sufficient information is available. However, commonsense notions of causality are 
particularly challenged when the target event occurs after the experience; as far as a 
parapsychological approach is concerned, precognition implies that people are able to 
anticipate the future without recourse to inference or deduction. Many parapsychological 
studies have attempted to test for precognition which can be defined as an anomalous 
correlation between current cognitive activity and a future event. In this endeavour to 
reproduce the phenomenon in a laboratory environment, where processes of inference and 




Outline of the thesis 
 
The current thesis adopts a parapsychological approach to the investigation of ostensible 
precognition by asking whether anomalous correlations can be observed between current 
cognitive activity and the future presentation of experimental stimuli. Chapter 2 will present 
a selective review of the range of methodologies used to test for precognition and anomalous 
anticipatory effects. The experimental paradigm used in the current thesis will be introduced 
in Chapter 3 along with a description of the main hypothesis under test. Five experiments 
designed to test the precognitive hypothesis using the current paradigm will then be reported. 
Chapter 4 will present two studies involving simulations of a methodological artifact that has 
previously been suggested as an explanation for a number of precognitive effects and it will 
be examined whether such an artifact can potentially explain the results reported in the 
current thesis. The thesis will end with a general discussion of the experimental results and 
some methodological problems that may impact on their interpretation. A number of 












In the laboratory, a test for precognition usually involves measuring some aspect of a 
participant’s behaviour in the present and observing whether this behaviour in some way 
correlates with the presentation of target stimuli in the future. Crucially, the experimental 
design must prevent the participant from obtaining any reliable information about upcoming 
stimuli by normal means, such as by inference or deduction. This is normally achieved by 
randomising the appropriate experimental variables. Numerous studies have been performed 
that follow this basic procedure using various response measures and experimental 
manipulations. The current section will describe these studies in detail. In doing so, the goal 
will be to provide a representative overview of the range of methodologies used in 
experimental tests of precognition. It will then be shown how the experimental paradigm 
used in the current thesis builds upon the methodology of previous research. 
   
Before reviewing specific studies in the relevant literature, it may be instructive to define 
two types of experiment. On the one hand, an experiment may explicitly require participants 
to use precognition to obtain information about target stimuli, either by a strategy specified 
in the experimental instructions or by one of their own choosing. This may be classed as a 
study of intentional precognition. On the other hand, an experiment may ask participants to 
engage in a task that does not explicitly require them to use precognition. This may be 
classed as a study of unintentional precognition. Here, participants may or may not be 
informed that the experiment is investigating precognition. Both types of experiment may 
use behavioural responses, physiological recording of nervous system activity, or a 
combination of these measures as dependent variables. However, it should be noted that 
drawing a distinction between tests of intentional and unintentional precognition is not meant 
to imply that any effects observed in each class of experiment necessarily have different 
underlying causes. In addition, some studies do not fall neatly into one particular class of 
experiment. For example, in some tests of unintentional precognition, participants are 
informed about the nature of the experiment but are asked to play a passive role and refrain 
from using any intentional strategies. However, since participants are aware that the 
experiment is investigating precognition, they may adopt intentional strategies nonetheless. 
Unfortunately, few studies of this kind report steps taken to evaluate whether such strategies 
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took place. Examples of experiments testing for precognitive effects that fall into each of 
these categories will now be discussed. 
 
 
Studies of intentional precognition using 
behavioural measures 
 
One of the simplest methods for investigating precognition in the laboratory has been the use 
of a forced choice design which, by definition, restricts a participant’s response to a fixed set 
of alternatives. Forced choice designs testing for intentional precognition require participants 
to predict which of several alternative stimuli will be randomly selected as a target in the 
future. After a decision is made, participants are then typically presented with the target 
stimulus as feedback or they are given information about the accuracy of their response. 
Forced choice designs therefore allow responses to be statistically compared to the null 
hypothesis of obtaining a particular overall score by chance alone. Thus, if a forced choice 
experiment obtains an overall score that deviates significantly from theoretical chance 
expectation (while at the same time preventing relevant information about target stimuli 
from being obtained by normal means) this is regarded as evidence in support of psi – the 
anomalous process hypothesised to underlie the above chance effect.  
 
For example, Rhine (1938) reports a series of forced choice precognition experiments carried 
out with a number of selected subjects using a deck of 25 cards printed with standard 
geometric symbols, termed Zener cards (Rhine, 1934; also see figure 1). Each deck 
contained 5 cards of each symbol and in each experimental run a subject was tasked with 
guessing the specific order of symbols that would result from a shuffled and dealt deck. 
Moreover, guesses were recorded before the deck was shuffled and dealt. A hit was recorded 
if a guess coincided with the actual symbol at a particular sequential position in the run. 
Therefore, 5 hits per run were expected by chance alone. In this series of experiments, an 
average of 5.14 hits were obtained in a total of 4523 runs. The observed number of hits can 
then be compared to the null hypothesis; that is, the expected score based on mean chance 
expectation of 5 hits per run. From this, the probability of obtaining the observed results by 
chance alone can be derived. The associated 1-tailed p-value for this series was 0.000003 
which would result in rejection of the null hypothesis and might be interpreted as evidence 
for the precognitive hypothesis. However, one could argue that, in such studies, the card 
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shuffling technique used to randomise the order of target stimuli was inadequate. If sufficient 
patterning exists in the sequence of target stimuli, this may increase the likelihood of a 
spurious match between responses and targets, leading to a false positive. For this reason, 
most contemporary precognition studies employ automated randomisation techniques such 
as the use of software-based pseudo-random number generators (pseudo-RNGs) that produce 
an output relatively free of bias.  





Figure 1. Symbols contained in a standard deck of Zener cards used in many forced choice 
studies. In early studies, 25 cards were used in a single deck with 5 cards of each symbol.  
 
 
Honorton and Ferrari (1989) report a meta-analysis of 309 forced choice precognition studies 
conducted between 1935 and 1987. Although all studies included in this meta-analysis were 
of a forced choice design, the authors note that “the studies use a variety of methodologies, 
ranging from guessing ESP cards and other card symbols to automated random number 
generator experiments” (Honorton & Ferrari, 1989, p. 283). Unfortunately, the meta-analysis 
does not provide any information on the number of studies that were testing for intentional as 
opposed to unintentional precognition. However, it will be assumed that the majority of 
studies were intentional tests of extra-sensory ability since the forced choice technique was 
introduced for this purpose. The meta-analysis gave an overall combined z-score of 11.41, 
suggesting that the results were extremely unlikely to be due to chance alone. The authors 
also assessed the influence of a potential file drawer of null studies on their main finding 
using Rosenthal’s ‘fail-safe N’ technique (Rosenthal, 1984). They concluded that an average 
of 46 studies with null results for every reported study in their meta-analysis would be 
required to reduce the main finding to chance level. However, Scargle (2000) argues that the 
fail-safe N technique can overestimate the number of studies in a file drawer required to 
nullify a particular finding because it assumes that the distribution of study effect sizes in the 
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file drawer is unbiased. This is a problem because, by definition, a file drawer will be biased 
to contain fewer positive studies than expected by chance, a factor not taken into 
consideration in the fail-safe N calculation. 
 
The overall effect size reported by Honorton and Ferrari (1989) was very small (r = 0.02). 
However, several interesting relationships emerged from the data. Firstly, effect sizes varied 
according to the degree of feedback given to participants. The largest effect sizes resulted 
from studies that provided trial-by-trial feedback. Studies that provided feedback after each 
run of trials produced the next largest effect size, followed by studies where the feedback 
was delayed (obtained mainly by postal delivery). Studies that provided no feedback to 
participants produced non-significant results with the smallest mean effect size. This 
suggests that feedback may be an important factor in studies testing for precognition and 
studies that provide trial-by-trial feedback to participants may stand the best chance of 
obtaining a positive result. It should be noted that this trend cannot be explained by sensory 
leakage since targets were selected after participants’ responses were recorded. However, 
trial-by-trial feedback does allow for the possibility that participants were learning to 
respond to non-random structure contained in the sequence of trials as a result of poor 
randomisation. Secondly, effect sizes tended to increase as the time interval between the 
response and target selection was reduced. The largest effect size came from studies where 
this interval was on the order of milliseconds, whereas intervals of over a month produced a 
near zero effect size. However, as the authors note, this relationship was confounded with 
degree of feedback. Nonetheless, similar negative correlations have been reported in 
analyses of experiential data where the number of reported precognitive experiences 
decreased as the time interval between the experience and perceived target event increased 
(Green, 1960; Orme, 1974). However, in cases of reported experiences occurring outside the 
controlled conditions of the laboratory, this may have been due to normal cognitive factors 
such as forgetting rather than representing any underlying characteristic of precognition.  
 
An alternative method of testing for intentional precognition is the free response design. 
Here, in contrast to forced choice designs where there are a fixed number of discrete 
responses that can be made for a given trial, the participant’s response is not constrained by 
knowledge about the stimulus set. Instead, stimuli are randomly selected from a much larger 
pool of which the participant has little knowledge or expectation. For example, a large and 
diverse set of photographs collected by the experimenter may serve as the pool from which 
target stimuli are selected at random. Stimuli in free response experiments are typically 
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visual such as realistic photographs or art prints (Krippner, Honorton & Ullman, 1971) but 
dynamic targets such as video clips are also used (Bem & Honorton, 1994). Precognitive free 
response designs usually proceed as follows. Firstly, a receiver is encouraged to describe 
their subjective impressions about a target stimulus (for example, a realistic picture) that will 
be randomly selected from a much larger pool in the future. After this period is over, the 
receiver’s responses are sent to an independent judge who compares them against a set of 
four stimuli (randomly selected from the same stimulus pool). The judge must then decide 
which stimulus is the closest match to the receiver’s mental impressions. After a first place 
match has been recorded, one of the four stimuli is randomly selected as the target. If the 
judge’s selection and the target selection are the same, the trial is a ‘hit’. The final stage 
usually involves presenting the target stimulus to the receiver as feedback. According to 
‘observational theory’ (see Houtkooper, 2002, for a review), this is a necessary step for 
obtaining precognitive effects. Providing the receiver with feedback of the target stimulus 
also seems intuitively analogous to how precognitive experiences are reported to occur. That 
is, it is rare to find a case where the percipient of an experience does not at some point 
become aware of the external ‘target’ event that they have apparently precognised.  During 
the entire free response procedure, care must be taken to ensure that the receiver, judge and 
experimenters do not know the identity of the target stimulus before the judge has selected 
their first place match. In practice, this is easily achieved by randomly selecting the target 
after completion of the judging phase. Results from free response experiments are 
statistically assessed in a similar way to forced choice experiments by comparing the 
observed hit rate with what would be expected by chance. 
 
One of the first formal series of free response precognition experiments was conducted at 
Maimonides Medical Centre, New York, and involved a selected participant, Malcolm 
Bessent, attempting to dream about an audio-visual display that would be presented to him 
the next morning (Krippner, Honorton & Ullman, 1971, 1972). In a typical session, Bessent 
would be sequestered in a sleep laboratory and monitored for signs of REM sleep which has 
been shown to be associated with dreaming. Once a sufficient period of REM sleep had been 
observed, he was woken up and asked to report what he had been dreaming about. Waking 
Bessent fresh from the dream state in this way meant that he could report the details of his 
dream with greater clarity. He was then allowed to go back to sleep but was wakened a 
number of times through the night, each time making a record of his dream impressions. The 
next morning, an experimenter would randomly select a target ‘theme’ comprising of a 
visual and audio display from a pre-arranged pool which was then presented to Bessent as 
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feedback. His dream transcripts were also sent to several independent judges who blindly 
evaluated them against the target display along with a number of randomly selected decoy 
displays and ranked each one according to how similar they appeared to the transcripts. The 
precognitive hypothesis was that Bessent’s dream transcripts would be matched to the target 
more often than expected by chance. Two series of eight dream precognition trials were 
conducted with Bessent as receiver. Child (1985) analysed the data from each series in terms 
of binary hits (i.e., when the target was ranked higher than the median rank for all stimuli in 
the judging set) and found that both series obtained significant results (series 1, p < 0.05, r = 
0.73; series 2, p < 0.05, r = 0.65 (effect sizes reported in Sherwood & Roe, 2003)) which 
suggested that Bessent was dreaming about events that he would experience in the future 
without using inference or deduction. On reviewing the Maimonides studies, which included 
another 11 experimental series investigating dream telepathy, Child (1985) could identify no 
major procedural flaws that may have accounted for the positive results. However, Child did 
point out that the original data had been handed to a number of independent statisticians who 
“must also have influenced the choice of procedures and measures” (p. 1223) and also raised 
concerns that the judging of each transcript against each target in the series was not carried 
out independently and therefore may have violated the independence assumption of the 
statistical tests. 
 
Because dream studies proved to be relatively time consuming, parapsychologists turned to 
another technique, known as the ‘ganzfeld’ procedure, which is aimed at inducing a dream-
like state of consciousness in a relatively short period of time while the receiver is awake and 
able to report their ongoing mental impressions. In this procedure, first used in 
parapsychology studies in the 1970s (Braud, Wood & Braud, 1975; Honorton & Harper, 
1974), the receiver undergoes a period of sensory deprivation and relaxation whereby each 
of the visual, auditory and tactile senses are exposed to a uniform and unstructured input. For 
example, a uniform visual field is created by placing halved ping-pong balls over the 
receiver’s eyes. Similarly, an unstructured auditory input such as white noise is played 
through headphones and the receiver sits in a comfortable reclining chair in order to reduce 
unwanted tactile sensations. It has been suggested that this sensory deprivation and 
relaxation technique facilitates psi by reducing external and internal sources of noise that 
may otherwise mask a relatively weak psi signal thereby increasing the signal to noise ratio, 
an idea that has become known as the noise reduction model of psi functioning (Honorton, 
1977). After a short period of time in the ganzfeld state, simple perceptual disturbances are 
usually reported such as zigzagged lines in the visual field, but after more prolonged 
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exposure (up to ten minutes) more complex, pseudo-hallucinatory images are experienced 
(Wackermann, Pütz & Allefeld, 2000). At this stage, the receiver is instructed to report their 
subjective impressions which are recorded and later sent to independent experimenters for 
judging against the target and several decoys as described previously. In a precognitive 
ganzfeld design, a target stimulus is randomly selected once the mentation session is over 
and the receiver is then either presented with the target as feedback while an independent 
experimenter performs the judging procedure or the receiver performs the judging procedure 
themselves while blind to the target. In telepathy designs there is another participant, called 
the sender, sequestered in an adjacent experimental room concentrating on the target 
stimulus and attempting to telepathically influence the receiver’s mentation. In a 
clairvoyance design, the target picture is displayed in a remote location without any sender 
present. In both the telepathy and clairvoyance designs, the receiver or an independent 
experimenter performs the judging. 
 
Several meta-analyses of the ganzfeld database exist (Bem & Honorton, 1994; Bem, Palmer 
& Broughton, 2001; Honorton, 1985; Hyman, 1985; Milton & Wiseman, 1999; Storm, 
Tressoldi & Di Risio, 2010a). Five out of six meta-analyses report an overall significant 
above chance effect. However, no consensus has emerged on whether these results can be 
interpreted as anomalous cognition rather than being due to flaws in the experimental 
methodology or problems relating to meta-analytical procedures (Hyman, 2010; Storm, 
Tressoldi & Di Risio, 2010b). The most recent meta-analysis (Storm et al., 2010a) was 
aimed at testing the noise reduction model and included both ganzfeld and non-ganzfeld 
experiments. A total of 59 free response studies conducted between 1997 and 2008 were 
included of which 10 were explicitly designed to test for precognition. Three groups of 
studies were formed. A ganzfeld group included studies that used the ganzfeld procedure to 
place receivers in a state of mild sensory deprivation, whereas studies that placed receivers in 
other states that could be regarded as ‘noise reductive’ such as dreaming, hypnosis, 
relaxation and meditation were classified as non-ganzfeld noise-reduction studies. Finally, a 
non-ganzfeld, no noise- reduction group was created from studies in which receivers were in 
a normal state of wakefulness. This meta-analysis found that the mean effect size for both 
the ganzfeld and non-ganzfeld noise-reduction groups was significantly greater than the 
effect size for the non-ganzfeld, no noise- reduction group which was at chance. This finding 
lends support to the noise reduction model of psi suggesting that participants were more able 




One particular theoretical problem should be mentioned here in relation to free response 
precognition studies. Although the target stimulus is typically selected at random after the 
receiver has reported their mental impressions, some studies also involve the receiver acting 
as the judge. The judging procedure involves direct observation of the target and decoy 
stimuli in order to rank each image against the receiver’s mental impressions. Observational 
theories of psi (Houtkooper, 2002) suggest that if the receiver directly observes the target 
and decoy stimuli during the judging phase, this may confound the correct choice of target 
because information about the target and decoys may be obtained precognitively. In effect, 
the judging procedure can be conceptualised as two stages of ‘observation’; initial inspection 
of the entire judging set and subsequent knowledge of the target via feedback. Observational 
theory suggests that examination of the judging set before the actual target is revealed 
provides the receiver with precognitive information about the content of the target and decoy 
images, while explicit knowledge of target identity after the judging phase is complete 
further biases the receiver’s mentation towards features relevant to the target. Therefore, 
although the receiver’s mentation is expected to contain relatively more precognitive 
information relevant to the target, it is also expected to contain some precognitive elements 
relevant to decoy images. These predictions from observational theory suggest that free 
response precognition studies should use independent judges so that the receiver can be 
presented with feedback of the target stimulus in isolation in order to increase the signal to 
noise ratio. Indeed, as noted by Bierman (2010), one of the most successful ganzfeld studies 
involved this very procedure in which receivers viewed the target after their mentation had 
been recorded and attempted to influence their subjective impressions ‘retro-actively’ while 
the judging procedure was performed blind by an independent experimenter (Wezelman, 
Gerding & Verhoeven, 1997). Using this procedure, Wezelman et al. obtained a 44% hit rate 
where 25% would be expected by chance.  
 
In one prospective study designed to test the idea that the receiver, acting as the judge, can 
obtain information about decoys in addition to the target, Bierman (1988) ran 16 ganzfeld 
trials in which the receiver carried out the judging procedure. In addition, a second 
independent judge was presented with the stimulus set containing the target and a randomly 
selected control set of stimuli that did not contain the target and was asked to blindly decide 
which stimulus set they thought, as a whole, matched the receiver’s mentation. After a 
decision had been made, the control set was removed by an experimenter and the same 





 The results showed, firstly, that the receiver tended to correctly identify the target with 
an overall hit rate of 37.5%. Secondly, the independent judge correctly identified the 
stimulus set containing the target 62.5% of the time compared to the control stimulus set. 
Lastly, on occasions where the independent judge ranked the actual target as third or fourth 
place (i.e., a binary miss), they correctly identified the target set 83% of the time. Bierman 
(1988) interprets these findings as evidence suggesting that the receiver obtained 
precognitive information about the decoy stimuli as well as the target stimuli, reasoning that 
on occasions where the independent judge failed to correctly identify the target, they 
nonetheless correctly identified the correct target set above chance, presumably by matching 
information from the receiver’s transcript with the appropriate decoy images. However, 
Bierman (1988) points out that although all effects were in the predicted direction, they 
failed to reach statistical significance and suggests that low statistical power may have been 
a reason for this. Further studies should therefore attempt to replicate this suggestive effect 
using more participants. Alternatively, past studies may be re-examined using fresh 
independent judges attempting to blindly identify the original target set against a randomly 
selected control set using the receiver’s original transcripts. However, since Bierman’s 
hypothesis is that the receiver obtains information about the decoys, in addition to the target, 
it may be better to remove the actual target from the target set in such an analysis in order to 
ascertain whether correct identification of the target set is really due to information relevant 
to decoy stimuli or whether it is entirely due to the target stimulus.  
 
Observational theories also imply that free response experiments using telepathy and 
clairvoyance designs, in which the receiver also performs the judging procedure, can be 
interpreted in terms of precognition since the judging involves observation of the target. For 
example, although only approximately one sixth of the ganzfeld studies included in the 
Storm et al. (2010a) meta-analysis were explicitly defined as precognition studies, it is 
possible that precognition was operating in the majority of studies intended to investigate 
telepathy and clairvoyance. Similar issues could be raised with interpretation of the 
Maimonides dream telepathy studies (Ullman & Krippner, 1989). One may wonder, 
therefore, whether re-examination of previous data would reveal a larger effect for studies 
that only provided receivers with feedback of the target compared to studies in which the 
receiver also acted as the judge.    
                                                          
2
 In this study, the experimenter who interacted with the independent judge was not blind to the target 
set or the target stimulus within the target set, therefore some degree of sensory leakage was possible, 
as acknowledged by Bierman (1988).  
25 
 
Studies of intentional precognition using 
physiological measures 
 
As well as behavioural measures, studies have used indirect and direct measures of neural 
activity in conjunction with explicit precognition tasks. Warren, McDonough and Don 
(1992a, 1992b) used event related brain potentials (ERPs) as the dependent variable in a test 
of precognition using a selected subject, Malcolm Bessent, who had obtained above chance 
results on previous forced choice (Honorton, 1987) and free response studies (Ullman & 
Krippner, 1989). In each trial, Bessent was successively presented with four stimuli on a 
computer screen. During this period, his brain’s electrical response to each stimulus was 
recorded with EEG. The computer then displayed all four stimuli together and Bessent was 
required to guess which one would be randomly selected as the target image. After Bessent 
had made his guess, the actual target was presented again as feedback. The results showed 
that Bessent scored at chance on the forced choice task but analysis of the ERP data showed 
that the evoked potentials associated with the initial presentation of target stimuli were of 
greater negative amplitude than those associated with decoy stimuli. This effect was 
characterised as a negative slow wave appearing between 150 to 500 ms after stimulus 
presentation with the effect being widely distributed over the range of scalp recording sites, 
suggesting that Bessent’s brain was selectively responding to presentation of the target 
image before he was made aware of which stimulus was the actual target. Since the hit rate 
on the forced choice task was at chance, Warren et al. suggest that this was an unconscious 
discrimination between the target and decoy images that did not affect his decision making 
processes.  
 
In a similar study, participants were successively presented with four pictorial stimuli while 
their heart rate was monitored (Sartori, Massaccesi, Martinelli & Tressoldi, 2004). The 
computer then displayed all four stimuli together and participants were required to guess 
which one would be presented to them as the target. Two conditions were used; in the 
clairvoyant condition the target picture was covertly selected, at random, at the start of the 
trial before any physiological responses were recorded, whereas in the precognitive 
condition the target was randomly selected after the participant had viewed all four stimuli 
and responded to the forced choice task. It was hypothesised that, in both the clairvoyant and 
precognition conditions, the mean heart rate while viewing targets would be different 
compared to decoys. This was based on evidence that autonomic nervous system activity can 
act as a marker of unconscious processing (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). 
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The results showed that mean heart rate significantly increased while viewing target images 
compared to decoys in both the clairvoyant and precognitive conditions (p < 0.001 and p < 
0.05 respectively). However, behavioural data showed no above chance guessing suggesting 
that the observed increase in mean heart rate was the result of unconscious precognitive 
processes. In two further studies, this effect was replicated (Tressoldi, Martinelli, 
Massaccesi, & Sartori, 2005) using a design essentially identical to that of Sartori et al. 
(2004); mean heart rate was significantly greater for targets compared to non-targets (p < 
0.05 and p < 0.01 for studies 1 and 2 respectively). The p-values from all three studies were 
reported as two-tailed therefore the significant results cannot be attributable to 
inappropriately tailed tests. However, the reported effect sizes were all very small with no 
result exceeding a Cohen’s d effect size measure of 0.06. An effect size this small may raise 




In another forced choice experiment, Moulton and Kosslyn (2008) measured brain activity 
using fMRI while participants viewed emotional and neutral stimuli. Two stimuli were 
consecutively presented and participants were required to guess which one would be 
randomly selected as the target in the future (the experimental design also included a 
‘sender’ viewing the actual target in a remote location thereby allowing for the possibility of 
telepathy and clairvoyance). It was hypothesised that brain activity associated with viewing 
targets-to-be would be different from decoys. However, the results of this study were null; 
behavioural data showed that participants did not score above chance and no differential 
brain activation for targets compared to decoys was found. Moulton and Kosslyn (2008) 
interpret their findings as “the strongest evidence yet obtained against the existence of 
paranormal mental phenomena” (p. 182), although the authors also note the logical 
difficulties in affirming the null hypothesis. However, one could argue that since their 
behavioural data indicated that participants were unable to guess the target stimuli more than 
expected by chance, this would suggest that psi was not operating on this particular occasion 
                                                          
3
 It should also be noted that the author of the current thesis noticed some discrepancies between the 
sign of the test statistics reported in Tressoldi et al. (2005) and the direction of the effects illustrated in 
Figure 2 of the same publication; the t-value and effect size for Experiment 1 were reported as 
negative in the main body of text yet the heart rate for targets was greater than for non-targets in 
Figure 2. In Experiment 2, the t-value and effect size were both positive and the heart rate for targets 
was also greater than for non-targets as illustrated in Figure 2. Again, in Sartori (2004), the t-value 
reported for the clairvoyant condition was positive whereas it was negative for the precognitive 
condition, yet the heart rate was reported as greater for targets compared to non-targets in each 
condition. It will be assumed that these discrepancies were due to typographical errors and that the 
heart rate was indeed higher for targets than for non-targets in every study. 
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and it is therefore unsurprising that no underlying neurophysiological psi effect was found. 
Nevertheless, a number of previous studies have indeed obtained evidence for underlying 
neurophysiological psi effects in the absence of behavioural psi effects (Sartori et al., 2004, 
Tressoldi et al., 2005; Warren et al., 1992a, 1992b) and therefore this argument is not 
particularly convincing. It might also be reasonable to suppose that the noisy environment of 
an fMRI scanner is not conducive to psi functioning, but again, positive results have been 
obtained using fMRI in at least one other study (Bierman & Scholte, 2002) although there 
were noticeable differences in the design and hypothesis of interest in each case. Perhaps the 
most reasonable explanation for the null results, aside from the non-existence of psi, is that 
the study was underpowered, having run only 19 participants. Indeed, a contrast involving 
the data from one participant did reveal significant differences in the BOLD response 
between targets and decoys in a number of brain areas. However, Moulton and Kosslyn 
(2008) account for this result in terms of differences in the visual and semantic properties of 
target and decoy stimuli presented to that particular participant due to the counterbalanced 
design that was used (stimulus properties were counterbalanced across the experiment but 
not within individual participant sessions).   
 
 
Studies of non-intentional precognition using 
behavioural measures 
 
Intentional precognition experiments involve participants attempting to predict the future by 
paranormal means. However, the majority of reported precognitive experiences seem to 
happen spontaneously and without the conscious intent of the individual (Stokes, 1997). 
Therefore, various studies have used methods designed to measure non-intentional 
precognition. This can be done in various ways, such as allowing participants simply to play 
a passive role in the experiment or by ensuring that participants do not know the experiment 
is about precognition.  
  
Luke, Delanoy and Sherwood (2008) describe a non-intentional precognition experiment in 
which participants were presented with four fractal images on a given trial and asked to 
decide which one they preferred. Each participant completed ten trials in this manner. The 
computer then randomly and covertly selected one image as a ‘target’ for each trial. If a 
participant’s preference matched the randomly selected target, this was designated a hit. 
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Furthermore, if a participant obtained more hits than chance expectation over the ten trials, 
that participant went on to perform a secondary task involving looking at erotic images. 
However, if the participant scored below chance expectation they went on to perform a 
boring vigilance task involving paying attention to strings of digits. Moreover, the length of 
time allocated to performing the pleasant and unpleasant secondary tasks was contingent on 
a given participant’s level of performance in the covert precognition task in that a greater 
number of hits (or misses) resulted in a longer duration for the pleasant (or unpleasant) task. 
The experiment was classed as a study of non-intentional precognition because participants 
were unaware that they had to use any psychic ability in the preference task. Based on a 
model proposing that psi functions to serve the current needs of an individual (Stanford, 
1974), it was predicted that participants would choose the target images more often than 
chance expectation, thus leading to a favourable outcome. This prediction was confirmed; 
the results showed that the target fractals were preferred an average of 2.85 times when 2.5 
was expected by chance, a result that was statistically significant. Participants in this study 
were also classified as erotically reactive or un-reactive based on whether they scored above 
or below the mean on an erotic reactivity scale originally constructed by Bem (2003). In a 
planned analysis, participants who were classed as erotically reactive obtained more hits in 
the precognition task than erotically un-reactive participants. Together, these results suggest 
that an anomalous process was biasing decisions in the preference task in an unconscious but 
goal-directed manner in such a way that participants were rewarded with a pleasant or 
favourable outcome consistent with their particular disposition. Although the authors do not 
discuss potential normal explanations for these results, the randomisation of target fractals 
and their relative on-screen position was checked and found to be within chance expectation. 
Indeed, since trial-by-trial feedback was not provided, this would eliminate the possibility of 
implicit or explicit learning of any small bias that may have been present in the position of 
target fractals. 
 
In a further two replication attempts by Luke, Roe and Davison (2008), participants were 
again presented with a preference task in the same way as in Luke, Delanoy and Sherwood 
(2008). However, there were some procedural differences compared to the previous study. In 
experiment 1, participants were randomly allocated to either a contingent or a non-contingent 
condition. The contingent condition involved a pleasant or unpleasant secondary task, the 
event of which was contingent upon performance in the preceding preference task as before. 
However, the pleasant secondary task did not involve viewing erotic pictures as in the 
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previous study, but involved rating cartoon images for humorousness.
4
 The unpleasant task 
in the contingent condition was comprised of paying attention to strings of digits as in the 
previous study. In the non-contingent condition, the experiment simply ended after the 
preference task, i.e., participants were not given a secondary task to perform. The results, 
when collapsed across both conditions, showed that participants chose the target fractals 
more often than chance expectation. Surprisingly however, when conditions were considered 
separately, the non-contingent condition resulted in a significant above chance hit rate 
whereas the contingent condition was marginally non-significant and in the predicted 
direction, although the difference between these conditions was not significant. This result 
was somewhat inconsistent with the experimental hypothesis since the non-contingent 
condition was not explicitly associated with any reward and was therefore expected to 
generate fewer hits than the contingent condition. In discussing this finding, Luke, Roe and 
Davison (2008) speculate that an eagerness to perform well at the task may have been 
enough to provide an element of reward for participants allocated to the non-contingent 
condition. Nonetheless, the non-contingent condition was abandoned in experiment 2 in 
favour of ensuring that the contrast between the pleasant and unpleasant conditions was valid 
by administering a post-session questionnaire to participants. Experiment 2 followed the 
same basic design as experiment 1 in that the pleasant secondary task consisted of judging 
the humorousness of cartoons whereas the unpleasant task was the same vigilance task as 
previously described. Again, the results showed that target fractals were chosen more often 
than expected by chance, leading to a greater propensity towards pleasant secondary task 
outcomes as predicted. Unfortunately, information about the adequateness of the 
randomisation output was not provided in Luke, Roe and Davison (2008). Therefore this 
potential explanation for the results cannot be addressed.  
 
Precognitive effects have also been reported using reaction time as the dependent variable. In 
a series of studies, Klintman (1983, 1984) reported an apparent psi effect using a variation of 
the Stroop test. In each trial, participants were initially presented with a coloured rectangle 
and were required to name the colour as fast as possible. This was followed by the name of a 
colour-word and they were then required to indicate whether the name of the colour-word 
matched the colour of the previous rectangle. Based on a large body of previous research 
(MacLeod, 1991) the standard Stroop hypothesis predicts that reaction times to the colour-
name would be slower when the colour name mismatched the colour of the rectangle. This 
                                                          
4
 This was due to ethical considerations since participants were recruited by convenience from a 
public exhibition on superstition at the Northampton Museum and Art Gallery. 
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was indeed the case but Klintman also found that when this mismatch occurred, reaction 
times to name the colour of the rectangle were slower even though the match and mismatch 
conditions were randomly determined. This was interpreted as a “time-reversed interference” 
effect, in that the effect of the mismatch condition was able to reach back in time and 
influence the time taken to name the coloured rectangle. A replication was attempted by 
Camfferman (1987) who obtained positive results but concluded that the effect may be 
explained by differences in participants’ level of alertness since the reaction time to name the 
coloured rectangle and the reaction time to name the colour word were not independent. 
Another replication attempt was carried out by Radin and May (2001) who obtained positive 
results. However, their method of analysis differed in many ways to Klintman (1983, 1984) 
and Camfferman (1987). Savva and French (2002) ran three studies attempting to replicate 
Klintman’s original findings. However, when they applied both the analyses used by 
Klintman (1983, 1984) and Camfferman (1987) to the data from their first study, results 
were obtained in the opposite direction in each case with the analysis based on Camfferman 
(1987) obtaining significant results in the predicted direction. A further two studies failed to 
replicate the ‘time-reversed interference’ effect suggesting that the effect is not as robust as 
originally reported  in Klintman (1983, 1984). The fact that different methods of analysis 
produced results in opposite directions is also cause for concern in these experiments and 
suggests that the effects may be artifactual.  
 
Bem (2011) reports another series of experiments examining precognitive effects using 
reaction time measures and other standard behavioural measures. Bem’s approach was to 
take well established psychological effects and to ‘time-reverse’ the order of stimulus and 
response. For example, in one study, participants were given a precognition task that was a 
‘time-reversed’ version of an affective priming experiment. In each trial, a picture (for 
example, a beautiful landscape) was presented on the screen and participants were required 
to indicate as fast as possible whether they thought the picture was pleasant or unpleasant. 
After they made their response, a prime word was briefly flashed on the screen, the valence 
of which was either congruent or incongruent with the picture. The hypothesis was that the 
mean reaction time to pictures on congruent trials would be faster than on incongruent trials 
even though the prime was presented after the response had been made. The results of Bem’s 
first retro-active priming study showed that participants were approximately 15ms faster to 
name the pictures when the prime word was congruent even though the category of trial was 
randomly determined and the prime was displayed after the participant made their response. 
Because the retro-active hypothesis stated that the results would mirror the effect of a 
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standard, non-retroactive procedure, Bem also ran the same participants on a normal, 
forward-priming version of the experiment using the same stimulus materials. This standard 
procedure produced the expected results confirming that responses were approximately 22ms 
faster when a congruent prime was flashed before presentation of the picture. In a second 
study, Bem found the same pattern of significant results; participants were approximately 
20ms faster on congruent trials in the retro-active priming procedure and approximately 
29ms faster on congruent trials in the forward priming procedure. 
 
In another study, termed precognitive habituation, Bem drew on the idea that repeated 
exposure to positively arousing and negatively arousing stimuli renders the stimuli less 
arousing (more neutral) upon subsequent viewing. Previous research established that this 
effect is strongest when the repeated exposure is subliminal (Bornstein, 1989). Therefore, 
Bem reversed the procedural order of events to investigate a retro-active version of this 
effect. Participants were asked to choose which of a pair of strongly arousing, negative 
pictures they preferred. After a response had been made, one of the pictures was randomly 
selected as a target and repeatedly displayed to the participant at a subliminal level. Bem 
hypothesised that subliminal presentation of the target after the preference task would retro-
actively render the target less negatively arousing, biasing participants to prefer the target 
picture over the decoy picture in the preference task. This hypothesis was confirmed with 
participants preferring the target picture 53.1% of the time when 50% was expected by 
chance (p = 0.01). Trials with neutral picture pairs were also administered which obtained 
non-significant results as predicted. In a further replication attempt, Bem introduced 
positively arousing picture pairs and hypothesised that retro-active habituation would render 
the target picture less positively arousing, biasing participants to prefer the decoy picture. 
The results showed that participants did indeed prefer the decoy pictures on trials with 
positively arousing picture pairs and the previous results with negative picture pairs were 
also replicated.   
 
In a final set of two studies, Bem ‘time-reversed’ a facilitation of recall procedure. 
Participants were given a list of nouns and then asked to recall as many as they could. This 
was followed by a practice session on a randomly selected subset of words from this list. 
Normally, rehearsal before recall enhances recall of practiced words. However, in both 
studies, Bem found that a practice session after the recall session resulted in recall of more 
to-be-practiced words, suggesting that the practice session retro-causally influenced recall. A 
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larger effect was found in the second study which involved a deeper level of encoding in the 
practice phase.  
 
In total, Bem (2011) reported nine time-reversed experiments, finding a significant main 
effect in all but one study. Many secondary analyses were also performed on subsets of data 
examining personality variables, gender differences and various stimulus presentation 
parameters but such findings are beyond the scope of this review. The mean effect size 
across all experiments was d = 0.22 which according to Cohen (1988) is suggestive of a 
small effect. A number of criticisms have been levelled at the methodology described in 
Bem’s paper, mostly focussing on the statistical treatment of data. For example, several 
authors have raised concerns over the use of one-tailed tests (Alcock, 2011; Wagenmakers, 
Wetzels, Borsboom & van der Maas, 2011) and others have argued that frequentist statistical 
methods used in null hypothesis testing are problematic (LeBel & Peters, 2011) with some 
suggesting that Bayesian methods be used to assess the evidence for the precognitive 
hypothesis (Wagenmakers et al. 2011; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, Kievit & van der 
Maas, 2011). LeBel and Peters (2011) grant that Bem’s methods often exceed the accepted 
standard of modal research practice in social psychology (Cook & Groom, 2004) but claim 
the extraordinary nature of Bem’s hypotheses and confirmatory results suggest that such 
standards need to be improved. 
 
Several independent replications of Bem’s work have been attempted. Batthyany (2010) 
reports one positive replication of the precognitive habituation effect. Using high-arousal 
negative pictures, the results showed that participants preferred the target-to-be on 53.3% of 
trials, an effect that was of similar magnitude to that obtained in Bem’s original study. 
However, participants in Batthyany’s replication were tested in groups of five, each of whom 
viewed the same trial projected on a canvas (participants indicated their preference on each 
trial by writing on separate scoring sheets). Consequently, responses in each group cannot be 
regarded as independent which may have introduced a statistical ‘stacking’ effect similar to 
that described in the forced choice ESP literature (Davis, 1978) with the result that a p-value 
generated from a statistical test that assumes independence may be misleading. Ritchie, 
Wiseman and French (2012) and Robinson (2011) report exact replication attempts of the 
retro-active recall effect using the same software as used in the original Bem (2011) study. 
The Ritchie et al. study involved three separate replication attempts at independent 
laboratories, all of which failed to find any support for Bem’s original findings despite the 
fact that the experiments were attempting to replicate the study with largest reported effect 
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size (d = 0.42). Similarly, the results from Robinson (2011) were null. However, it is 
possible that a failure to replicate the retro-active recall effect was due to a lack of 
participant naivety about the details of the experimental procedure. During the study phase 
of the retro-active recall experiment, participants are not required to explicitly encode the list 
of words. Rather, encoding is assumed to be incidental since participants are only required to 
visualise each word in the list and are not supposed to be aware of the impending recall test. 
However, if the recall test was no longer a surprise to participants in the replication attempts, 
perhaps because they were made aware of the procedure from prior media coverage of 
Bem’s original studies, they may have been using explicit encoding strategies to memorise 
the words in preparation for the recall test.
5
 Whether this would make a difference to the 
expression of retro-active recall effects remains to be seen but, at least, this may be a reason 
to suppose that these particular replication attempts were not ‘exact’ as one might imagine.   
 
 
Studies of non-intentional precognition using 
physiological measures 
 
Physiological measures have also been used in non-intentional precognition experiments. 
Don, McDonough and Warren (1998) presented self-reported gamblers with playing cards in 
a gambling task while measuring ERPs. Cards were presented one at a time to participants 
while the electrical activity of their brain was monitored. All four playing cards were then 
presented together and participants were required to guess the winning card. Participants did 
not wager any money and performed the task ‘just for fun’. In this respect, the design was 
very similar to the intentional forced choice precognition experiments using EEG described 
previously (Warren et al., 1992a, 1992b). The only difference in this case was that 
participants were unselected for previous psychic ability and were unaware that the 
experiment was testing for precognition. The resulting ERPs associated with targets and 
decoys were analysed and the results showed that there was a significantly more negative 
slow wave associated with viewing targets, with the effect occurring over the left 
hemisphere. This partially replicated their previous findings with a selected subject (Warren 
et al., 1992a, 1992b). In another replication attempt McDonough, Don and Warren (2002) 
ran 20 participants through the same task. Again, ERPs were used to measure any 
                                                          
5
 I would like to give credit to Michael Franklin who put forward this argument in the comments 
section of the online Ritchie et al. (2011) article. 
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precognitive effect and participants were selected for self-reported gambling habits. The 
results were marginally significant and suggested that processing of target stimuli was 
associated with a more negative slow wave but over right hemisphere sites, a result that only 
partially replicated previous findings. Thus, all studies in this series of replications involved 
a negative going component in the resulting ERPs, although as noted by McDonough et al. 
the hemispheric localisation of the effect was inconsistent from study to study. McDonough 
et al. (2002) also note that negative components of ERPs tend to be observed in studies 
involving attentional processing. In particular, they point to previous research identifying 
negative components peaking at approximately 260ms during the processing of infrequent 
stimuli amongst a sequence of frequently occurring stimuli (Näätänen, 1982) and suggest 
that the relatively infrequent target stimulus amongst a group of frequently occurring decoys 
may have been processed in a similar manner. Similarly, McDonough et al. (2002) draw a 
comparison between their results and those of McCallum, Barrett and Pocock (1989) who 
observed a negative going slow wave in frontal regions that was associated with stimuli 
delivered to attended channels in a selective auditory attention task and those of De Jong, 
Kok and van Rooy (1988) who also observed a frontal negative slow wave in response to 
attended stimuli. However, the precognitive ERP effect has yet to be replicated by an 
independent laboratory and the fact that its localisation differed between studies raises the 
possibility that the effect was due to methodological artifacts, perhaps originating from 
choices in data processing (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2011).         
 
Another method of testing for non-intentional precognition has become known as the 
presentiment paradigm. In a typical experiment, some measure of a participant’s physiology 
is continuously recorded while they are presented with a random sequence of dichotomous 
stimuli, such as calm versus emotional pictures. Participants are not instructed to respond to 
the stimuli in any specific way but instead are asked to remain passive while their 
physiological response is measured. For example, Radin (1997b) measured participants’ 
electrodermal activity (EDA) while presenting them with a random sequence of emotional 
and calm photographs. Each trial was initiated by the participant by pressing a key and, after 
a few seconds of blank screen, a randomly determined calm or emotional picture was 
presented for three seconds. This was followed by a blank screen for a few more seconds 
after which the trial was terminated and the participant was free to initiate the next trial when 
ready. Normally, an individual’s EDA increases in response to presentation of an emotional 
picture, whereas it remains relatively inactive in response to a neutral picture. Radin (1997b) 
observed this normal response but also observed higher EDA a few seconds before 
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presentation of emotional pictures compared to calm pictures despite the fact that their 
occurrence was randomly determined. Since participants did not report any conscious 
awareness about which type of stimulus was about to be presented, the data can be 
interpreted as an unconscious anticipation of emotional stimuli, reflected in the activity of 
the autonomic nervous system. Radin (2004) reports a series of replications again using EDA 
as the dependent measure. One study out of three replication attempts yielded a significant 
positive result, with the remaining two experiments yielding non-significant results but in the 
predicted direction. When data from all four experiments was combined, there was an overall 
significant effect and pre-stimulus EDA activity positively correlated with independent 
ratings of stimulus emotionality suggesting that participants were also anticipating the degree 
of emotionality of the upcoming stimulus. However, this correlation was very small and 
achieved statistical significance due to a large number of data points (r = 0.04, p = 0.008, N 
= 4569). Radin also considers a number of alternative explanations for his results including 
sensory and statistical cues, procedural artifacts, selective reporting, fraud and expectation 
strategies but ultimately rejects them. The latter explanation, discussed in detail in Chapter 4 
of the current thesis, concerns a bias that can arise from intra-trial expectation effects 
(Dalkvist & Westerlund, 2006; Dalkvist, Westerlund & Bierman, 2002; Wackermann, 2002). 
Essentially, participants may form an expectation about the upcoming stimulus based on the 
outcome of previous trials. For example, participants may believe that after a long sequence 
of calm trials, the next trial is likely to be an emotional trial (in fact, this belief is fallacious 
since the outcome of each trial is randomly determined and independent). As a result, their 
EDA may increase as a function of the number of consecutive calm trials and reset to 
baseline levels after viewing an emotional trial. If such behaviour occurs, then EDA will 
tend to be at a peak level before presentation of emotional trials which may lead to the 
appearance of a presentiment effect when, in fact, the result is due to an artifact. Radin 
(2004) considers this explanation and rejects it as a plausible account for his results because 
his data did not show that participants’ skin conductance levels were increasing in response 
to consecutive calm trials.  
 
Two successful replications of the presentiment effect have been reported that also measured 
EDA but used randomly presented audio startle stimuli to elicit a physiological response 
(May, Paulinyi & Vassy, 2005; Spottiswoode & May, 2003). Here, instead of trials being 
initiated by the participant, a continuous ‘trial’ was initiated by the experimenter at the start 
of the session and stimuli consisting of either a burst of white noise or a control period of 
silence were presented at random intervals. In both studies, EDA was observed to be higher a 
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few seconds before noise stimuli compared to periods of silence. However, Broughton 
(2004) ran a presentiment experiment using calm and emotional pictures while measuring 
EDA but found no effect despite having selected 220 of the most arousing and 220 of the 
least arousing pictures from the International Affective Picture System stimulus set (Lang, 
Bradley & Cuthbert, 1995).  
 
Two studies report positive results using heart rate as the dependent variable to investigate 
anticipatory responses to neutral and alerting acoustic stimuli (Tressoldi, Martinelli, 
Zaccaria, & Massaccesi, 2009; Tressoldi, Martinelli, Scartezzini & Massaccesi, 2010). 
However, a number of methodological problems can be identified that can potentially 
explain the results of these studies. Tressoldi et al. (2009) followed a simple presentiment 
design whereby each participant was presented with 10 neutral and 10 alerting sounds in 
random order. A significant effect was found in that heart rate before neutral stimuli was 
lower than before alerting stimuli (d = 0.13, p < 0.0001). However, using a fixed number of 
stimuli in this manner may introduce statistical cues that participants may notice and 
capitalise on in order to predict the upcoming stimulus at a rate greater than chance. Indeed, 
the experimental instructions actually informed participants that they would receive 10 
neutral and 10 alerting trials during their session. A participant would therefore have only 
needed to keep a simple count of the number of trials of each category to, at least, predict the 
last trial with certainty. Unfortunately, Tressoldi et al. (2009) do not examine their data for 
this possibility or discuss statistical cueing as an alternative explanation for their results. The 
same methodological issue is present in Tressoldi et al. (2010) where positive results were 
also obtained.  
 
Tressoldi, Martinelli, Zaccaria and Massaccesi (2011) use pupil dilation responses to neutral 
and alerting sounds to test for presentiment effects. They employed a novel design in which 
a preliminary ‘calibration’ session gathered data on individual participant pupillary 
responses to 10 neutral and 10 alerting sounds. For each participant, an average pupil 
dilation measure for each category of stimulus was calculated. Following that, the second 
session involved presenting the neutral and alerting sounds in a random order. However, this 
time, the computer compared the participant’s pre-stimulus pupil dilation on a given trial 
with their individual baseline values calculated from session one. This calculation was 
carried out online during the two second period before stimulus presentation. Thus, if a 
participant’s pre-stimulus pupil dilation on a given trial in session two was closer to their 
neutral baseline value then the computer predicted that the trial was about to play a neutral 
37 
 
sound. If, however, the pre-stimulus pupil dilation was closer to their alerting baseline value, 
an alerting trial was predicted. In this way, a hit or a miss was recorded for each trial 
depending on the prediction that was made from the pre-stimulus pupil dilation data. 
However, the final analysis presented in Tressoldi et al. (2011) consisted of calculating the 
number of hits separately for each stimulus category. They report that the hit rate for alerting 
trials was 60.3% (binomial, p < 0.00001) but incorrectly assume that chance expectation was 
50%. The reason this method of analysis is flawed is as follows. Suppose that in the 
calibration session, alerting sounds caused a participant’s pupils to dilate more than neutral 
sounds resulting in a greater mean baseline value for that category. Now suppose that in 
session two, the same participant’s pupils were on average more dilated compared to session 
one. This could have been due to a number of normal reasons such as adaptation to the 
lighting conditions. If such dilation was extreme (for the sake of argument), an alerting 
sound would have been predicted on every trial in session two leading to a 100% hit rate 
when alerting trials were analysed separately. Of course, the corollary of this scenario would 
be a 0% hit rate for neutral trials and, if all data was considered, the expected 50% hit rate 
would result. Indeed, the data presented in Tressoldi et al. (2011) suggests this pattern of 
results; the hit rate for neutral sounds was 44.6% (binomial p < 0.01), although the authors 
do not report this analysis. A valid method of analysing the data from this experiment would 
simply be to look at the overall hit rate which was 52.4% and significant with a one-tailed 
binomial test (p = 0.03). Therefore, weak evidence for a presentiment effect was indeed 
present in the data.  However an explanation in terms of statistical cueing cannot be ruled out 
here since, like in Tressoldi et al. (2009) and Tressoldi et al. (2010), a fixed number of 
neutral and alerting sounds were administered and participants were made aware of the 
relative frequencies of each type before the session began.    
 
A number of studies have tested for presentiment effects using neurophysiological 
measurements. McRaty, Atkinson and Bradley (2004a, 2004b) report a replication attempt 
using concurrent measurements of skin conductance, heart rate and brain activity. The same 
basic design as Radin (1997b) was used except that the number of calm and emotion trials 
presented to each participant was fixed, although sequenced in a random order. McRaty et al. 
found a significant presentiment effect when they examined heart rate and EEG but no effect 
was found for skin conductance. The EEG data showed that the ERP associated with the pre-
stimulus period was more negative for emotional trials compared to calm trials over left and 
right frontopolar regions, suggesting a possible involvement of attentional processes. In 
another study, Bierman and Scholte (2002) used fMRI to test for precognitive brain activity 
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preceding emotional and neutral pictures. A presentiment effect was found for females who 
showed anticipatory brain activity preceding erotic and violent pictures, mainly in the visual 
cortex. However, males only showed anticipation to erotic stimuli and the results for both 
analyses were marginally significant. The authors therefore regard the study as exploratory 
since a number of analyses were performed on subsets of the data. Furthermore, lack of an 
fMRI presentiment effect in frontal regions is inconsistent with the results of McRaty et al. 
(2004b) who found a precognitive negative going potential preceding emotional stimuli in 
frontal regions using EEG, although the poor temporal resolution of fMRI may have 
contributed to this discrepancy.    
 
Another EEG presentiment experiment was carried out by Radin and Lobach (2007) who 
tested for precognitive anticipation of simple visual stimuli. The design followed closely that 
of Radin (1997b) where participants initiated each trial with a button-press and, after a few 
seconds, were randomly presented either with a flash of light or no flash. A significant 
presentiment effect was only obtained for females with the effect characterised as a more 
positive voltage preceding the flash condition compared to the no-flash condition over the 
occipital region. Males, on the other hand, did not show this effect. However, it is unclear 
why the results from this study were presented separately for each gender (an analysis of all 
the data was not included). Therefore, replication of such gender effects would be required 
before drawing firm conclusions from this study.  
 
Radin and Borges (2009) report a presentiment study testing for anticipatory eye movements 
and pupil dilation before presentation of emotional and neutral pictures. Again, the general 
design was based on that of Radin (1997b). However, in an attempt to increase the effect 
size, the planned analysis compared the 5% most emotional to the 5% most calm pictures 
from the stimulus set, based on their independent ratings of arousal (stimuli were taken from 
the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1995)). They 
hypothesised that emotional pictures would be preceded by greater pupil dilation which was 
confirmed. Like previous studies using EDA as a measure of autonomic arousal, the increase 
in dilation reflected the post-stimulus response to viewing the emotional content of the 
stimulus. In addition, participants moved their eyes to the left significantly more before 
emotional pictures. Radin and Borges (2009) interpret this finding as suggestive of 
precognitive, right-hemisphere processing of emotional valence. However, the emotional 
pictures used in their study may have contained more visually interesting features on the left 
compared to neutral pictures and therefore the anticipatory eye movements may have 
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reflected a precognitive orienting of visual attention. This interpretation is supported by their 
data (Radin & Borges, 2009, figure 7, p. 207) where mean gaze position is biased to the left 
side of emotional pictures when they were actually viewing these stimuli.  
  
 
Summary of laboratory studies 
 
The above review presents a non-exhaustive overview of the range of methodologies and 
findings from studies testing for conscious and unconscious forms of anomalous anticipatory 
effects. Behavioural measures included forced choice, judgement and preference decisions, 
reaction time and word recall, whereas physiological measures included electrodermal 
activity, heart rate, brain activity, pupil dilation and eye movements. The extent to which 
methodological flaws can be identified in each study is variable, with some studies better 
designed to test for precognition than others. The issue of methodological flaws has been 
systematically addressed with regards to experimental paradigms such as the dream ESP 
studies (Child, 1985) and the ganzfeld database (Bem, 1994; Hyman, 1994, 2010; Storm et 
al. 2010a, 2010b). In the case of ganzfeld studies, Storm et al. (2010a) report that the effect 
sizes of studies conducted between 1992 and 2008 did not correlate with methodological 
quality ratings from two independent judges. However, when taking into account the entire 
ganzfeld database (1974 – 2008), they document a slight linear decline in mean study effect 
size over time, although they advise caution in assuming this decline can be explained in 
terms of increasing methodological quality. Indeed, Storm et al. note that a quadratic curve 
fitted to the same data suggests a significant ‘rebound’ in effect sizes due to studies 
conducted after around 2000. Preliminary results from a meta-analysis of all presentiment 
studies conducted to date are reported in Tressoldi (2011). The overall mean effect size for 
the presentiment database was 0.26 (Z = 8.7) using a fixed effects model and 0.28 (Z = 6.07) 
using a random effects model, while an effect size of 0.12 (fixed effects) and 0.13 (random 
effects) was reported for the entire ganzfeld database as a comparison. The results of a 
Bayesian analysis on the presentiment data was also reported which provided strong 
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis. However, Tressoldi (2011) reports these 
findings as a summary of the results of a meta-analysis submitted for publication 
(Mossbridge, Tressoldi & Utts, submitted) and it remains to be seen whether the published 
analysis will provide details on whether effect sizes in the presentiment database are related 
to study quality. Indeed, as described previously, some presentiment studies (e.g., Tressoldi 
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et al., 2009, 2010, 2011) suffer from series methodological weaknesses and one may wonder 




A role for attention in precognition? 
 
Although the existing literature on precognition contains a body of positive studies that 
would benefit from further replication, there has been relatively little research aiming to 
establish whether there are particular cognitive systems that play a central role in the 
expression of these effects. Nevertheless, a number of previous studies investigating 
precognition using non-intentional and physiologically based measures suggest the potential 
involvement of selective attention (Don et al., 1998; McDonough et al., 2002; McRaty et al. 
2004b; Warren et al., 1992a, 1992b). Although psychologists may differ in their precise 
definition of attention, there is general agreement that it is involved in a great deal of 
perceptual and cognitive processing. Furthermore, it is not a unitary phenomenon but has 
various forms tailored to different processing contexts. For example, we can voluntarily 
maintain our focus of attention on certain features of the environment or on internal 
representations such as mental imagery. We can divide our attention between multiple tasks 
and select information from a range of available sources for more detailed processing. 
Attention can also be captured involuntarily by salient stimuli in the environment while 
thoughts and feelings can unexpectedly intrude on our stream of consciousness. 
 
Given the pervasive role of attention in cognition, could this processing system play a 
significant role in precognition? Such a question has not been directly addressed in 
parapsychology with experimental and theoretical studies predominantly focussing on 
memory as a potential substrate upon which the anomalous process presumably underlying 
extra-sensory effects occurs (Broughton, 2006; Irwin, 1979; Palmer, 2006; Roll, 1966). A 
shortage of studies looking at the role of attention is perhaps surprising since the information 
conveyed in reports of extra-sensory experiences often appears to interrupt and demand 
attention, reminiscent of the way a salient stimulus can achieve the same effect.       
 
An experimental paradigm was therefore developed that would allow for a test of 
precognition within the context of a task designed to measure the allocation of attention to 
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visual stimuli using eye tracking techniques. This novel paradigm will be described in the 
next chapter followed by five empirical tests of the precognitive hypothesis using variations 
































Chapter 3: Testing for precognition using eye 
tracking techniques 
 
Development of the current paradigm 
 
This chapter describes a series of experiments using a novel paradigm designed to test for 
precognitive effects in the visual attention system using eye tracking as a behavioural 
measure. In order to examine unconscious forms of precognition, previous studies used an 
experimental design that can be described as a test of whether an individual’s 
neuropsychological system responds to the initial presentation of a stimulus in anticipation 
of its repeated presentation, at a time when no such predictive response could be made. The 
general methodology of this paradigm, here termed sequential presentation, is shown in 
figure 2. Each trial involves measuring continuous physiological activity while a number of 
stimuli (usually four) are briefly presented in sequence. Following this, participants are 
typically given a forced choice task where they are required to guess which one of those 
stimuli will be chosen as the target for that trial (however, the forced choice task is not an 
essential design feature). After a decision has been made, the target is randomly selected and 
presented to the participant again as feedback. When the experiment is complete, 
physiological activity associated with the initial presentation of the target and decoys is then 
compared. This type of design tests the hypothesis that an individual can selectively respond 
to the initial presentation of the target stimulus at a time when its identity cannot not be 
deduced or inferred, whether that selective response is measured via electrodermal activity, 
heart rate, nervous system activity or some other physiological metric. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of studies have used this paradigm in conjunction with 
physiological and neurophysiological measures such as heart rate (Sartori et al., 2004), fMRI 
(Moulton & Kosslyn, 2008) and EEG (Don et al., 1998; McDonough et al., 2002; Warren et 
al., 1992a, 1992b). Of the studies that obtained positive results, the data suggest that the 
selective response to targets was at an unconscious level that did not influence overt decision 
making since overall performance on the forced choice task was at chance. However, the 
overt behaviour probed by the forced choice task may have been insensitive to the level at 
which the selective response to targets occurred. Indeed, a meta-analysis of forced choice 
precognition studies obtained an overall mean effect that was very small (Honorton & 
Ferrari, 1989) suggesting that forced choice tests are a relatively ineffective behavioural 
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means to test for precognition. In addition, a number of studies based on the sequential 
presentation paradigm obtained suggestive evidence for the involvement of attention in the 
expression of anomalous anticipatory effects (Don et al., 1998; McDonough et al., 2002; 




Figure 2. The Sequential Presentation Paradigm: In the study phase, stimuli S1-S4 are 
presented in a random sequence while physiological activity is recorded. The participant 
then makes a forced choice about the target identity. Finally, the actual target is randomly 
selected (in this case S2) and displayed as feedback. 
 
 
If attentional processes underlie this type of anticipatory effect, as previous research 
suggests, use of a behavioural index of attention may be an alternative means to test for 
selective responses to target stimuli. Eye movements represent one such behavioural index of 
the visual attention system. Where and when we move our eyes reflects the kind of visual 
information we have decided to process in detail at a given point in time. Typically, we 
move our eyes approximately three to four times per second (Henderson, 2003; Rayner, 
1998) and the majority of this behaviour consists of a succession of fixations interspersed 
with rapid saccades that serve to reposition the eyes on regions of interest.
6
 Visual 
processing is effectively blocked during saccades so that we do not experience adverse 
motion blur and the vast majority of sensory input is derived from fixations which align 
fixated regions with the fovea, allowing them to be processed to a much higher degree of 
detail. Thus, eye movements are an expression of overt visual selection because they result 
in enhanced processing of regions and features of the visual field by a limited pool of 
                                                          
6
 The eyes are also able to track moving stimuli and while doing so adopt a smooth motion called 
pursuit. However, pursuit does not occur when stimuli are motionless as is the case in the current 





resources. While eye movements reflect overt selection, covert selection refers to our ability 
to shift attention between features or locations of the visual field while our gaze remains 
stationary. Although research has shown that spatial shifts in covert attention can confer a 
certain degree of processing benefit at selected locations in the peripheral field (Eriksen & St 
James, 1986; Posner, 1980), a clearly more effective method of spatial selection involves 
moving the eyes so that the fovea is aligned with the region of interest. 
 
Several factors can influence whether a region or feature of the visual field is selected as the 
target for a fixation. Firstly, selection can be based on the physical properties of a stimulus. 
For example, attention might be involuntarily captured by a stimulus with a unique physical 
feature such as a small patch of red in a uniform grey background which may trigger an eye 
movement to that location. Visual search experiments show that salient distractor items can 
trigger an involuntary eye movement towards their location even when such behaviour is in 
conflict with current task goals (Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn & Irwin, 1998). The physical 
properties of a fixated stimulus can also affect how long gaze remains held on that item 
(Blakely, Wright, Dehili, Boot & Brockmole, 2012), reflecting an influence on attentional 
disengagement. Itti and Koch (2000) propose that the visual cortex constructs a ‘saliency 
map’ representing the structural features of the visual environment based on information 
from sensory pathways such as luminance, contrast, orientation, colour, texture and spatio-
temporal frequency. Regions of the map that represent highly salient features will tend to 
capture, attract or hold overt visual attention. Support for this idea comes from studies in 
which the location and duration of eye movements during scene viewing were correlated 
with the structure of computationally modelled saliency maps (Itti, 2006; Itti & Koch, 2000; 
Parkhurst, Law & Niebur, 2002). 
  
Secondly, selection can be influenced by higher level factors originating from within an 
individual’s neuropsychological system such as memory, goals and expectations. For 
example, early experiments measuring eye movements showed that the location of fixations 
while viewing a painting varied according to the particular task instructions given to 
participants (Yarbus, 1967). Further studies showed that the number of fixations and overall 
time spent looking at objects in scenes varied according to whether participants were 
instructed to search or memorise the scene (Castelhano, Mack & Henderson, 2009). Studies 
have also failed to find evidence that models of visual saliency predict eye movement 
behaviour during scene viewing and that such behaviour is better modelled by taking top-
down influences into account (Henderson, Brockmole, Castelhano & Mack, 2007; Torralba, 
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Oliva, Castelhano & Henderson, 2006). Object memory can also influence attentional 
selection. Chanon and Hopfinger (2008) found that the time spent looking at objects during 
memorisation of a natural scene was greater when the same objects had been part of a 
previous encoding session. However, experimental context may be important for the effects 
of item memory on attentional allocation. Johnston, Hawley and Farnham (1993) showed 
that novel words capture attention when presented together with previously encoded words, 
whereas Christie and Klien (1995) found that familiar items had a greater influence on 
attention than unfamiliar items during a motion detection task.  
 
Thus, previous studies consistently show that eye movements can act as an index of ongoing 
visual and cognitive processing priority and offer a more direct measure of attentional 
allocation than more traditional measures such as reaction time (Duc, Bays & Husain, 2008). 
Therefore, by measuring the location and duration of eye fixations in a precognition task, it 
may be possible to evaluate whether a target stimulus has been prioritised for more extensive 
processing at a given point in time. As far as the current author is aware, only one previous 
study has measured eye movements in a precognition task (Radin & Borges, 2009). 
However, that particular study used horizontal eye movements as an indicator of emotional 
processing. The current set of studies is therefore the first to use eye movements to test for 
precognitive effects in the visual attention system.  
 
Building on the methodology from the sequential presentation paradigm described above, an 
experimental paradigm was developed that would allow for a test of precognitive effects in 
the visual attention system using eye movements as a behavioural measure. Like the 
sequential presentation paradigm, the current paradigm involved the initial presentation of 
target and decoy stimuli followed by the repeated presentation of the target as feedback. 
However, there were a number of differences. Firstly, target and decoy stimuli were 
presented simultaneously in an array, rather than in a sequence, in order to allow the visual 
attention system to express selective responses to each stimulus via eye movements. 
Secondly, rather than imposing forced choice task conditions (as was the case with the 
sequential presentation paradigm), the current experiments required participants to memorise 
the stimulus array in preparation for a recognition test without informing them that the 
experiment was an investigation of precognition. It was thought that presenting the task as a 
‘guessing game’ might introduce response biases that may reduce the experiment’s ability to 
detect potential precognitive effects. For example, analysis of forced choice ESP 
experiments using Zener cards has shown that participants display a tendency to guess each 
46 
 
symbol an equal number of times over the course of their session and tend to avoid guessing 
a symbol twice in a row (Stanford, 1975). Since random sampling will most certainly 
generate unsymmetrical target distributions and target repetitions in forced choice 
experiments, this form of response bias would serve to reduce the signal to noise ratio. On 
the other hand, it was thought that a memorisation task might reduce these particular sources 
of response bias since guessing behaviour would be incidental rather than an explicit 
requirement.    
 
The general design of the current paradigm is shown in figure 3. Each trial consists of a 
study and test phase. In the study phase, four stimuli are presented in an array while eye 
movements are recorded. During this time, participants are asked to attend to and memorise 
each stimulus in preparation for a yes/no recognition test. After a brief retention interval, the 
trial is randomly determined to proceed according to one of two conditions. In the old 
condition, the target stimulus is presented as a probe, whereas in the new condition the probe 
is a previously unobserved stimulus. The yes/no recognition test therefore functions as a 




Figure 3. The current visual attention paradigm: In the study phase, participants are required 
to memorise an array of stimuli, S1-S4, while their eye movements are recorded. After a brief 
retention interval, a probe is presented for a yes/no recognition test. The target (in this case 
S2) is presented as a probe in old trials while a previously unobserved stimulus (S5) is 
presented in new trials. Old and new trials are presented in a random sequence. 
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Description of the general hypothesis 
 
In the current thesis, precognition is defined as an anomalous correlation between present 
cognitive activity and a future event. Accordingly, the precognitive hypothesis proposes that 
the degree of attention allocated to target stimuli during the study phase will correlate with 
the repeated presentation of the target stimulus in the future. Since old trials present target 
stimuli in the future but new trials do not, there will be a difference in attentional allocation 
to targets when old and new trials are compared. In contrast, the null hypothesis predicts that 
there will be no difference. No assumptions are made about the type of information 
processing underlying a selective response to targets in the old condition. Therefore, the 




Dependent variables in the current paradigm 
 
All of the experiments in the present thesis used eye movement variables to probe the 
allocation of attention during the study period. The duration and location of fixations are 
widely acknowledged to reflect processes involved in gaze control (Henderson, 2003). Two 
variables, Total Dwell Time (TDT) and First Fixation Time (FFT), were used and were 
assumed to reflect the degree to which the experimental stimuli were able to hold and attract 
attention respectively. A number of processes are likely to influence these measures such as 
those involved in sensory analysis, object recognition, encoding, maintenance, semantic 
analysis and potential expectations about target status. Each variable was defined as follows: 
 
Total Dwell Time 
 
TDT was defined as the total time spent fixating a given stimulus, measured over the entire 
study period. This was calculated by summing the duration of all individual fixations falling 
on the relevant stimulus. Saccades were not included in this measure, even if the saccadic 
movement traversed the relevant stimulus. TDT is likely to indicate the degree to which a 




First Fixation Time 
 
FFT was defined as the time taken to fixate the relevant stimulus for the first time, measured 
from trial onset to the beginning of the first fixation on the relevant stimulus. FFT is likely to 
indicate the degree to which a given stimulus attracts attention from the peripheral field. 
 
In total, a series of five experiments were carried out using the general paradigm described 
above, each measuring TDT and FFT associated with each stimulus in the array. Experiment 








Experiment 1 was an initial test of the current paradigm that was designed to test for 
precognitive effects in the visual attention system using an experimental design adapted from 
past studies. Participants were presented with an array of real-world objects and were 
required to attend to and memorise each object in preparation for a recognition test. After 
memorisation, two conditions were randomly determined; in the old condition, the target 
object was presented again as a probe in the recognition test, whereas a novel object was 
presented in the new condition. Participants were required to indicate whether they had 
viewed the object before. It was hypothesised that the degree of attention allocated to the 
initial presentation of the target object, as indexed by eye movements, would be different 
between the two conditions. The paradigm was a non-intentional test of precognition since 












50 student participants (41 female, 9 male) were recruited by convenience from the 
psychology department subject pool resource at the University of Edinburgh. The average 
age of participants was 18.9 years (range, 17-31). All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision and were either native or non-native English speakers. Course credit was 
awarded for participation. Participants were required to sign a consent form as 
acknowledgement of the experimental aims, risks and data anonymity. The consent form 
included the right to terminate the session at any time without reason. The experiment met 
the British Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines and was approved by the psychology 





General stimulus characteristics 
 
It was decided that images of real world objects and animals would serve as experimental 
stimuli. Use of such stimuli has several advantages. Firstly, the precognitive hypothesis does 
not make any assumptions about the kind of processing involved in selective responses to 
target stimuli. Studying images of real world objects and animals is expected to involve a 
number of processes such as sensory analysis, object recognition, semantic analysis, 
categorisation and lexical activation (Ungerleider & Bell, 2011). Therefore, use of these 
stimuli does not restrict a test of the precognitive hypothesis to selective responses based on 
one particular level of analysis. In contrast, use of simple geometric shapes restricts selective 
responses to information based on lower levels of analysis which may be the wrong level at 
which to assess the effect of interest. Secondly, use of images depicting real-world objects is 
comparable to a number of contemporary precognition studies of unconscious precognition 
where stimuli comprise of relatively complex, meaningful images (Bem, 2011; Broughton, 
2004; Mcdonough et al., 2002; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2008; Radin, 2004; Radin & Borges, 





Static images were used in the study phase while video clips were used as probe stimuli in 
the test phase. The use of video clips was based on evidence that videos resulted in a 
significantly higher hit rate compared to static images when used as target stimuli in a series 
of ganzfeld experiments (Bem & Honorton, 1994). However, static images were used in the 
study phase because it was felt that an array of simultaneously presented video clips would 




Array stimuli comprised of static images and were constructed as follows. 132 digitised 
colour images of real-world objects and animals were obtained from the internet. Irrelevant 
background was removed from the outer contours of each item using image editing software 
and all digitised images were manually adjusted to be approximately equal in size (mean of 
245 pixels in width and 215 pixels in height). Items were arranged into 33 groups of 4. 
Members of each group were chosen in an attempt to maximise within-group differences in 





Figure 4. Example of an array used in Experiment 1 
 
 
3 groups of stimuli were used in practice trials while the remaining 30 groups were used in 
the experimental session. One item in each group was then arbitrarily selected by the author 
to be the target for that group. Target items in each group were fixed throughout the 
experiment. The remaining three items in each group served as decoys. 3 practice and 30 
experimental arrays were then constructed. Arrays consisted of the four items in each group 
positioned on a uniform grey background (RGB = 192, 192, 192). In each array, the display 
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was divided into four equally sized quadrants and items were randomly allocated to one 
quadrant and positioned in the centre. After this procedure, the position of each item within 
the array did not vary throughout the experiment. Arrays were displayed at a resolution of 





Video clips were created to serve as probe stimuli in the test phase of each trial. Clips were 
taken from the internet and were also created by the author using a digital camera. Each clip 
featured a single item as the central focus of attention. All clips were 10 seconds in length 
and were presented at 30 frames per second at a screen resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. For 
the experimental session, two clips were grouped with each array corresponding to the old 
and new condition; old clips featured the designated target item for the given array while 
new clips featured a new item. Target items featured in old clips were selected to match the 
structural features of the corresponding array image as closely as possible. The items 
featured in new clips were selected in an attempt to maximise visual and semantic 
differences between the new item and all other items in the array. In total, 30 old and 30 new 
clips were created for the experimental session and an additional 3 clips were created for use 
in the practice trials. All participants viewed the same practice trial clips in the same order. 













Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch monitor at a refresh rate of 60Hz. Eye movements were 
recorded using an SR Research EyeLink 1000 table mounted eye tracker, sampling at 
1000Hz and accurate to within 0.01 degrees of visual angle. Participants viewed stimuli at a 
viewing distance of approximately 90cm with binocular vision. However, only the right eye 
was tracked as is standard procedure in the eye tracking literature. The experiment was 
implemented using Experiment Builder (SR Research) and raw data was captured using Data 
Viewer (SR Research). Raw data was then automatically transferred from Data Viewer to 







Participants answered advertisements stating that the experiment was investigating visual 
memory. Upon entering the experimental room, participants were sat comfortably at the eye 
tracker and viewed the following instructions on the monitor: 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment investigating visual memory. In each 
trial, you will be shown a screen containing four everyday objects. This will be 
followed by a short video clip featuring one object. Your task is to decide whether 
the object featured in the video clip was present in the previous screen. During the 
video clip, press the green button for ‘yes’ and red button for ‘no’. Try to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible. 
 
A calibration procedure was then performed requiring participants to fixate nine points 
arranged in a grid on the display which was then repeated for validation. Three practice trials 
were then presented. After the practice trials, participants were reminded of the instructions 
and eye position was re-calibrated.  
 
Experimental trials then proceeded according to the following steps which are summarised in 
figure 6. A drift correction screen presented a fixation circle at the centre of the display. 
When the participant fixated the centre of this marker, the experimenter initiated the trial. An 
array was then presented for 4 seconds while eye movements were recorded. Each array was 
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presented only once and in random order. The computer then displayed a blank screen for 1 
second, after which a pseudo-RNG (using the Mersenne Twister algorithm as a core 
generator) randomly determined whether the trial was in the old or new condition with equal 
probability. If the trial was in the old condition, a video clip was presented featuring the 
target object for that trial. If the trial was in the new condition, a video clip was presented 
featuring a new object not present in the previous array. In the new condition, a given array 
was always followed by the same video clip assigned to that array. Each video clip played 
for 10 seconds and participants could respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with the use of a hand held 
controller at any time during the clip, although they were encouraged to respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible. Once the participant made their response, the video clip 
continued to play for the entire 10 seconds ensuring that all participants viewed the clip for 
the same amount of time. During each trial, the experimenter faced a monitor with his back 
to the eye tracker display. The experimenter’s monitor displayed information about eye 
position and calibration but did not display any information about which particular array was 
being viewed by the participant during the experiment. All participants received 3 practice 




Figure 6. Schematic showing the basic experiment procedure of a single trial in Experiment 
1. A drift correction screen was first presented. After the experimenter initiated the trial, an 
item array was then presented for 4 seconds while eye movements were recorded. This was 
followed by a blank screen for 1 second. The computer then randomly determined whether 
the trial proceeded in the old or new condition. In the old condition, a video clip was 
presented that featured the designated target item for that trial (in this case, a telephone). In 
the new condition, a video clip was presented featuring an item not encountered in the 
previous array. Old and new trials were determined with equal probability. 
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Detection of fixations and saccades 
 
Experiment Builder allows for an interest area (IA) to be drawn around stimuli so that eye 
movements detected within the boundaries of an IA are automatically assigned to the 
appropriate stimulus. An IA was assigned to each item in a given array and was constructed 
by manually drawing a boundary around the item. On average, IA boundaries were 
approximately 5cm from the outer contours of each item which ensured that fixations that 
did not land directly on the item, but were nevertheless directed towards it, were captured by 
the interest area.  Therefore, IAs varied in size and shape between items but remained fixed 
for a given item. All fixations and saccades that landed within an IA were automatically 
assigned to the appropriate item for later analysis. Although it is possible to define IAs after 
data has been collected, all IAs were constructed before data collection and remained fixed 











Emphasis has typically been placed on the importance of randomisation in experiments 
testing for precognition. This is because a test of the null hypothesis requires that the design 
controls for all means of inferring or deducing future events. Randomisation with 
replacement means that a particular outcome of a randomisation event has a constant 
probability throughout the experiment which ensures that outcomes cannot be predicted 
beyond what would be expected by chance. For that reason, randomisation with replacement 
is often used in precognition studies. One possible disadvantage of this method is that one is 
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left with an unequal distribution of outcomes since their overall frequency is not constrained. 
This may be cause for concern if the randomisation procedure happens to produce a 
disproportionate frequency of one particular outcome by chance, to the extent that it may 
affect response characteristics and introduce noise into the data. 
 
On the other hand, an experimenter may choose to constrain the overall frequency of 
outcomes with a balanced design and thus randomise without replacement. However, 
randomisation without replacement means that the probability of observing a particular 
outcome will fluctuate throughout an experimental session and will depend on the outcome 
of previous randomisation events. For example, let us imagine a 4-trial experiment with two 
possible conditions, A and B. Let us also suppose that the design required the same number 
of trials in the A and B condition at the end of the experiment (i.e., 2 of each). The 
probability of observing condition A or B on trial 1 would be 1/2. However, if trial 1 resulted 
in condition A, the probability of observing condition A on trial 2 is now 1/3. Theoretically, 
this may allow for a correlation between participants’ behaviour and the fluctuations in 
outcome probability that result from this method, compromising a test of the null.  
 
It was therefore decided that Experiment 1 use randomisation with replacement to determine 
the trial condition. Thus, the probability of observing an old or new trial was held constant 
throughout the experiment. Although the randomisation was implemented by a pseudo-RNG 
which will contain a small degree of bias, the Mersenne Twister core generator passes many 
stringent test of randomness and its output can therefore safely be regarded as unpredictable 





In Experiment 1, the identity of target stimuli was fixed throughout the experiment. 
Therefore, the precognitive hypotheses were as follows: 
 
1) The mean TDT for target items will be different when old and new trials are 
compared, reflecting a difference in the degree to which target items hold attention 
in each condition. 
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2) The mean FFT for target items will be different when old and new trials are 
compared, reflecting a difference in the degree to which target items attract attention 
in each condition. 
 
According to the null hypothesis, there will be no such differences given that the random 
selection of old and new conditions is not expected to correlate with behaviour during study. 
Since the type of information underlying the hypothesised selective response to targets in old 





Two analyses are reported for each test of the precognitive hypothesis; one with participants 
as the unit of analysis (n = 47) and one with items as the unit of analysis (n = 30). Tests were 
two-tailed unless specified otherwise. In addition, a Bonferroni correction for two 
comparisons (TDT and FFT) was applied to each test of the precognitive hypothesis. Effect 
sizes are reported as Cohen’s d. Data trimming procedures were applied post-hoc to assess 







Data from 3 participants was excluded before statistical analysis due to a poor eye tracking 
signal, leaving data from 47 participants (38 female, 9 male) with an average age of 18.9 
years (range 17 – 31). In addition, data from trials in which participants responded either 
incorrectly or gave no response were excluded from further analysis. This was to ensure that 







Reaction Times and Response Accuracy 
 
The mean reaction time in the recognition task was 1298ms in the old condition and 2466ms 
in the new condition, which was found to be significantly different, t(46) = -8.36, p < 0.0001. 
This is likely to reflect differences in the time taken to attend to items in old and new video 
clips due to differences in their dynamic properties. Overall accuracy was high with 97.0% 
and 96.6% correct responses to probe stimuli in old and new trials respectively. This 
supports the validity of the experimental manipulation since items in old video clips were 
almost always identified as being old and vice versa for items in new video clips.    
 
 




Table 1 shows the relationship between array position and the sequence in which items were 
fixated for the first time. In general, items occupying the top left position of the array 
(position 1) were fixated first, followed by the top right (position 2), bottom right (position 
4) and then bottom left (position 3). A similar relationship can be seen when FFT is 
examined for each position in the array, collapsed across conditions (see figure 8). Items in 
position 1 are fixated the earliest, followed by position 2, while items in position 3 and 4 are 
fixated last. A one way ANOVA on FFT with array position as a factor revealed a highly 
significant effect of position, F(3,46) = 133.6, p < 0.0001. This suggests that participants 
adopted an approximately clockwise viewing behaviour with a strong tendency to fixate the 
top left item first. This may reflect behaviour that occurs during reading where, in the 
English language, the top left word in a passage of text tends to be read first. However, items 
were sometimes re-examined multiple times after other items in the array had been fixated. 
Figure 8 also shows that mean TDT decreased as a function of array position with items in 
position 1 holding the greatest degree of attention while items in position 3 and 4 held the 
least degree of attention. This decrease was significant as revealed by a one way ANOVA on 
TDT with array position as a factor, F(3,46) = 38.99, p < 0.0001, and was perhaps due the 
approximately clockwise pattern of viewing behaviour adopted by the majority of 
participants during study. In other words, extensive viewing of late-fixated items occupying 
position 3 and 4 may have been interrupted by the termination of the study array.  
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Targets vs. decoys 
 
Overall, the TDT for decoys (M = 797.9, SD = 38.1) was greater than for targets (M = 727.4, 
SD = 65.5), t(46) = 6.1, p < 0.0001, d = 1.32, and the FFT to targets (M = 1406.3, SD = 
185.5) was greater than for decoys (M = 1357.2, SD = 143.4), t(46) = 3.07, p <0.01, d = 0.30 
suggesting that decoys were fixated earlier and for longer.
7
 Since targets and decoys were 
arbitrarily selected before the experiment and fixed in position, this result is likely to reflect 
intrinsic differences in their visual and semantic properties and their average position in the 
array. 
   Sequence  
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th  
          
         Array position 
Array 
Position 
1 81.1 12.9 2.6 3.4 
2 11.4 67.3 8.5 12.7 
3 4.8 15.2 21.4 58.6 
4 2.7 4.5 67.5 25.2 
 










 as a function of 




Figure 8. Mean TDT (ms) and mean FFT (ms) to all items as a function of position in the 
array in Experiment 1. 
                                                          
7
 The smaller standard deviations for decoys are a consequence of averaging across three stimulus 







































The pseudo-RNG generated 802 trials in the old condition and 608 trials in the new 
condition. Since the ratio of old to new trials should have been approximately 1:1, this 
difference alone represented somewhat of an anomaly. Therefore, the current author 
presented this data to SR Research (designers of the eye tracking software used in the current 
thesis) and it was discovered through further correspondence that the discrepancy in output 
could be traced to an unexpected bug in the Experiment Builder eye tracking software. The 
difference in frequency between old and new trials was tested with a chi-squared goodness 
of fit test and was found to be highly significant, X
2
 (1, 1410) = 26.4, p < 0.0001. It was 
therefore concluded that the sequence of trial conditions was unlikely to have been 
adequately random and may have contained a significant degree of underlying structure. 
Even though visual inspection of the trial sequence for each participant did not reveal any 
obvious repeating pattern, the potential presence of bias in the sequence of trial conditions 
limits conclusions that can be drawn from tests of the precognitive hypothesis. 
 
 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 1 shows the mean TDT for target and decoy items in the old and new conditions. The 
results show that target items were fixated approximately 44 ms longer in the old condition 
compared to the new condition. Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests suggested that 
TDT data for old and new targets was normally distributed (participants, old, D(47) = 0.128, 
p > 0.2; new, D(47) = 0.116, p > 0.2, items, old, D(30) = 0.124, p > 0.2; new, D(30) = 0.127, 
p > 0.2 ), therefore parametric tests were used in the planned analysis. A paired t-test 
confirmed that this difference was statistically significant; participants, t(46) = 2.41, p = 0.02 
(with Bonferroni correction), d = 0.51; items, t(29) = 2.10, p = 0.04 (with Bonferroni 
correction), d = 0.32. In addition, the TDT for decoys was greater in new trials compared to 
old trials suggesting that the increase in target TDT for old trials was not the result of a 
general increase in dwell time over all items in the old condition, but rather, a selective 
response to targets. In order to assess whether this result was due to the influence of outliers, 
a 10% trim was applied to the raw data. 5% of data points with the highest TDT values and 
5% of data points with the lowest TDT values were removed. This removed all TDT values 
above 1403ms and less than 299ms. After this trimming procedure, the data showed that 
target items were fixated approximately 30ms longer in the old condition compared to the 
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new condition. However, only the analysis by participants was significant with the trimmed 
data; participants, t(46) = 2.47, p = 0.02 (with Bonferroni correction), d = 0.42; items, t(29) = 
1.47, p = 0.15 (with Bonferroni correction), d = 0.29. Therefore, trimming the data appeared 
to somewhat reduce the effect which may suggest that outliers were influencing the results 
from the untrimmed data. The TDT results can only be regarded as suggestive evidence in 
favour of hypothesis 1 for this reason. However, it should also be noted that the sequence of 
trial conditions was biased which brings this result into further doubt.  
 
 Old New 
Target 748.7 (80.2) 703.7 (95.8) 
Decoy 792.0 (44.1) 804.8 (45.4) 
 
Table 1. Mean TDT (ms) for targets and decoys in old and new trials. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. Values shown are for participant means from untrimmed data. 
 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 2 shows the mean FFT for target and decoy items in the old and new conditions. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests suggested that FFT data for old and new targets 
was normally distributed (participants, old, D(47) = 0.106, p > 0.2; new, D(47) = 0.125, p > 
0.2, items, old, D(30) = 0.118, p > 0.2; new, D(30) = 0.112, p > 0.2 ), therefore parametric 
tests were used in the planned analysis. The mean FFT for targets did not significantly differ 
between the old and new condition; participants, t(46) = 0.16, p = 0.87, d = 0.03; items, t(29) 
= 0.88, p = 0.39, d = 0.01. Applying a 10% trim to the raw data did not affect this result; 
participants, t(46) = 0.05, p = 0.96, d = 0.01; items, t(29) = 0.72, p = 0.48, d = 0.09. 
Therefore hypothesis 2 was not confirmed. 
 
 Old New 
Target 1414.5 (246.0) 1406.2 (266.1) 
Decoy 1343.3 (156.6) 1377.4 (170.9) 
 
Table 2. Mean FFT (ms) to targets and decoys in old and new trials. Standard deviations are 







Experiment 1 was an initial test of the novel experimental paradigm developed in the current 
thesis that was designed to examine the hypothesis that visual attention can selectively 
respond to target stimuli in anticipation of their repeated presentation in the future. As far as 
the current author is aware, this is the first time that eye movements have been used to 
directly probe visual attention for the presence of precognitive effects. One previous 
experiment (Radin & Borges, 2009) used eye tracking to test for horizontal eye movements 
preceding presentation of emotional and calm pictures. However, that study was not 
designed to directly probe the activity of visual attention as was done here. Therefore, the 
current paradigm contributes to the existing literature in this regard.  
 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that although there was no difference in first fixation 
time when old and new trials were compared, participants spent more time fixating target 
items in the old condition compared to the new condition. This appeared to support 
hypothesis 1 and suggests that target items were more effective at holding attention in old 
trials. In contrast, the results for FFT were non-significant suggesting that even though target 
items held attention for a longer period of time, they did not attract attention from the 
periphery any more in the old condition. This null result may have been due to the strong 
tendency for participants to fixate items in a specific order. For example, approximately 80% 
of items in the top left of the array were the first to be fixated which may have significantly 
lessened the paradigm’s ability to detect a precognitive effect in the FFT data. 
 
There are several potential explanations for the significant results observed in the TDT 
comparison. Firstly, one may argue that participants obtained information about targets by 
normal sensory channels, termed sensory leakage. Parapsychology experiments that aim to 
test for contemporaneous psi effects such as telepathy are particularly prone to criticism 
based on sensory leakage because the target stimulus and response co-occur in time. 
However, in precognitive designs, issues of sensory leakage are nullified since the critical 
manipulation occurs after responses have been recorded. Here, probe stimuli were presented 
after eye movements were recorded; therefore, there is no possibility that participants could 
have acquired sensory information about the trial condition. In addition, since the probe 
video clip was randomly selected by the computer at least one second after the recording 
period had ended, there was no possibility of participants picking up on subtle auditory cues 
as a result of the processes involved in accessing the video clip from the computer’s hard 
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drive. However, in Experiment 1 the experimenter knew the identity of the fixed target items 
and was present in the experimental room for purposes of monitoring the adequacy of eye 
movement calibration during each session. Thus, it is conceivable that the experimenter 
could have alerted the participant to the identity of the target item by some unconscious 
manner. However, this could not have provided the participant with any information 
predictive of the trial condition because the experimenter was blind to this aspect of the 
experiment. 
 
A second and more likely explanation is based on the fact that the output of the pseudo-RNG 
was biased and produced many more old trials than would be expected by chance. It is 
therefore possible that the sequence of old and new trials presented to each participant 
contained an underlying structure, a possibility that inevitably brings confirmation of 
hypothesis 1 into doubt. If it is assumed that a systematic bias in the sequence of old and new 
trials was present, then participants may have learned and responded to this underlying 
structure as each experimental session progressed. Indeed, Brugger and Taylor (2003) 
propose that positive results from forced choice ESP tests, in which participants are often 
given long runs of trials with feedback, may be explained by implicit sequence learning 
(Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). Furthermore, they suggest that implicit sequence 
learning may, in principle, account for the results of any forced choice ESP experiment that 
involves feedback (and, presumably, a sufficient number of trials) because all methods of 
randomisation, including those of ‘true’ RNGs, will contain a small degree of bias. This 
argument may have merit when applied to early forced choice ESP studies in which 
randomisation was based on relatively crude means such as manual shuffling of cards 
(Rhine, 1934). However, modern pseudo-RNGs such as the Mersenne Twister (used here) 
pass stringent tests of randomness (L’Ecuyer & Simard, 2007) and the number of 
randomisation events before this core generator repeats its output is well in excess of the 
number of trials administered to individual participants, which would seem to make learning 
of any underlying structure implausible. Nevertheless, since the actual data from Experiment 
1 suggests that the sequence of trial conditions was biased, the implicit sequence learning 
hypothesis can at least be tested here, albeit in a post-hoc manner. If participants were indeed 
learning to respond to a bias in the sequence of old and new trials, we would expect the TDT 
effect to increase over the course of individual sessions. As can be seen from figure 9, a plot 
of this relationship shows that, contrary to the implicit learning hypothesis, there is a 
decrease in the TDT effect over time rather than an increase. However, the trend is not 
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significant (r = -0.07, n = 30). It should be noted that since the plot is not cumulative, the 








Although this analysis does not support the implicit sequence learning hypothesis, it cannot 
be ruled out as an explanation since a more complex pattern of learning may exist that is not 
detectable by a simple linear correlation. However, confirmation of hypothesis 1 was not the 
result of a general increase in TDT over all items in the array. Rather, TDT increased for 
targets and decreased for decoys when old and new trials were compared. Therefore, for 
participants to have produced this result by implicit sequence learning, they must have been 
able to reliably predict both the trial condition and the position or identity of the target over 
the course of the session. Target items were arbitrarily selected by the current author before 
the experiment began rather than being selected at random during the experiment, therefore 
it is possible (but perhaps not likely) that participants acquired implicit knowledge of target 
identity through shared preference with the current author and were able, in conjunction with 
sequence learning, to bias their eye movements accordingly. 
 
Because of the difficulty in interpreting the positive results of Experiment 1 due to the 
reasons described above, Experiment 2 was carried out as an exact replication of Experiment 





































Experiment 1 obtained a significant difference in target TDT between the old and new 
condition. In this respect, the results were promising. However, the biased output of the 
process used to randomise the sequence of trial conditions meant that interpretation of this 
finding was problematic. The data was examined for the presence of implicit learning effects 
that might have arisen from responses to subtle patterns in the sequence of trials in each 
session. Although the data did not directly support the sequence learning hypothesis, caution 
should nonetheless be exercised when ruling out an explanation of the results of Experiment 
1 in terms of statistical learning. In light of this methodological issue, an exact replication of 
Experiment 1 was carried out in Experiment 2 with proper randomisation in order to see 
whether the effect would replicate under these conditions. In other respects, Experiment 2 
was identical to that of Experiment 1 except for the recruitment of a new set of participants 










60 student participants (43 female, 17 male) were recruited by convenience from the 
psychology department subject pool resource at the University of Edinburgh. The average 
age of participants was 18.9 years (range, 18-24). All participants had normal or corrected to 
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normal vision and were either native or non-native English speakers. Course credit was 
awarded for participation. Participants were required to sign a consent form as 
acknowledgement of the experimental aims, risks and data anonymity. The consent form 
included the right to terminate the session at any time without reason. The experiment met 
the British Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines and was approved by the psychology 





The procedure was the same as used in Experiment 1 except for a correction to the 
randomisation process. The software bug present in the SR Research Experiment Builder 
software, identified from Experiment 1, was caused by use of the Python function 
random.randint(a,b) within a particular Experiment Builder graphical interface function. A 
correspondence from SR Research recommended that an alternative method be used by 
which the same Python randomisation function could be used without causing a biased 
output. This new procedure was implemented in Experiment 2 which did not affect any other 








Eye tracking signals were adequate for all participants, therefore no individual participant 
data was excluded. Data from trials in which participants responded either incorrectly or 
gave no response were excluded from further analysis. This was to ensure that only those 







Reaction Times and Response Accuracy 
 
The mean reaction time in the recognition task was 1227ms in the old condition and 2384ms 
in the new condition. Overall accuracy was high with 96.3% and 98.6% correct responses to 
probe stimuli in old and new trials respectively. This supports the validity of the 
experimental manipulation since probe items in old video clips were almost always 
identified as being old and vice versa for items in new video clips.    
 
 




Table 3 shows the relationship between array position and the sequence in which items were 
fixated for the first time. The data shows that, on average, items in position 1 were fixated 
first, followed by position 2, position 4 and finally position 3. This trend is reflected in the 
FFT data collapsed across all items and conditions (see figure 10) which shows that items in 
position 1 were fixated the earliest, followed by position 2, while items in position 3 and 4 
were fixated last. A one way ANOVA on FFT with array position as a factor revealed a 
highly significant effect of position, F(3,59) = 158.9, p < 0.0001. This pattern of results 
closely mirrors that of Experiment 1 and shows that participants again tended to adopt a 
clockwise pattern of viewing behaviour. In addition, the TDT decreases as a function of 
array position with items in position 1 having the longest dwell time in a similar manner to 
Experiment 1.  
 
Targets vs. decoys 
 
Overall, the TDT for decoys (M = 774.1, SD = 52.0) was greater than for targets (M = 717.6, 
SD = 70.4), t(59) = 6.42, p < 0.0001, d = 0.91, and the FFT to targets (M = 1374.3, SD = 
153.2) was greater than for decoys (M = 1325.0, SD = 162.2), t(59) = 3.14, p <0.01, d = 0.31 
suggesting that decoys were fixated earlier and for longer. Again, this data is comparable to 





  Sequence  
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th  
          
         Array position 
Array 
Position 
1 82.7 9.6 3.1 4.5 
2 10.5 68.8 7.6 13.0 
3 4.8 15.2 24.5 55.4 
4 1.9 6.3 64.8 27.0 
 










 as a function of 
position in the array.  Array positions were 1 (top left), 2 (top right), 3(bottom left), 4 (bottom 
right). 
 
   
Figure 10. Mean TDT (ms) and mean FFT (ms) to all items as a function of position in the 




The pseudo-RNG generated 864 trials in the old condition and 936 trials in the new 
condition. A chi-squared goodness of fit test confirmed that the distribution of old and new 
trials was not significantly different, X
2
 (1, 1800) = 2.8, p = 0.09. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 4 shows the mean TDT for target and decoy items in the old and new conditions. 




































was normally distributed (participants, old, D(60) = 0.081, p > 0.2; new, D(60) = 0.121, p > 
0.2, items, old, D(30) = 0.095, p > 0.2; new, D(30) = 0.070, p > 0.2 ), therefore parametric 
tests were used in the planned analysis. The results show that the TDT for targets was less in 
old compared to new trials but this difference was not statistically significant; participants, 
t(59) = -0.77, p = 0.44, d = -0.12; items, t(29) = -0.26, p = 0.80, d = -0.03. A 10% trim on the 
raw data did not affect this result; participants, t(59) = -1.14, p = 0.26, d = -0.26; items, t(29) 
= -1.77, p = 0.09, d = -0.21. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not confirmed.  
 
 
 Old New 
Target 711.2 (93.1) 722.1 (87.7) 
Decoy 775.5 (60.7) 773.3 (55.1) 
 
Table 4. Mean TDT (ms) for targets and decoys in old and new trials. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. Values shown are for participant means from untrimmed data. 
 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 5 shows the mean FFT for target and decoy items in the old and new conditions. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests suggested that FFT data for old and new targets 
was normally distributed (participants, old, D(60) = 0.100, p > 0.2; new, D(60) = 0.091, p > 
0.2, items, old, D(30) = 0.097, p > 0.2; new, D(30) = 0.103, p > 0.2 ), therefore parametric 
tests were used in the planned analysis. The mean FFT for targets did not significantly differ 
between old and new trials; participants, t(59) = -0.61, p = 0.55, d = -0.12; items, t(29) = -
0.72, p = 0.48, d = -0.04. A 10% trim on the raw data did not affect this result; participants, 
t(59) = 0.02, p = 0.98, d = 0.004; items, t(29) = -0.09, p = 0.93, d = -0.004.  Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 was not confirmed.  
 
 
 Old New 
Target 1360.9 (287.7) 1386.9 (239.1) 
Decoy 1298.6 (160.3) 1353.3 (192.0) 
 
Table 5. Mean FFT (ms) to targets and decoys in old and new trials. Standard deviations are 





Experiment 2 was an attempt to replicate the preliminary findings from Experiment 1 with 
adequate randomisation. The results provided no support for the precognitive hypothesis; 
there was no difference in target TDT and FFT when old and new trials were compared. 
There are a number of potential explanations for this failure to replicate. Firstly, it may 
simply suggest that the null is true. In Experiment 1, randomisation was affected by a 
software error and, consequently, many more old trials were produced than expected by 
chance. The results from Experiment 1 may therefore have been due to the presence of bias 
in the trial sequence. In contrast, when there was no obvious bias in the random selection of 
trial conditions in Experiment 2, there was no effect in the data. However, post-hoc analysis 
of the data from Experiment 1 revealed no clear pattern that would suggest implicit learning 
of a bias in the sequence of old and new trials and, in fact, the data seemed to indicate that 
the effect diminished over each session. Alternatively, the results from Experiment 1 may 
have been due to chance, with the bias in RNG output playing an insignificant role. 
Alternatively, the null may actually be false and the failure to replicate the results of 
Experiment 1 indicates that the precognitive effect is unreliable under the current 
experimental conditions. However, the absence of a theoretical framework for precognition 
means that there are many design factors that could, in principle, be held responsible for a 
failure to replicate the initial effect.  
 
One factor that could have potentially contributed to poor replicability is the type of 
encoding occurring during study. Two main forms of encoding are available to participants 
during memorisation of real-world objects in the current paradigm; verbal encoding whereby 
the name of the object is encoded in a phonological store (Baddeley, 1986) and visual 
encoding whereby the visual features of the object are encoded in a visuo-spatial 
‘scratchpad’ (Logie, 1986). Once encoded, each temporary store of information is 
maintained by a rehearsal mechanism. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were free to 
memorise each item using a visual or verbal encoding strategy, or a combination of 
strategies. It is therefore possible that the apparent precognitive effect observed in 
Experiment 1 was largely dependent on one or the other of these encoding strategies. 
 
Two further experiments were therefore carried out. In Experiment 3A, video clips were 
presented as probes in the same way as Experiments 1 and 2. This served as a further attempt 
to replicate the effect under the same conditions as the previous studies. However, 
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Experiment 3B presented object names as probes in the recognition test. Accordingly, 
participants would be encouraged to adopt a verbal encoding strategy in order to carry out 
the recognition task effectively. Several methodological changes were also made to 
Experiments 3A and 3B. Firstly, target items were randomly selected from all available 
items in the array which ensured that targets and decoys were sampled from the same 
population of stimuli. Secondly, the position of items in the array was randomised. These 
changes to the randomisation scheme allowed for a comparison between target items in the 
old condition and all items in the new condition since the latter were categorically identical 
according to the precognitive hypothesis.  
 
 
Experiment 3A and 3B: Improving randomisation 




The results of Experiment 1 did not replicate in Experiment 2. This may have been due to a 
number of factors. Firstly, the null hypothesis may be true and the results of Experiment 1 
can be interpreted in terms of inadequate randomisation or chance. Alternatively, the null 
may be false and the experimental conditions may not have been optimal for the effect to 
replicate across Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 3A was designed as a further attempt to 
replicate the apparent effect observed in Experiment 1 while Experiment 3B was designed to 
explore whether encouraging participants to use a verbal encoding strategy would result in a 
more reliable effect. Accordingly, participants in Experiment 3A were presented with video 
clips in the test phase, as in Experiments 1 and 2. However, participants in Experiment 3B 
were presented with object names in the test phase, thus encouraging them to verbally 
encode the study items in order to perform the recognition task effectively. Three additional 
methodological changes were also implemented; target items were randomly selected from 
all available items in the array and the position of each item in the array was randomised. 
Thirdly, the stimulus set used in Experiments 1 and 2 was amended to include a number of 








50 student participants were recruited for both Experiments 3A and 3B (3A, 37 female, 13 
male; 3B, 34 female, 16 male). The average age of participants was 20.7 years for 
Experiment 3A (range, 18-31) and 19.9 years for Experiment 3B (range, 18-28). All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and were either native or non-native 
English speakers. Course credit was awarded for participation. Participants were required to 
sign a consent form as acknowledgement of the experimental aims, risks and data 
anonymity. The consent form included the right to terminate the session at any time without 
reason. The experiment met the British Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines and was 






55 of the array items used in Experiment 1 and 2 were used in Experiment 3. In addition, 65 
new digitised colour photographs of real-world objects and animals were added to make a 
total of 120 items used in experimental trials. The new items were introduced to make it 
easier to construct corresponding target video clips. Images of real-world objects were 
obtained from internet sources and their background was removed using image manipulation 
software. Experimental items were then arranged into 30 groups of 4 while attempting to 
maximise within-group differences in their visual and semantic properties. Arrays were 
displayed at a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. 3 groups of items were used in practice trials 
while the remaining 30 groups were used in the experimental session. During runtime, the 




Experiment 3A: Video clips featuring each array item and an additional new item were 
created to make a total of 150 experimental video clips. Five video clips were grouped with 
each array; four clips featuring array items and one clip featuring a new item not present in 
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the array. The new item videos were created with an effort to maximise visual and semantic 
differences between the new item and all other items in the array. All video clips were 10 
seconds in length and were presented at 30 frames per second at a screen resolution of 1024 
x 768 pixels.  
 
Experiment 3B: Arial text at font size 40 was used for all item names in the test phase. Text 






Participants answered advertisements stating that the experiment was investigating visual 
memory. Before each session began, participants were randomly allocated to either 
Experiment 3A or 3B. Upon entering the experimental room, participants were sat 
comfortably at the eye tracker and viewed instructions displayed on the monitor. A 
calibration procedure was then performed requiring participants to fixate nine points 
arranged in a grid on the display which was then repeated for validation. Three practice trials 
were then presented. After the practice trials, participants were reminded of the instructions 
and eye position was re-calibrated.  
 
Experimental trials then proceeded according to the following steps which are summarised in 
figure 11. All randomisation events were implemented using the Mersenne Twister as a core 
generator (Matsumoto & Nishimura, 1998). A drift correction screen presented a fixation 
circle at the centre of the display. When the participant fixated the centre of this marker, the 
experimenter initiated the trial. The computer then randomly selected the position of each 
item within the array. The array was then presented for 4 seconds while eye movements were 
recorded. Each group of items was presented only once and in random order. A blank screen 
was then displayed for 1 second, after which the computer randomly determined the trial 
condition and which item from the array would serve as the target for that trial. If the trial 
was in the old condition, the target was presented as a probe item. If the trial was in the new 
condition, a new item was presented. Video clips were presented as probes in Experiment 3A 
and object names were presented as probes in Experiment 3B. In the new condition, a given 
array was always followed by the same probe item assigned to that array. Each probe item 
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was presented for 10 seconds and participants could respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with the use of a 
hand held controller at any time during the clip, although they were encouraged to respond 
as quickly and accurately as possible. Once the participant made their response, the probe 
item remained on the display for the entire 10 seconds ensuring that all participants viewed 
probe items for the same amount of time. During each trial, the experimenter faced a monitor 
with his back to the eye tracker display. The experimenter’s monitor displayed information 
about eye position and calibration but did not display any information about which particular 
array was being viewed by the participant during the experiment. All participants in 





Figure 11. The basic experimental procedure of a single trial in Experiments 3A and 3B. A 
drift correction screen was first presented. Once the central circle was fixated, the 
experimenter initiated the trial and the computer randomly determined the position of items 
within the array. The array was then presented for 4 seconds while eye movements were 
recorded. After a blank screen, the computer randomly determined the target item and the 
trial condition. Video clips were presented as probe items in Experiment 3A whereas object 
names were presented as probe items in Experiment 3B. 
 
 
Detection of fixations and saccades 
 
Interest areas were drawn in each quadrant of the array and were 400 pixels in width and 300 
pixels in height. These dimensions were sufficient to surround all items and ensured that 
fixations that did not land directly on the item, but were nevertheless directed towards the 
item, were captured by the interest area. All fixations and saccades that landed within an IA 
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were automatically assigned to the appropriate item for later analysis. All IA’s were 
constructed before data collection, remained fixed in size and position and were invisible to 





In Experiments 3A and 3B, target and decoy items were randomly selected from the same 
population of items rather than being fixed as in Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, a test of the 
precognitive hypothesis could compare targets in the old condition with all items in the new 
condition since all items are categorically equivalent in the new condition. The precognitive 
hypotheses for Experiment 3A and 3B were therefore as follows: 
 
1) The mean TDT for target items in the old condition will be different than mean TDT 
for all items in the new condition, reflecting a difference in the degree to which 
target items hold attention in the old condition. 
2) The mean FFT for target items in the old condition will be different than mean FFT 
for all items in the new condition, reflecting a difference in the degree to which 
target items attract attention in the old condition. 
 
Again, since the type of information underlying the hypothesised selective response to 
targets in the old condition is not specified, the hypotheses are non-directional and two-tailed 




All statistical tests were carried out on participants as the unit of analysis. Item analyses were 
not carried out because the randomisation with replacement procedure resulted in a low 
number of data points for many items. Tests were two-tailed unless specified otherwise. In 
addition, a Bonferroni correction for two comparisons (TDT and FFT) was applied to each 
test of the precognitive hypothesis. Effect sizes are reported as Cohen’s d. Data trimming 









Data from 1 participant in Experiment 3A was excluded because no response was given in 
the recognition test on any trial. In addition, data from trials in which participants responded 
either incorrectly or gave no response were excluded from further analysis. This was to 
ensure that only those trials in which participants paid attention to the task were included. 
 
 
Reaction Times and Response Accuracy 
 
The mean RT in Experiment 3A was 1080ms in the old condition and 1867ms in the new 
condition, t(48) = -6.39, p < 0.0001. Mean RT in Experiment 3B was 1090ms in the old 
condition and 1060ms in the new condition which was not statistically significant, t(49) = 
1.11, p = 0.27. The discrepancy in RT results between Experiment 3A and 3B was most 
likely due to differences in the time taken for items in the old and new video clips to capture 
attention in the recognition test. Overall accuracy was high; Experiment 3A resulted in 
93.2% and 96.8% correct responses in old and new trials respectively; Experiment 3B 
resulted in 97.3% and 98.9% correct responses to old and new trials respectively.  
 
 
General viewing behaviour 
 
The general viewing behaviour in both Experiment 3A and 3B closely mirrored that in 
previous experiments. Participants tended to fixate the item in the top left corner first and 
continued in an approximately clockwise fashion. Table 6 shows the relationship between 
array position and fixation sequence and figure 12 shows mean TDT and mean FFT for all 








   Sequence  
   1st 2nd 3rd 4th  
 
 
          





1 85.3 10.6 1.7 2.4 
2 5.5 70.7 10.3 13.5 
3 7.4 15.3 17.3 59.9 
4 1.8 3.4 70.7 24.1 
      
Expt. 
3B 
1 86.9 8.9 2.2 5.3 
2 9.1 68.6 10.0 15.6 
3 5.4 19.6 24.7 53.5 
4 1.9 6.2 66.4 28.8 
 
 










 as a function of 
position in the array for Experiment 3A and 3B.  Array positions were 1 (top left), 2 (top right), 





Figure 12. Mean TDT (ms) and mean FFT (ms) to all items as a function of position in the 





In Experiment 3A, 745 old trials and 755 new trials were generated. In Experiment 3B, 744 
old trials and 756 new trials were generated. Neither frequency deviated significantly from 
chance expectation, 3A: X
2
 (1, 1500) = 0.06, p = 0.81; 3B: X
2







































Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 7 shows the mean TDT for targets, decoys and all items in the old and new condition 
for Experiments 3A and 3B. Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests suggested that all 
TDT data was normally distributed (all p > 0.2) therefore parametric tests were used. In 
Experiment 3A, targets in the old condition were fixated approximately 1.5ms less than 
items in the new condition and this difference was not significant, t(48) = -0.12, p = 0.90, d = 
-0.02. In Experiment 3B, targets in the old condition were fixated approximately 11.4ms 
more than items in the new condition and this difference was also not significant, t(49) = 
0.74, p = 0.46, d = 0.14. A 10% trim of the raw TDT data from each experiment did not 
affect this result; 3A, t(48) = 0.15, p = 0.88, d = 0.03; 3B, t(49) = -0.06, p = 0.95, d = -0.01. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1 was not confirmed for either experiment. 
 
 
  Old New 
Expt. 3A 
Target 776.7 (93.5) 792.1 (107.4) 
Decoy 778.1 (58.7) 773.6 (52.1) 
All items 777.8 (50.7) 778.2 (46.9) 
    
Expt. 3B 
Target 803.2 (110.3) 796.4 (94.0) 
Decoy 792.7 (47.6) 790.3 (42.1) 
All items 795.2 (29.5) 791.8 (34.3) 
 
Table 7. Mean TDT (ms) for targets, decoys and all items in the old and new condition for 




Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 8 shows the mean FFT for targets, decoys and all items in the old and new condition 
for Experiments 3A and 3B. Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests suggested that all 
FFT data was normally distributed (all p > 0.2) therefore parametric tests were used. In 
Experiment 3A, targets in the old condition took approximately 17.5ms longer to fixate for 
the first time than items in the new condition but this difference was not significant, t(48) = 
0.53, p = 0.60, d = 0.07. A 10% trim on the raw data did not affect this result, t(48) = -0.17, p 
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= 0.86, d = -0.03. Hypothesis 2 was therefore not confirmed for Experiment 3A. In 
Experiment 3B, targets in the old condition took approximately 86.8ms longer to fixate for 
the first time than items in the new condition and this difference was significant, t(49) = 
2.16, p = 0.04, d = 0.36 (Bonferroni corrected for two comparisons). This result suggests that 
target items in the old condition did not attract attention as effectively as items in the new 
condition. In order to assess the influence of potential outliers on the result from Experiment 
3B, a 10% trim was applied to the raw data; 5% of data points with the highest FFT values 
and 5% of data points with the lowest FFT values were removed. This removed all FFT 
values above 3087ms and less than 227ms. After this trimming procedure, the effect was 
substantially reduced; the data showed target items in the old condition were only fixated 
approximately 6.7ms later than items in the new condition. This difference was non-
significant, t(49) = 0.23, p = 0.82, d = 0.03 and suggests that the result of the main analysis 
was likely to have been influenced by outliers. Confirmation of hypothesis 2 for Experiment 
3B should therefore be treated with caution.  
 
 
  Old New 
Expt. 3A 
Target 1311.5 (309.8) 1278.2 (256.0) 
Decoy 1300.8 (160.5) 1299.4 (185.6) 
All items 1303.4 (165.2) 1294.0 (166.9) 
    
Expt. 3B 
Target 1468.0 (301.1) 1409.2 (334.7) 
Decoy 1364.2 (168.2) 1372.1 (158.7) 
All items 1389.4 (166.2) 1381.3 (162.2) 
 
Table 8. Mean FFT (ms) for targets, decoys and all items in the old and new condition for 






Experiments 3A and 3B were both designed as further tests of the precognitive hypothesis 
using the experimental paradigm developed in the current thesis. Experiment 3A was an 
attempted replication of the apparent effect observed in Experiment 1, again using dynamic 
probe stimuli, but with more extensive randomisation procedures. Experiment 3B presented 
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participants with object names as probe stimuli in an attempt to explore whether encouraging 
participants to adopt a verbal encoding strategy would lead to a more reliable effect. 
However, no compelling evidence for precognition was obtained in either Experiment 3A or 
3B. There was a significant result found in Experiment 3B when FFT was examined but 
trimming the data to assess the influence of outliers drastically reduced the effect and 
rendered the analysis non-significant. It would therefore be prudent to regard the significant 
effect found with the untrimmed data as due to a spurious effect of outliers.  
 
The presence of null results can be interpreted in a number of ways. As discussed previously, 
this could simply indicate that the null is, in fact, true. If we compare the data from 
experiments 3A and 3B, not only did the results fail to reach significance but the differences 
between conditions were also in opposite directions, which adds another element of 
inconsistency. Methodologically, Experiments 3A and 3B were perhaps superior to previous 
experiments; since targets were randomly sampled and their position was randomly 
determined, a bias in the placement of target position and a bias in the sequence of old and 
new trials would have to be present to generate a spurious result. 
 
However, a consequence of randomising variables without balancing their overall frequency 
is that their final distribution is likely to be unsymmetrical. For example, the proportion of 
targets occupying each position in the array is likely to be uneven in the old condition. The 
data from each experiment so far has shown that the position an item occupies in the array 
affects the TDT on that item; for example, items occupying position 1 are fixated 
approximately 100ms longer than items in positions 3 and 4. In addition, randomly sampling 
targets with replacement means that the old condition was likely to contain different numbers 
of each array item serving as the target, with items differing in their inherent visual 
attractiveness. Therefore, although non-significant deviations in these distributions are not 
likely to lead to spurious false-positive effects, they may add noise to the data making 
reliable observation of an underlying precognitive effect more difficult, especially if the 
extraneous variables have a relatively large effect on eye movement measures compared to a 
presumably small precognitive effect.   
 
Experiment 4 therefore used a completely balanced design in an attempt to minimise sources 
of variance due to unsymmetrical distributions of targets and their position in the array. Each 
stimulus was to be presented the same number of times as a target and decoy, the same 
number of times in each array position, and the same number of times in each condition. The 
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total number of old and new trials was also balanced across the experiment. Using a 
completely balanced design does, however, introduce an element of predictability in the 
sequence of trial conditions and stimulus parameters. For example, if participants receive the 
same number of trials in the old and new condition, the probability that the last trial will be 
old or new is either 0 or 1, depending on the particular trial sequence history. Nevertheless, 
participants must be in a position to know, in advance, the total number of trials and the 
relative frequency of each condition in order to fully capitalise on this element of certainty.  
Furthermore, it is possible to examine the data for evidence of sequence learning that may 
account for any positive results that are found. 
 
Two further methodological changes were introduced in Experiment 4. Firstly, study items 
were taken from a set of standardised stimuli consisting of colourised drawings of real-world 
objects and animals (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004). Several norms are available for these 
stimuli such as ratings of familiarity, visual complexity and naming time. By using these 
standardised stimuli, the relationship between normative data and a potential precognitive 
effect could be explored. Secondly, the Rossion and Pourtois (2004) colourised drawings 
were also used as probes in the test phase in order to explore whether presenting exactly the 
same visual stimulus at study and test would result in a more reliable effect. 
 
 




The results of Experiment 3A and 3B failed to support the precognitive hypothesis and thus 
failed to replicate the apparent effect observed in Experiment 1. Experiment 4 was designed 
to further explore the potential role of the probe stimulus in the current paradigm. Several 
methodological changes were introduced. Firstly, standardised stimuli developed by Rossion 
and Pourtois (2004) were used as study items. The Rossion and Pourtois set is a colourised 
version of a stimulus set originally developed by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) and 
consists of pictorial representations of concrete nouns. The original Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980) images have been used in a number of previous experiments, for example 
in studies of attention (Dux & Harris, 2007; Pashler & Harris, 2001; Scholl, 2000), memory 
(Karlsen & Snodgrass, 2004; Kohler, Moscovitch & Melo, 2001), object identification 
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(Dell’Acqua & Job, 1998; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), the Stroop effect (Dishon-Berkovits 
& Algom, 2000) and priming (Damian, 2000; Mitchell, 2006). In addition, a number of 
studies have collected normative data for these stimuli (Barry, Morrison & Ellis, 1997; 
Rossion & Pourtois, 2004; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). This provided an opportunity to 
explore whether a precognitive effect, if present, would be systematically related to any 
particular normative variables which may help to elucidate any potential underlying 
cognitive or perceptual processes responsible for the observed effect. 
 
Secondly, test items were also taken from the same stimulus set. In other words, the target 
item and the probe item in the old condition were exactly the same visual stimulus. In 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3A, probe items were video clips that featured target objects in 
dynamic contexts. There may have been several disadvantages of using video clips as probes 
in these experiments. Firstly, the degree of visual correspondence between a given target 
array item and the object featured in the video clip was not an exact correspondence. This 
was naturally due to the dynamic nature of the video clip, which presented objects in a 
variety of changing perspectives. However, items featured in video clips also differed 
slightly from target array items in other structural ways such as form, surface details and 
exact dimensions. If the hypothesised precognitive effect is sensitive to the degree of visual 
similarity between stimuli presented at study and test, then it may be advantageous to present 
exactly the same visual stimuli in the study and test phase. By way of comparison, some well 
established psychological effects are sensitive to such considerations. For example, in 
perceptual priming experiments, the strength of the priming effect can be reduced if the 
prime does not exactly match the physical characteristics of the stimulus on its repeated 
presentation. For instance, changing an object’s orientation (Srinivas, 1995, 1996) or 
exemplar (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Cave, Bost & Cobb, 1996) between study and test 
can reduce the priming effect while studies of perceptual priming using word stimuli show 
that the priming effect is reduced by changing typography (Jacoby & Hayman, 1987). This is 
not to imply that perceptual priming and precognition share any underlying mechanism. 
Rather, this suggests that such considerations be empirically tested since priming 
experiments and the current paradigm are, at least, methodologically comparable in that both 
involve the repeated presentation of stimuli, albeit in reverse order in the present case.   
 
Thirdly, in order to remove potential sources of noise, the trial condition, item position and 
target identity were completely balanced across the study. In Experiments 3A and 3B, both 
the position of items in the array and the identity (and therefore the position) of the target 
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item was randomised with replacement during the experiment runtime. As a consequence of 
this unbalanced randomisation procedure, the old condition was composed of an 
asymmetrical distribution of target items and their position in the array. Although this is not 
likely to inflate the rate of false positives, it may have made detection of an underlying 
precognitive effect more difficult especially if the size of the hypothesised effect is small 
compared to the variance component introduced via this randomisation procedure. Indeed, 
the data from all previous experiments showed that the TDT and FFT varied considerably as 
a function of an item’s position in the array. Array position had the strongest effect on FFT, 
with the difference in mean FFT varying by as much as 1500ms. Array position affected 
TDT to a lesser extent with a largest difference of approximately 100ms between positions. 
Another source of noise in previous experiments may have been the unequal distribution of 
items appearing as targets, again due to randomisation with replacement. Items are expected 
to vary in their inherent ability to attract and hold attention due to differences in their 
physical and semantic properties. For example, if the randomisation procedure happened to 
select a greater number of visually salient items as targets, this may have also introduced 
another element of noise into the data.  
 
In order to remedy these sources of noise, Experiment 4 introduced a balanced design. Each 
item was presented for the same number of times as a target in each array position and in 
each condition across the entire study. Items were also presented the same number of times 
as decoys in each array position and in each condition. Finally, each participant received the 
same number of trials in the old and new condition (however, they only viewed a particular 







96 student participants (74 female, 22 male) were recruited by convenience from the 
psychology department subject pool resource at the University of Edinburgh and through 
university based internet boards. The average age of participants was 21.5 years (range, 18-
37). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and were either native or non-
native English speakers. Course credit was awarded for participation. Consent forms were 
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provided to participants who were required to sign them as acknowledgement of the 
experimental aims, risks and data anonymity. The consent form included the participant’s 
right to terminate the session at any time without reason. The experiment met the British 
Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines and was approved by the University of Edinburgh 





Experiment 4 used stimuli created by Rossion and Pourtois (2004) (retrieved from 
http://www.nefy.ucl.ac.be/facecatlab/stimuli.htm), which were colourised versions of stimuli 
originally developed by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) and consisted of coloured 
pictorial representations of concrete nouns from various categories such as clothing, 
furniture, tools, kitchen utensils, musical instruments, fruit, vegetables and animals. Stimuli 
from the Rossion and Pourtois (2004) set were used as study items and test items. Items were 
displayed on a white background, each in one of the four quadrants of the array, and were 
arranged into 52 groups of 5. In assigning items to groups, the main concern was to achieve 
some degree of within-group variability in the conceptual and visual features of each item. 
Therefore, items were arranged into groups on the basis of their familiarity ratings provided 
in Rossion and Pourtois (2004). In the Rossion and Pourtois (2004) study, participants rated 
the familiarity of each item on a 5 point scale with a rating of 1 assigned to items that were 
judged to be very unfamiliar and a rating of 5 for very familiar items. Familiarity was 
defined as “the degree to which you come in contact with or think about the concept''. 
Accordingly, all 260 items were first sorted by their familiarity rating and the item with the 
lowest familiarity rating was then grouped with the 53
rd







 items. This process was repeated, starting with the 2
nd
 lowest rated item 








, etc. This ensured that the items 
within each group had a broad range of familiarity ratings. Rossion and Pourtois (2004) also 
provide subjective ratings of item complexity, measured by asking participants to rate each 
image on “the amount of detail or intricacy of line in the picture''. Since the basic correlation 
between ratings of familiarity and complexity was medium sized and negative (r = -0.53), 
this method of grouping items by ratings of familiarity was expected to also result in a 
modest degree of within-group variability in visual complexity. Once items were assigned to 
groups, 1 item in each group was randomly selected to act as the new item while the 4 
remaining items were used in the study phase. Arrays were displayed at a resolution of 1024 
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x 768 pixels. 4 groups of stimuli were used in practice trials while the remaining 48 groups 
were used in the experimental session. All participants received the same stimuli in practice 







Participants answered advertisements stating that the experiment was investigating visual 
memory. Upon entering the experimental room, participants were sat comfortably at the eye 
tracker and viewed instructions displayed on the monitor. A calibration procedure was then 
performed requiring participants to fixate nine points arranged in a grid on the display which 
was then repeated for validation. Three practice trials were then presented. After the practice 
trials, participants were reminded of the instructions and eye position was re-calibrated.  
 
Experimental trials then proceeded according to the following steps which are summarised in 
figure 13. A drift correction screen presented a fixation circle at the centre of the display. 
When the participant fixated the centre of this marker, the experimenter initiated the trial. An 
array was then presented for 4 seconds while eye movements were recorded. A blank screen 
was then displayed for 1 second followed by presentation of the probe item for yes/no 
recognition. In the old condition, the target for the given trial was presented, whereas in the 
new condition a novel item was presented. Each probe item was presented for 10 seconds 
and participants could respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with the use of a hand held controller at any time 
during the clip, although they were encouraged to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Once the participant made their response, the probe item remained on the display 
for the entire 10 seconds ensuring that all participants viewed probe items for the same 
amount of time. During each trial, the experimenter faced a monitor with his back to the eye 
tracker display. The experimenter’s monitor displayed information about eye position and 
calibration but did not display any information about which particular array was being 







Figure 13. Schematic showing the basic experimental procedure of a single trial. A drift 
correction screen was first presented with a fixation circle located at the centre. Once this 
circle was fixated, the experimenter initiated the trial. An item array was then presented for 4 
seconds while eye movements were recorded followed by a blank screen for 1 second. The 
computer then displayed a probe in the test phase. In the old condition, the target item for 
the given trial was presented whereas in the new condition a novel item was presented. 
 
 
Balancing of variables 
 
Each participant received 24 trials in the old condition and 24 trials in the new condition 
presented in a random order with no constraints on the number of trials in a particular 
condition appearing in succession. The Mersenne Twister core generator (Matsumoto & 
Nishimura, 1998) was used to randomise the order of trials. Each array of stimuli was 
presented once to each participant. A fully balanced design was employed such that each 
item appeared in each array position for the same number of times in each condition across 
the study. In addition, each item appeared as the target for the same number of times in each 
array position and in each condition. 96 participants were required for three repetitions of the 
fully balanced stimulus list. This meant that after all participants had been recruited; each 
item appeared 12 times as a target (3 times in each array position) and 36 times as a decoy (9 





Detection of fixations and saccades 
 
Interest areas were drawn in each quadrant of the array and were 400 pixels in width and 300 
pixels in height. These dimensions were sufficient to surround all items and ensured that 
fixations that did not land directly on the item, but were nevertheless directed towards the 
item, were captured by the interest area. All fixations and saccades that landed within an IA 
were automatically assigned to the appropriate item for later analysis. All IAs were 
constructed before data collection, remained fixed in size and position and were invisible to 





The hypotheses were the same as in Experiment 3A and 3B in that the allocation of visual 
attention to items would differ between old and new trials. Since all items in the new 
condition were categorically equivalent, targets in old trials were compared with all items in 
new trials. The hypotheses in Experiment 4 were therefore as follows:  
 
1) The mean TDT for target items in the old condition will be different than the mean 
TDT for all items in the new condition.  
2) The mean FFT for target items in the old condition will be different than the mean 
FFT for all items in the new condition.  
 
Again, since the type of information underlying the hypothesised selective response to 






Two statistical tests are reported per comparison; one with participants as the unit of analysis 
(n = 96) and one with items as the unit of analysis (n = 192). All tests were two-tailed and 
were performed on untransformed data. In addition, a Bonferroni correction for two 
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comparisons was applied to tests of Hypothesis 1 and 2. Effect sizes are reported as Cohen’s 







If data from a particular participant was rejected before analysis (for example, due to a poor 
eye tracking signal), another participant was recruited to obtain a total of 96 participants 
required for full balancing. To ensure the experiment was fully balanced, data from all trials 




Reaction Times and Response Accuracy 
 
The mean RT for trials with correct responses was 841ms in the old condition and 818ms in 
the new condition, t(94) = 2.06, p = 0.04 (two-tailed). Overall accuracy was high; 96.8% and 
97.6% correct responses in old and new trials respectively. 
 
 
General viewing behaviour 
 
The general viewing behaviour in Experiment 4 continued to replicate that of previous 
experiments. Participants tended to fixate the item in the top left corner first and continued in 
an approximately clockwise fashion. Table 9 shows the relationship between array position 
and fixation sequence and figure 14 shows the mean FFT for all items in each array position 






  Sequence  
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th  
         
       Array position 
Array 
Position 
1 82.7 11.5 1.8 4.0 
2 11.6 72.1 9.0 7.3 
3 4.2 10.3 33.6 51.8 
4 1.5 6.1 55.6 36.8 
 
 








 as a function of 





Figure 14. The mean FFT (left) and mean TDT (right) for all items as a function of position in 




Participants tended to fixate items in position 1 for the longest amount of time (M = 836.8, 
SD = 112.3) followed by position 2 (M = 812.3, SD = 108.1), position 3 (M = 740.9, SD = 
105.2) and finally position 4 (M = 692.7, SD = 101.3). A one-way ANOVA with array 
position as a factor revealed a highly significant effect of array position, F(3,191) = 201.8, p 
< 0.001. Further paired t-tests (with Bonferroni corrections) revealed that TDT diminished as 
a function of position such that pos1 > pos2, t(191) = 3.36, p < 0.001, pos2 > pos3, t(191) = 




































Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit tests suggested that TDT data for old targets and all 
new items was normally distributed (participants, old-targets, D(96) = 0.095, p > 0.2; new, 
D(96) = 0.110, p > 0.2; items, old-targets, D(192) = 0.049, p > 0.2; new, D(192) = 0.043, p > 
0.2), therefore parametric tests were used in the planned analysis. Table 10 shows the mean 
TDT for items in the old and new conditions. Target items in the old condition were fixated 
approximately 14.6ms less than items in the new condition. However after Bonferroni 
correction for two comparisons, this difference was marginally non-significant for both 
participant and item analyses; participants, t(95) = -1.82, p = 0.07, d = -0.23; items, t(191) = 
-1.84, p = 0.07, d = -0.13. Nevertheless, the pattern of data was consistent with the 
precognitive hypothesis in that the degree of attention allocated to targets and decoys 
appeared to be different in the old condition but not in the new condition. However, the 
difference between targets and decoys in the old condition could not be assessed statistically 
since data from each group was not obtained independently and would thus violate the 
independence assumption of the statistical test. 
 
In order to assess the influence of potential outliers, a 10% trim was applied to the raw data; 
5% of data points with the highest TDT values and 5% of data points with the lowest TDT 
values were removed. This removed all TDT values above 1341ms and less than 334ms. 
After this trimming procedure, the data showed that target items in the old condition were 
fixated for approximately 14.5ms less than items in the new condition (see table 10). This 
difference was now found to be significant for both participant and item analyses; 
participant, t(95) = -2.12, p = 0.04, d = -0.28; items, t(191) = -2.35, p = 0.02, d = -0.19 
(Bonferroni corrected for two comparisons). Although the effect size expressed in 
milliseconds was slightly less, effect sizes expressed as Cohen’s d were larger than the main 
analysis due to a reduction in the standard deviation of item and participant means obtained 
from the trimmed raw data. The result of this trimmed analysis suggests that the marginally 
non-significant result from the main analysis may have been affected by outliers. When data 
was trimmed, a stronger central tendency was revealed. Hypothesis 1 was therefore 
confirmed; although this confirmation should be treated with caution since significance was 






 All data  10% trimmed 
 Old New  Old New 
Targets 756.7 (121.1) 770.8 (116.1)  744.3 (88.1) 760.1 (80.8) 
Decoys 774.5 (101.5) 771.5 (96.5)  759.7 (71.1) 758.4 (70.6) 
All items 770.0 (98.2) 771.3 (93.8)  755.8 (66.2) 758.8 (64.7) 
 
 
Table 10. Mean TDT (ms) for targets, decoys and all items in the old and new condition. 
Analyses for all data and 10% trimmed data are shown. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. Values shown are from items as the unit of analysis.  
 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
FFT was found to be normally distributed in all datasets (Kolmogorov-Smirnov: participants, 
old-targets, D(96) = 0.088, p > 0.2; new, D(96) = 0.081, p > 0.2; items, old-targets, D(192) = 
0.056, p > 0.2; new, D(192) = 0.051, p > 0.2) therefore paired t-tests were used in all 
comparisons. Table 11 shows the mean FFT for targets, decoys and all items in the old and 
new condition. The mean FFT for targets did not significantly differ from items in the new 
condition; participants, t(95) = 0.39, p = 0.69, d = 0.02; items, t(191) = 0.68, p = 0.50, d = 
0.09. A 10% trim also resulted in a non-significant difference (participants, t(95) = 1.33, p = 
0.19, d = 0.12; items, t(191) = 0.97, p = 0.33, d = 0.15). Therefore, hypothesis 2 was not 
confirmed suggesting that the degree to which items attracted attention from the periphery 
did not differ between conditions.  
 Old New 
Target 1308.3 (167.0) 1282.8 (191.1) 
Decoy 1300.7 (127.6) 1298.9 (120.6) 
All items 1302.6 (112.1) 1294.8 (110.6) 
 
Table 11. Mean FFT (ms) to targets, decoys and all items in the old and new conditions. 





Multiple regression: predictor variables 
 
Since Hypothesis 1 was confirmed, an exploratory analysis was carried out on the TDT data 
in order to examine whether the apparent precognitive effect was systematically related to 
normative data on the stimuli used in this study. In developing their original stimulus set, 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) selected concrete nouns based on several inclusion criteria 
as follows: 
 
1. The concepts must be unambiguously picturable. 
2. They must include exemplars from the widely used category norms of Battig and 
Montague (1969). 
3. They must represent concepts at the basic level of categorization (Rosch, Mervis, 
Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). 
 
Once the picture set had been created, normative data was collected on several stimulus 
dimensions including ratings of visual complexity, image agreement and concept familiarity. 
Rossion and Pourtois (2004) also provide similar normative data for their colourised 
stimulus set using the same procedures reported in Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). Other 
studies have collected data on naming time in British English (Barry et al., 1997). It was 
decided to explore the extent to which the precognitive effect was related to the four stimulus 
dimensions of complexity, image agreement, familiarity and naming time as described 
below. These variables have been proposed to reflect activity at various processing stages of 
visual object recognition and picture naming (Alario et al., 2004; Barry et al., 1997) and are 
thought to represent distinct aspects of the picture (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). Since 
participants were expected to be engaged in both object recognition and subvocal picture 
naming in the current paradigm, a potential correlation between these normative variables 
and the TDT effect may shed some light on the contribution of these processing stages in the 








Visual complexity refers to subjective ratings of how complex the form of the picture 
appears to be. Normative data on this variable was taken from Rossion and Pourtois (2004) 
who asked participants to rate each picture in their colourised set on “the amount of detail or 
intricacy of line in the picture” (p. 223). Participants were asked to rate the complexity of the 
drawing on a 5 point scale and rate the picture itself rather than the real-world object it 
represented. A rating of 1 was given to pictures with very low complexity and a rating of 5 to 
pictures with very high complexity. This variable is thought to reflect processing at the level 
of object recognition including structural analysis and pattern recognition (Alario et al., 
2004). There is some evidence that object recognition processes take longer with pictures of 
more complex objects compared to simple objects (Attneave, 1957; Ellis & Morrison, 1998) 
but other studies have reported so such differences (Biederman, 1987; Paivio, Clark, Digdon 
& Bons, 1989). If more complex objects take longer to process visually, this may impact on 
the time spent fixating these objects in the current paradigm. In addition, the structural 
intricacy of relatively more complex objects may make them more visually salient and 
therefore more likely to attract and hold attention (Itti & Koch, 2000). If so, we might expect 
more complex items to be fixated earlier and for longer than less complex items as 
participants view the array. 
 
 
Concept familiarity  
 
Familiarity refers to extent to which the concept, represented by the picture, has been 
encountered in everyday life. In the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) study, participants 
were asked to rate each picture "according to how usual or unusual the object is in your 
realm of experience” (p. 183) and familiarity was defined as “the degree to which you come 
in contact with or think about the concept” (p. 183). Participants were asked to rate the 
concept itself rather than way it was drawn. A rating of 1 indicated very low familiarity and 
a rating of 5 indicated very high familiarity. Familiarity is thought to be a pictorial version of 
word frequency and is likely to reflect how well the picture activates its semantic 
representation (Hirsh & Funnell, 1995). Participants contributing to the Rossion and Pourtois 
(2004) norms were French speakers, therefore familiarity norms were taken from Barry et al. 
(1997) who used British participants. This was to avoid potential differences in familiarity 
judgements that may arise from participants of a different nationality, which may occur if the 
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occurrence of particular concepts varies between nationalities and cultures. Familiarity 
norms from Barry et al. (1997) were obtained using the original line drawings from 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) rather than the colourised versions used in Experiment 4. 
However, since judgements of familiarity were based on the concept itself rather than on the 
visual characteristics of the picture, it is likely that these norms are applicable to the 
colourised stimulus set.     
 
 
Image agreement  
 
Image agreement is the extent to which the image generated from an object’s name matches 
the picture of the same name. Ratings of image agreement were taken from Rossion and 
Pourtois (2004) who presented participants with the name of an object followed by three 
seconds of blank screen and participants were required to form a mental image of the named 
object. The actual picture was then presented and participants rated how closely their image 
matched the visual characteristics of the picture. A rating of 1 indicated a low match while a 
rating of 5 indicated a high match. It has been suggested that this variable acts at the level of 
object recognition and reflects the degree to which the activation of stored structural 




Naming time  
 
Naming time is the time taken to name the object upon presentation of the picture. Norms 
were obtained from Barry et al. (1997) who used British English speaking participants. 
Naming latencies were recorded in milliseconds and were measured from picture onset to 
onset of a verbal response. Participants were required to name each object “as distinctly and 
quickly as possible” (p. 568). However, the Barry et al. study used the original set of line 
drawings created by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) to obtain their normative data 
whereas the dependent variables in Experiment 4 were obtained using the colourised version 
of that stimulus set. As shown by Rossion and Pourtois (2004), the inclusion of colour 
significant speeds naming time, therefore use of the Barry et al. norms may not accurately 
reflect the time taken to name coloured pictures. However, Rossion and Pourtois (2004) also 
obtained naming times for line drawings and the correlation between their colour and line 
94 
 
drawing naming time data is large (r = 0.78). Therefore, it will be assumed that use of 
naming times obtained from line drawings will not have a notable effect on this exploratory 
analysis. The time taken to name a pictorial object will reflect process involved in object 
recognition, semantic analysis, lexical retrieval and articulation (Levelt, 2001). In previous 
research, participants were presented with arrays of objects taken from the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart picture set and were asked to memorise each item in preparation for a memory 
test (Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). The study showed that the total time spent looking at 
objects was related to the number of syllables in the object’s name with longer names 
resulting in greater dwell time. Therefore one might expect the variable of naming time to 
correlate with item TDT in the current paradigm.  
 
 
Multiple regression: outcome variables 
  
Using items as the unit of analysis, the four variables of complexity, familiarity, image 
agreement and naming time were included as predictors in two simultaneous multiple 
regressions using the following as the outcome variable: 
 
 
1) TDT-All, defined as the TDT per item collapsed across both old and new 
conditions 
2) ΔTDT(Target-New), defined as the difference in TDT between targets in the old 
condition and items in the new condition 
 
 
Analysis 1 aimed to explore the extent to which attention was allocated to items on the basis 
of the stimulus dimensions of complexity, familiarity, image agreement and naming time 
whereas analysis 2 aimed to explore the extent to which the apparent precognitive effect was 
related to these same stimulus dimensions. Analysis 2 was performed on the 10% trimmed 












The overall regression equation was significant, accounting for 36% of the variance, F 
(4,187) = 26.3, p < 0.0001, R
2
 = 0.36. With the exception of familiarity, all variables entered 
into the multiple regression emerged as highly significant predictors of TDT-All. Naming 
time was the strongest predictor (p < 0.001) and was positively related to TDT-All 
suggesting that items taking longer to name held attention for longer. This is consistent with 
previous research showing that naming time is a major determinant of the time spent looking 
at objects during memorisation, with longer dwell times on items that have more syllables in  
their name (Zelinsky & Murphy, 2000). Thus, the high correlation between TDT-All and 
naming time suggests that participants were subvocally naming items while viewing the 
array. Image agreement had the next largest effect (p < 0.001) and was negatively related to 
TDT. This may be because items that more closely match stored structural descriptions of 
the object are more easily identified and encoded into memory and less time is therefore 
spent fixating these items. Complexity also had a significant independent effect (p < 0.01) 
and was positively related to TDT-All. This may have arisen because complex items are 
more visually salient (Itti & Koch, 2000) and are therefore more likely to attract and hold 
attention or perhaps that object recognition processes take longer to complete with more 
complex stimuli (Attneave, 1957; Ellis & Morrison, 1998). Finally, familiarity had a 
marginally significant effect on predicting TDT-All (p = 0.057) with a negative relationship 
suggesting that less attention was allocated to more familiar items. This may be because the 
semantic network of familiar items is more easily activated which may facilitate the 





After entering all variables simultaneously, the overall regression equation was non-
significant, F (4,187) = 1.52, p = 0.20, R
2
 = 0.031. Both image agreement and naming time 
had non-significant effects. However, both complexity and familiarity had independent 
effects that were marginally non-significant (both p < 0.06) and were both negatively related 
to the dependent variable. If this suggestive relationship does not represent a false positive 
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finding, it may indicate that the precognitive effect observed in Experiment 4 was greater for 










Comp. Fam. Imag. Nam. 
Comp. 0.293** -0.083  1    
Fam. -0.314** -0.099  -0.418** 1   
Imag. -0.263** 0.068  0.037 -0.211* 1  
Nam. 0.454** 0.016  0.053 -0.373** -0.027 1 
 
Table 12. Basic correlations between the predictor variables and TDT-All, and ΔTDT(Target-






Predictor Β Coeff. 
Standard 
Error 
β t value p 
TDT-All 
Comp. 22.33 6.43 0.226 3.47 0.001 
Fam. -12.83 6.71 -0.138 -1.91 0.057 
Imag. -35.24 7.33 -0.290 -4.81 0.000 
Nam. 0.234 0.039 0.383 5.98 0.000 
       
ΔTDT 
(Target-New) 
Comp. -12.825 6.712 -0.153 -1.91 0.058 
Fam. -13.394 6.996 -0.170 -1.91 0.057 
Imag. 3.821 7.650 0.037 0.50 0.309 
Nam. -0.020 0.041 -0.038 -0.49 0.313 
       
 








Experiment 4 was a further test of the precognitive hypothesis and implemented several 
changes in design. Namely, a new stimulus set was introduced, study and test items were 
drawn from the same stimulus pool and a balanced design was introduced to counter 
potential confounding effects of target position and identity. After applying a 10% trim to the 
raw data, the results of the main analysis showed that participants spent less time fixating 
target items in the old condition compared to items in the new condition, suggesting that less 
attention was allocated to targets. This result is consistent with the precognitive hypothesis, 
since old trials consisted of the repeated presentation of the target whereas new trials did not. 
Moreover, the pattern of data suggested that the amount of time spent fixating targets was 
less than the amount of time spent fixating decoys in the old condition, while no such 
difference was apparent in the new condition. This is also consistent with the precognitive 
hypothesis since targets and decoys are categorically equivalent in the new condition and 
were predicted to show no difference in attentional allocation (within-condition differences 
cannot be tested statistically since target and decoy data was not obtained independently). 
However, the direction of the effect was opposite to that found in Experiment 1 where target 
items were fixated for longer. This represents somewhat of an inconsistency in findings, but 
as this pertains to the results of the thesis as a whole, issues of result directionality will be 
raised in the general discussion of Chapter 5.   
 
In addition, there was suggestive evidence from an exploratory analysis that the TDT effect 
was negatively correlated with item complexity and familiarity. This suggests that less 
attention was allocated to targets if they were rated as more visually detailed or more 
familiar. However, the precognitive effect sizes from the main analysis and the exploratory 
analysis were small, raising the possibility that the results were due to methodological 
problems. Therefore, the following section will address a number of potential explanations 
for the results of Experiment 4 based on known factors. 
 
 
Explanation 1: Inappropriate use of statistical tests 
 
Two-tailed tests were used in the main analysis and were corrected for two multiple 
analyses. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the result were due to inflation of type I error 
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from inappropriate use of one-tailed testing or lack of correction for multiple analyses, a 
criticism that has been levelled at previous research (Wagenmakers, et al., 2011). 
 
 
Explanation 2: Selective data reporting 
 
The main analysis in Experiment 4 was carried out on all available data. No trials were 
excluded on the basis of incorrect responses in the recognition task, nor were any outliers 
removed. Therefore, the result of the main analysis cannot be attributed to data exclusion. 
However, while the experiment was being carried out, data from a small number of 
participants was removed from the study prior to any statistical analysis. This was based on a 
qualitative assessment of the eye tracking data for each participant after they had been run 
through the experiment. For example, if an excessive amount of missing data was detected 
(due to loss of the eye tracking signal) or if an excessive number of fixation durations less 
than 100ms were observed (due to an intermittent eye tracking signal), then data from these 
participants was removed and another participant was recruited to take their place. However, 
since the data had not been statistically analysed at that time and the number of excluded 
participants was low (n = 6), it is unlikely that removal of these participants introduced a 
selection bias into the dataset.     
 
 
Explanation 3: Sensory cues 
 
In previous experiments, the target and/or trial condition was randomly selected by the 
computer after the dependent variable had been recorded. In those cases, issues of sensory 
cueing are ruled out entirely. However, in Experiment 4, the sequence of target positions and 
trial conditions was randomised at the start of the session and was therefore predetermined at 
the start of each trial. One might argue that audible cues originating from retrieval of images 
from the computer’s hard disk at the start of each trial provided participants with information 
about the trial condition or target item. However, this type of explanation seems implausible 
since the computer controlling the display of stimuli was located inside a closed cabinet 
some distance away from the participants and, upon inspection, the experimenter could hear 
no audible cue from the hard disk when seated at the eye tracker. Explanations in terms of 
sensory cues can therefore be safely ruled out.   
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Explanation 4: Statistical cues 
 
The most plausible explanation for the results of the TDT analysis is one based on statistical 
cues, present as a consequence of the bias contained in a random sequence of trials that have 
a balanced frequency of conditions or stimulus parameters. In Experiment 4, participants 
received 24 trials in each condition and the 24 target items presented in each condition were 
evenly distributed over the four array positions (6 times in each position). Therefore, 
although trials were presented in random order, the balanced protocol raises the possibility 
that participants may have used statistical information from previous trials to predict 
(consciously or unconsciously) the upcoming trial condition and target position at a level 
above that expected by chance alone. This explanation is of particular importance not only to 
this study, but to experimental psychology as a whole since balanced designs are routinely 
used in studies of cognition and perception. If the results of Experiment 4 are indeed the 
result of conscious or unconscious use of statistical cues, then many other studies that use 
balanced designs may be susceptible to similar effects which may impact on the 
interpretation of their results. 
    
It should firstly be noted that in order for statistical cues to result in the observed effect in 
Experiment 4, participants would need to make a prediction about both the current trial 
condition and the position of the target item in the array based on past information. A 
cumulative count model (CCM) may be able to predict the current trial condition above a 
probability of 0.5 by counting the number of previous trials in each condition and making a 
prediction according to the condition with the lowest count. On average, not only would a 
CCM increase the probability of correctly predicting the trial condition above 0.5, but the 
model need not include information about the total number of trials in the session. Similarly, 
to predict the current target position above a 0.25 probability, a count could be made of all 
array positions that the target occupied in previous trials (but only old trials since 
information about target position in new trials was not available to participants) and a 
prediction made on the basis of the position with the lowest count. If participants were 
implementing some form of CCM, either consciously or unconsciously, then once a 
prediction of the current trial condition and target position had been made, eye movements 
could accordingly be biased towards or away from the predicted target position which 
would, on average, result in a dependent variable differential when targets and decoys were 
compared. A CCM would also result in an increase in prediction accuracy as the session 
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progressed since statistical information about the upcoming trial condition and target 
position would become more reliable over the course of a session.  
 
Is it plausible that participants would engage in statistical processing of this sort during the 
experiment? Given that participants were required to memorise each array item rather than 
make any prediction about the trial condition or target position, this seems intuitively 
unlikely. Inter-trial memory effects have been demonstrated in other paradigms but are 
relatively short lived. For instance, an effect labelled ‘priming of pop out’ occurs during 
visual search experiments when the search target on a particular trial occupies the same 
location as the target on the previous trial (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996). Here, the 
deployment of attention to the repeated target location is facilitated, an influence that extends 
to about five to eight subsequent trials (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996). Clearly, a CCM 
prediction based only on information from a handful of preceding trials would be at a 
considerable disadvantage compared to a prediction based on information from all preceding 
trials. However, the current paradigm differs in many ways to the one used to elicit priming 
of pop out effects and it cannot be ruled out that participants were making predictions about 
current trials based on all available information since the start of their session.  
 
Nevertheless, the data from Experiment 4 can be examined to see if it is consistent with the 
predictions of a CCM. Firstly, a cumulative count simulation can be run on the actual 
sequence of trials observed in Experiment 4 to examine whether the predictions of such a 
model correlate with eye movement behaviour.  Accordingly, a CCM was applied to the 
actual sequence of trials generated for each participant in Experiment 4 and a prediction 
about the current trial condition and target position was made on the following basis: 
 
1) To predict the current trial condition, the model counted the number of previous 
trials in each condition for a given participant. The condition with the lowest count 
was predicted as the current trial condition. If the count for each condition was 
equal, no prediction was made since no statistical cue was present on that occasion.  
 
2) If the current trial was predicted as “old” from step 1, the model counted the number 
of times the target appeared in each position for all previous trials that were in the 
old condition. The position with the lowest count was predicted as the target position 




The above model should produce the following pattern of data if it is to explain the results of 
Experiment 4: On occasions when the current trial is predicted to be in the old condition, 
predicted targets should have a lower TDT than predicted decoys. In fact, the opposite was 
the case. When the model predicted the current trial as old, predicted targets had a mean 
TDT of 778.3ms (n = 1068) whereas predicted decoys had a mean TDT of 765.4ms (n = 
3204). 
 
Secondly, a CCM would predict an increase in the size of the effect over the course of the 
session since the probability of a correct prediction increases and participants would also 
have had more opportunity to recognise any underlying pattern to the placement of target 
positions. In order to test this prediction, the data from Experiment 4 was first split by the 
first and last half of each participant’s session with the last half predicted to exhibit a greater 
effect.  However, the data shows that the effect is largely confined to the first half of each 
session (see table 14). The difference in TDT between targets and new items in the first 24 
trials was approximately 25.8ms with items as the unit of analysis, t(191) = -2.64, p <0.01, d 
= -0.21 (Bonferroni corrected for 2 comparisons), and approximately 27.8ms with 
participants as the unit of analysis, t(95) = -3.10, p <0.01, d = -0.40 (Bonferroni corrected for 
2 comparisons). In contrast, the difference in TDT between targets and new items was trivial 
in the last 24 trials (by participants, 4.4ms, p = n.s.; by items, 3.3ms, p = n.s.).   
 
 First 24 trials  Last 24 trials 
 Old New  Old New 
Target 750.1 (135.7) 770.3 (158.7)  763.5 (155.1) 766.9 (147.3) 
Decoy 781.7 (122.4) 776.5 (110.4)  765.6 (106.3) 766.3 (109.9) 
All items 773.6 (113.7) 775.9 (107.2)  766.3 (102.1) 766.9 (99.5) 
 
Table 14. Mean TTD (ms) to targets, decoys and all items in the old condition split between 
the first and last 24 trials in each session. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Values 
obtained from items as the unit of analysis. 
 
 
As a further test, the difference in TDT between targets and items in the new condition was 
plotted against the trial sequence averaged over all participant sessions. The CCM would 
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predict an increase in the size of the effect over the course of the session but, as shown in 
figure 15, the data actually suggests that the effect declines as a function of trial sequence, 
although the correlation is not significant (r = 0.11, n.s.). It should be noted that each data 
point is not cumulative so the decline in effect cannot be attributable to regression to the 
mean. Together, these analyses suggest that participants were not capitalising on the 
statistical information contained in the sequence of trial conditions and target positions and 





Figure 15. The difference between Target TDT and TDT for all items in the new condition as 
a function of trial sequence, averaged over all participant sessions. 
 
 
However, several cautionary points are warranted here. Firstly, the analyses may be 
confounded by the effects of target position and target item identity since each individual 
analysis does not contain a balanced frequency of these parameters. For example, a greater 
percentage of targets may have been presented in array positions associated with lower TDT 
in the first 24 trials. Indeed, the data suggests that this is the case, although the bias is small; 
for the first 24 trials in the old condition, 48.6% of targets were collectively presented in 
positions 1 and 2 (the array positions associated with greater TDT) whereas 51.4% of targets 
were collectively placed in positions 3 and 4. However, since a reciprocal bias occurs in the 
last 24 trials due to the balanced design, we might expect a similar TDT difference in the 
opposite direction yet no such difference is observed. However, the analyses assume that 
































are initially very responsive to such cues, but later on in the session become much less 
responsive, then this may have offset any increase in prediction accuracy resulting from 
more reliable statistical cues as the session progressed. Therefore, although the results cannot 
be readily explained by statistical cueing, such an account cannot be ruled out entirely. 
 
In summary, confirmation of hypothesis 1 is not readily explainable in terms of inappropriate 
statistical tests, selective data reporting, sensory cues or statistical cues. However, there 
remains one potential explanation that will now be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. This explanation, termed the expectation bias, has received some attention in 
previous literature as a potential explanation for the positive results of previous studies of 
precognition, in particular the presentiment studies. The following chapter will firstly 
describe the mechanics of the bias and how it has been proposed as a potential explanation 
for previous studies of precognition. Secondly, a simple model of the bias will be presented 
as it applies to the current paradigm and an estimate made of its potential contribution to 
positive results. Finally, data from Experiments 1 to 4 will be used to assess the extent to 

















Chapter 4 - Exploring the effects of an 
expectation bias in the current paradigm: 




Many of the experiments described in Chapter 2 were testing for precognition using 
physiological measures. Arguably, the most popular type of study to employ such 
methodology has become known as the presentiment experiment. In a typical experiment, 
participants sit at a computer screen and are simply required to passively view a series of 
emotional and calm pictures presented to them in a random sequence. During this time, some 
measure of their autonomic arousal is continuously recorded both before and during 
presentation of the pictures. It is well established that the autonomic nervous system 
responds to the presentation of emotionally arousing stimuli. For example, arousal will be 
higher when an emotional picture is shown compared to when a calm picture is shown. 
However, the presentiment hypothesis proposes that participants’ level of autonomic arousal 
will also be higher moments before viewing emotional pictures compared to calm pictures, 
despite the fact that the two types of stimuli are presented in a random sequence. A number 
of presentiment experiments have reported anomalous anticipation of emotional stimuli 
using measures of skin conductance (Bierman & Radin, 1997; Radin, 2004), heart rate 
(McRaty et al., 2004), pupil dilation (Radin & Borges, 2009) and fMRI (Bierman & Scholte, 
2002) and other studies have also used the same basic paradigm to test for anticipatory brain 
activity preceding emotionally neutral stimuli such as flashes of light (Radin & Lobach, 
2007). 
 
A test of the presentiment hypothesis involves calculating mean values of the dependent 
variable in each condition and comparing means to establish whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between conditions. If the dichotomous stimuli are presented in a 
random sequence, it is assumed that the overall mean values in each condition will be the 
same according to the null hypothesis. However, contrary to what one might expect, 
calculating means in this way can under certain circumstances lead to an artifactual 
difference between the mean values even when the sequence of stimuli is perfectly random. 
In order for this bias to arise, the pre-stimulus value of the dependent variable on a given 
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trial must, to a certain extent, be systematically related to the outcome of previous trials. This 
bias has been described in detail in a number of publications (Dalkvist & Westerlund, 2006; 
Dalkvist, Westerlund & Bierman, 2002; Radin, 2006; Wackermann, 2002) and has been 
discussed as a potential explanation for the results of presentiment studies (Broughton, 2004; 
Radin, 2004; Spottiswoode & May, 2003). 
 
An example of the how the bias can arise may be described in the following manner. 
Consider a presentiment experiment involving 4 participants, each receiving only two trials 
where the outcome of each trial is randomly determined to be either an emotional picture (E) 
or a calm picture (C). As shown in table 15, four participants are required to account for all 
possible permutations of trial outcomes from a two-trial experiment. Now suppose that a 
participant’s level of pre-stimulus arousal is zero on the first trial and that each participant 
engages in the so-called ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), here 
characterised by an erroneous belief that the probability of a particular outcome on the 
second trial is dependent on the outcome of the first trial. Specifically, let us say that each 
participant believes that the second trial is likely to be E merely because the previous trial 
was C. Now also suppose that if the first trial is C then the participant’s pre-stimulus arousal 
increases by one unit on the second trial due to the false expectation that the second trial will 
be E. 
 
As can be seen from table 15, each participant’s pre-stimulus arousal level starts at 0, 
representing no expectation about the outcome of the first trial. However, the pre-stimulus 
arousal level on the second trial changes as a function of the outcome from the first trial; if 
the first trial is C then the participant’s pre-stimulus arousal level on the second trial is 1; if 
the first trial is E then the pre-stimulus arousal level on the second trial is 0. The mean 
arousal columns in table 15 specify the participant mean arousal values for C and E trials 
calculated across the two trials in their particular session. The overall mean values are the 
overall mean arousal levels for C and E trials calculated across participant means. We can 
see that, on average, the overall mean arousal for E trials (0.333) is greater than the overall 
mean arousal for C trials (0.167), representing a bias. Moreover, if participant 1 and 4 are 
removed to allow a within-subjects analysis (since they did not receive at least one C or E 
trial) then the difference between C and E trials becomes greater (0.5). Because this bias has 
been largely described by modelling participant expectations about upcoming trials in 
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presentiment experiments (Dalkvist et al. 2002; Dalkvist & Westerlund 2006; Radin, 2004) it 












1 C 0 
0.5 n/a 
2 C 1 
      
2 
1 C 0 
0 1 
2 E 1 
      
3 
1 E 0 
0 0 
2 C 0 
      
4 
1 E 0 
n/a 0 
2 E 0 
      
   Overall 
Means: 
0.167 0.333 
    Bias = 0.167 
 




There is, however, a way in which the expectation bias can be avoided altogether in this two-
trial example. If overall mean values for pre-stimulus arousal are simply calculated across all 
trials, without firstly calculating individual participant means, then the overall mean values 
in each condition are 0.25 and no bias occurs. However, as pointed out by Dalkvist and 
Westerlund (2006), every possible permutation of trial outcomes must be included in the 
calculation and each permutation must be present an equal number of times in order for this 
method to result in zero bias. With a two-trial experiment, this does not pose a practical 
problem since there are only four possible permutations. However, for an experiment with 30 
trials per participant, Dalkvist and Westerlund (2006) calculate that 1.074 x 10
9
 participants 
would be required to ensure that all possible sequences are included with equal frequency, 
                                                          
8
 Two similar terms are used in the current chapter; the expectation effect and the expectation bias. 
The term expectation effect refers to a change in the dependent variable over successive trials as a 
result of expectation based on the outcome of previous trials. The term expectation bias refers to the 




thus reducing the bias to zero. Therefore, for practical reasons, presentiment experiments 
cannot include all possible permutations of trial outcomes and, under these circumstances, 
the mean arousal level will on average be larger for E trials compared to C trials whether 
means are calculated across all trials or across individual participant means. 
 
The ‘expectation bias’ is, of course, not reliant on expectation effects per se and is not 
restricted to experiments measuring pre-stimulus arousal. All that is required is that the 
experiment employs two or more stimulus categories or conditions and the dependent 
variable varies in some systematic way with the outcome of previous trials. For example, 
sequential dependency effects have been observed during choice reaction time tasks (Cho et 
al., 2002; Soetens, Boer, & Hueting, 1985; Sommer, Leuthold & Soetens, 1999; Tanaka & 
Shimojo, 1996), visual search (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000) and saccadic go/no-go tasks 
(Emeric et al., 2007). Since, in all these cases, the dependent variable systematically varies in 
accordance with the outcome of previous trials, we would expect a bias to arise for the same 
reasons as described above. Moreover, if the experiment employs a balanced design, as 
many psychology studies do, it may also be susceptible to biases based on statistical cueing. 
 
Dalkvist et al. (2002) report the results of a series of simulated presentiment ‘experiments’ 
that modelled participant expectations about upcoming stimuli based on the outcome of 
previous trials. In a manner similar to that illustrated in table 15, participants’ expectations 
were modelled as an increase in arousal after preceding ‘calm’ trials. Dalkvist et al. (2002) 
describe a simple binary model whereby pre-stimulus arousal on a given trial is set at 1 if the 
preceding trial was C and remains at that level until an E trial is encountered which resets the 
pre-stimulus arousal level to zero on the following trial. In the linear model, the pre-stimulus 
arousal on a given trial increases by 1 unit for every consecutive C trial unit it is reset to zero 
by an E trial. They also consider expectation functions with exponential and sigmoidal 
characteristics. In the exponential model, pre-stimulus arousal increases exponentially as a 
function of the number of previous C trials, whereas in the sigmoid model, pre-stimulus 
arousal is initially unresponsive to the first few consecutive C trials but accelerates as the 
number of consecutive C trials increases while finally levelling off at some maximum 
arousal level. Like the binary and linear models, pre-stimulus arousal in the exponential and 





They estimate the bias effect size resulting from each iteration of the simulation according to 




MeanE – MeanC 
X 100 
MeanAll 
         
 
Here, MeanE and MeanC are the overall mean pre-stimulus arousal values for ‘emotional’ and 
‘calm’ trials respectively, whereas MeanAll is the overall mean value collapsed across both 
conditions. As such, this is a relative percentage measure representing the size of the bias 
with respect to the average pre-stimulus arousal level. So, returning to the two-trial example 
illustrated in table 15, biasa for this hypothetical experiment would be calculated as follows: 
 
Biasa = 




 = 66.7%  
 
Thus, a two-trial ‘experiment’ of this type produces different mean arousal levels for calm 
and emotional trials and this bias is approximately two thirds the size of the overall mean 
arousal level. For each of the binary, linear, exponential and sigmoid models of expectation 
behaviour, Dalkvist et al. (2002) report the results of “about one million” (p. 68) simulated 
experiments where each experiment involved 16 participants, each receiving 32 trials. When 
the ratio of emotional to calm pictures was 1:1 and means were calculated over individual 
participant means, the size of biasa for the binary, linear, exponential and sigmoid models 
was reported as 6.39%, 12.48%, 11.34% and 6.39% respectively. However, when means 
were calculated across individual trials, the biasa value associated with each model was 
drastically reduced with no model producing a bias larger than 0.1%. Thus, Dalkvist et al. 
(2002) suggest that studies avoid calculating overall means across individual participant 
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means because this method is particularly prone to generating the bias. Instead, they 
recommend that analyses calculate means across all trials in the experiment in order to 
reduce the impact of the bias, although they do caution that more complex patterns of 
expectation may lead to larger biases. After examining the size of the bias in relation to 
sample size, they conclude that it decreases in size as the number of trials increases and 
approaches zero as the number of trials approaches infinity. 
 
As the above formula shows, the measure of biasa adopted by Dalkvist et al. (2002) is a 
relative measure with respect to the average pre-stimulus arousal level. Another potentially 
informative measure of bias is the size of the difference between the mean pre-stimulus 
arousal levels in each condition relative to the increase in arousal resulting from the 
modelled expectation behaviour. As far as the author is aware, this measure has not been 
previously described in the literature on the expectation bias and represents a novel means to 
assess the size of a simulated expectation bias relative to the expectation effect itself. 
Henceforth termed biasb, the measure can be expressed according to the following formula: 
 
Biasb = 
MeanE – MeanC 
X 100 
 MeanPreC – MeanPreE 
 
 
Here, MeanE and MeanC are defined in the same way as in biasa. However, MeanPreC is the 
mean pre-stimulus arousal level for trials in which the previous trial was C. Similarly, 
MeanPreE is the mean pre-stimulus arousal level for trials in which the previous trial was E. 
Again, if we return to the binary modelled two-trial example from table 15, biasb would be 
calculated as follows: 
Biasb = 
0.333 – 0.167 
X 100 
1 – 0 
 




Thus, it can be seen that the size of biasb is smaller than that of biasa and provides an 
estimate of the size of the expectation bias relative to the increase in arousal resulting from 
expectation behaviour. It should also be noted that although the term Mean Pre C – Mean Pre E 
will always a value of 1 in the binary model, the value of this term in linear, exponential and 
sigmoid models will vary as a function of how many consecutive C trials were generated by 
each randomised sequence. Values of biasb may be useful when examining data from real 
presentiment experiments. For example, it could be argued that if values of biasb tend to be 
relatively small across a number of reasonable models of expectation effect, we would 
expect to find relatively large expectation effects within datasets that generate significant 
presentiment effects, if such effects are indeed due to a bias of this kind. If, on the other 
hand, examination of experimental data does not provide evidence for the presence of 
relatively large expectation effects, despite the presence of concurrent presentiment effects, 
then an explanation for such positive results in terms of an expectation bias becomes less 
plausible.  
 
A series of simulations were therefore carried out with the following aims. Firstly, to 
replicate and extend the simulation results of Dalkvist et al. (2002) by providing estimates of 
biasa and biasb modelled according to simple rules of participant expectation in a 
presentiment experiment with dichotomous stimuli. Secondly, to assess the potential 
contribution of the expectation bias to the current paradigm by modifying the model 
parameters accordingly. In addition, the data from each experiment in the current thesis was 
examined to determine whether expectation effects were present and, if so, to evaluate 
whether the size of such effects could provide a plausible basis for the positive results from 
Experiment 1 and 4. 
 
 
Experiment 5A: A simulation of the expectation 
bias in a simple presentiment experiment 
 
The aim of Experiment 5A was to run a series of simulated experiments modelling the 
‘expectation bias’ and using the same model parameters described by Dalkvist et al (2002) in 
order to replicate their results. In addition, the methodology was extended to include a new 
relative measure of bias not previously described in the literature, here termed biasb, that 
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compared the difference between pre-stimulus arousal levels in each condition to the change 




Participants and sample size 
 
The same number of participants and trials per iteration were used in Experiment 5A as were 
used in Dalkvist et al. (2002) so that the results of each study could be reasonably compared. 
Therefore, in line with the Dalkvist et al. study, 16 ‘participants’ were run in each iteration of 




Two trial conditions were specified in the model, ‘calm’ and ‘emotional’. The outcome of 
each trial was determined randomly, with replacement, and independently both within and 
between participants. The RANDBETWEEN function in Microsoft Excel 2007 was used for 




Two models of expectation behaviour were specified. In the binary model, arousal on the 
first trial for a given participant was always set at 0. If the outcome of trial n was ‘calm’ then 
the arousal level on trial n+1 was set at 1. If the outcome of trial n was ‘emotional’ then the 
arousal level on trial n+1 was reset to 0. In the linear model, arousal on the first trial for a 
given participant was also set at 0. However, if the outcome of trial n was ‘calm’ then the 
arousal level on trial n+1 was the arousal level of trial n plus 1 arousal unit. Like the binary 
model, if the outcome of trial n was ‘emotional’ then the arousal level on trial n+1 was reset 







Trial Outcome Binary arousal Linear arousal 
1 “Calm” 0 0 
2 “Calm” 1 1 
3 “Calm” 1 2 
4 “Emotional” 1 3 
5 “Calm” 0 0 
6 “Emotional” 1 1 
7 “Emotional” 0 0 
8 “Emotional” 0 0 
 





Biasa and biasb were calculated according to the formulae presented above. For each 
iteration, values of biasa and biasb were obtained using mean arousal values calculated across 
all trials and across individual participant means. The overall bias estimates were then 
determined by averaging across all iterations (n = 5000). The by trial method of calculating 
mean arousal values simply summed the arousal levels across all trials in each condition and 
divided by the number of trials in each condition. The by participant method firstly 
calculated the mean arousal levels for each participant in each condition and then calculated 
the overall mean arousal levels across participant means.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results of each series of simulations are presented in table 17. It can be seen that the 
biasa estimates are, on the whole, slightly larger than those reported in Dalkvist et al. (2002) 
and the standard deviations are considerably larger. This may be due to the smaller number 
of iterations performed in the current series of simulations (5000 per series) compared to the 
“about a million” that were reported to have been carried out in Dalkvist et al. (2002) or it 
may reflect differences in the random number generators used in each case. However, the 
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results are qualitatively similar in that the size of biasa produced by the by participant 
method was much larger than that produced by the by trial method of calculating mean 
arousal values. Similarly, the linear model produced a larger biasa than the binary model, in 
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Table 17. Results of a series of simulated experiments with 16 participants each receiving 32 
trials, with 5000 iterations per series. Binary and linear models are shown, with means 
calculated by participants and by trials. BiasDalk refers to the values published in Dalkvist et 
al. (2002) using the same model parameters except for the number of iterations. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.  
 
 
The results also show that when the by participant method of calculating means was used, 
the measure of biasb was roughly half the size of biasa. For example, for the linear model, the 
difference in arousal between ‘calm’ and ‘emotional’ trials is approximately 6.4% of the 
increase in arousal resulting from the modelled expectation behaviour. Thus, if one were to 
assume that the linear model is a good approximation of participants’ expectation behaviour 
in a real experiment, one might expect to find an expectation effect approximately 15 times 
larger than the observed presentiment effect within the same dataset if the observed 
presentiment effect was really due to an expectation bias of this kind. Moreover, if means are 
calculated by trials, the situation is more extreme since the values of biasb are no greater than 
114 
 
1% of the modelled increase in arousal due to expectation. Dalkvist and Westerlund (2006) 
note that most published presentiment studies use the by-trial method of calculating mean 
pre-stimulus arousal values in each condition. Therefore, one might expect to find much 
larger expectation effects when examining the data from such studies if the results are due to 
an expectation bias. Perhaps the simplest way to detect expectation effects in previous 
studies would be to split the data by trials that were immediately preceded by calm versus 
emotional trials; the expectation bias hypothesis would predict greater pre-stimulus arousal 
on current trials that were preceded by calm trials compared to emotional trials, an effect that 
would hold regardless of whether the current trial was calm or emotional. 
 
The results of Experiment 5A were therefore in general agreement with the data from 
Dalkvist et al. (2002) thereby replicating their results. In addition, biasb estimates varied in a 
similar manner according to the particular model of expectation and the method of 
calculating mean arousal values. In Experiment 5B, a further series of simulations were 
therefore run in order to model the bias as it might apply to the current paradigm.  
 
 
Experiment 5B: Simulating the expectation bias in 
the current paradigm 
 
In a typical presentiment experiment, there is only one outcome variable per trial; a calm or 
emotion picture. However, there are two potential outcome variables for every trial in the 
current paradigm; the trial condition and the target position. Therefore, a model of 
expectation bias as applied to the current paradigm must take both of these outcome 
variables into account. Old trials provide participants with information about the array 
position occupied by the target item whereas new trials do not. One could therefore imagine 
a model of expectation whereby participants modify their viewing behaviour on the current 
trial based on knowledge of the position occupied by the target on the previous trial. For 
example, suppose that participants spend longer fixating the array position occupied by the 
preceding target if the preceding trial was in the old condition, and that viewing behaviour is 
unaffected if the preceding trial was in the new condition. This kind of model might be 
thought of as an ‘expectation effect’ but, clearly, a number of other perceptual and cognitive 
effects may form the basis of this model such as priming or procedural learning (Fecteau & 
Munoz, 2003). Whatever process underlies such sequential dependencies, a bias will emerge 
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for the same reasons as described previously. However, the size of the bias when modelled in 
the context of the present paradigm remains to be established, in addition to its potential 
contribution to the observed results. Thus, several series of simulations were run based on 
binary and linear models of expectation involving experiments with 96 participants, each 
receiving 48 trials. These participant and trial parameters were the same as used in 
Experiment 4 and would therefore provide a reasonable comparison with the results of this 
experiment, which seemed to have obtained suggestive evidence for a precognitive effect. In 
addition, a random and balanced method of determining the trial condition and target 





Participants and sample size 
 
96 participants were run on each iteration of the simulation. Each participant received 48 




Two outcomes were specified for each trial; the condition (‘old’ or ‘new’) and target position 
(1-4). In the random design, the condition of each trial and the target position were 
determined randomly with replacement (using the RANDBETWEEN function in Microsoft 
Excel 2007), and independently both within and between participants. This reproduced the 
randomisation conditions present in Experiments 3A and 3B. The balanced design used the 
same frequency and distribution of trial conditions and target positions as used in 
Experiment 4; each participant received the same number of trials in each condition and the 
target was specified in each array position an equal number of times both within participants 
and across an individual ‘experiment’. However, the sequence of trial conditions and target 
placements presented to participants was randomised for each successive iteration of the 






Versions of the binary and linear models were used in the current series of simulations.  The 
binary model was based on the following rules. The dependent variable (DV) was always set 
to 0 on trial 1 at each array position for every participant. If trial n was in the old condition, 
the DV on trial n+1 was set at 1 unit on the array position occupied by the target on trial n. 
However, if trial n was in the new condition, the DV was reset to 0 at all array positions on 
trial n+1. These rules reflect the fact that old trials provide information about the previous 
target position but new trials do not. In the linear model, the increase in the DV was additive 
within a particular array position rather than being set at 1, in the same way as described 
previously. An example of the output from each expectation model is shown in table 18. 
 
    Binary  Linear 


















1 Old 1  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
2 Old 3  1 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 
3 Old 3  0 0 1 0  0 0 1 0 
4 New n/a  0 0 1 0  0 0 2 0 
5 Old 2  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
6 New n/a  0 1 0 0  0 1 0 0 
7 New n/a  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
8 New n/a  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table 18. An 8-trial example of the binary and linear models of expectation behaviour as 









Biasa was a relative percentage measure defined as: 
 
Biasa = 




Here, MeanOldT is the overall mean value of the DV associated with target positions (i.e., 
referring to subscript ‘T’) in the old condition (i.e., referring to subscript ‘Old’)  whereas 
MeanNew is the overall mean value of the DV associated with all array positions in the new 
condition. MeanAll is the overall mean value of the DV collapsed across both categories. 
Thus, for the binary modelled 8-trial example illustrated in table 18, biasa would be 
calculated as follows: 
 
Biasa = 
(0 + 0 + 1 + 0) / 4 – (0.25 + 0.25 + 0 + 0) / 4 
X 100 
(0 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0 + 0.25 + 0 + 0) / 8 
 
 = 100%  
 
 
Biasb was also a relative percentage measure defined as: 
 
Biasb = 
MeanOldT – MeanNew 
X 100 
 MeanPreOldT – MeanPreNew 
 
Here, MeanOldT and MeanNew are defined in the same way as in biasa. However, MeanPreOldT is 
the overall mean value of the DV associated with array positions corresponding to the target 
position (i.e., referring to subscript ‘T’) on immediately preceding old trials (i.e., referring to 
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subscript ‘PreOld’), whereas MeanPreNew is the overall mean value of the DV associated with 
all array positions on trials that were immediately preceded by a new trial. The term 
MeanPreOldT – MeanPreNew thus refers to the mean increase in the DV as a result of the 
modelled expectation behaviour. The value for this term will be 1 in the binary model but 
will vary in the linear model as a function of the particular sequence of target positions 
generated in each simulated experiment. Thus, for the binary modelled 8-trial example 
illustrated in table 18, biasb would be calculated as follows:  
 
Biasb = 
(0 + 0 + 1 + 0) / 4 – (0.25 + 0.25 + 0 + 0) / 4 
X 100 
(1 + 1 + 1 + 1) / 4  – (0 + 0 + 0) / 3 
 
 = 12.5%  
 
For each iteration of the simulation, values of biasa and biasb were obtained using mean DV 
values calculated across all trials and across individual participant means. The overall bias 
estimates were then determined by averaging across all iterations (n = 5000). The by trial 
method summed DV values across all trials and divided by the number of trials. The by 
participant method firstly calculated the mean DV values for each participant and then 
calculated the overall mean DV values across participant means.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The results of each simulation are presented in table 19. It should firstly be noted that the 
bias estimates are mostly negative. This is due to the fact that the model specified an increase 
in the DV on the relevant array position. If the model specified the reverse relationship, then 
a positive bias would have been generally produced.  
 
When the outcome of each trial is randomly determined with replacement, the results are 
qualitatively similar to the results from Experiment 5A; calculating overall mean values 
across individual participant means produces a larger bias than calculating means over all 
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trials. The bias estimates are also smaller than those reported in Experiment 5A. This is 
likely to be due to two factors. Firstly, more participants were run in each iteration (96 as 
opposed to 16) and each participant received more trials (48 as opposed to 32). The results 
are therefore consistent with the conclusions of Dalkvist et al. (2002) who note that the size 
of the bias decreases as the number of trials increases. Secondly, the number of possible 
outcomes on a given trial is greater in the current paradigm compared to a typical 
presentiment experiment; if there are more possible outcomes, the effects of expectation on 
the resulting bias are diminished. In particular, the estimates of biasb are approximately 6 to 
10 times less than those produced from the previous series of simulations.  
 
However, when the trial outcomes are pre-determined and balanced across each experiment 
(but randomly sequenced for each iteration), the estimates of biasa and biasb are much larger. 
This is likely due to two factors. Firstly, there are statistical cues present as a result of the 
balancing. The modelled expectation behaviour, whereby the DV increases by one unit on 
the array position occupied by the target on the previous trial, has essentially the same effect 
as a response based on statistical cueing because, on average, the current target is less likely 
to occupy the same position as the target on the previous trial compared to a different 
position. Of course, the statistical advantage gained from basing current responses on the 
outcome of only the immediately preceding trial is much less than the advantage gained from 
basing current responses on all available information from the first trial, such as is the case 
with a cumulative count model described in Chapter 3. In other words, when an experiment 
uses a balanced design, ‘expectation’ behaviour is no longer fallacious and, in fact, can lead 
to an effect that reflects the processing of statistical cues embedded in the sequence of trials. 
Secondly, a computational bias arising from expectation will also contribute to the estimates 
of biasa and biasb in addition to the statistical cueing effect. Therefore, these two factors in 
combination may have contributed to the larger estimates in the balanced design. It is also 
noteworthy that, due to the balanced distribution of conditions and target positions, the by-
participant and by-trial method of calculating means produce equivalent values for each 






















































         


































         



































         





































Table 19. Results of 5000 simulated experiments with 96 participants each receiving 48 
trials. The method of determining trial outcome is shown as random or balanced. Binary and 
linear models are also shown, with means calculated by participants and by trials. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.  
 
 
Expectation Effects in Experiments 1 to 4 
 
The series of simulations run in Experiment 5B show that a robust expectation bias arises 
whenever overall means are calculated across participant means and that the bias is largest 
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when a balanced design is used. Nevertheless, the estimates of biasb are still only 2% of the 
modelled increase in the dependent variable for balanced designs. The data from each 
experiment in the current thesis was therefore examined in order to establish whether 
expectation effects were present in each case and whether the size of the expectation effects 
could plausibly account for the positive results in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4. For each 
experiment, the TDT data was re-categorised in order to derive values of MeanPreOldT and 
MeanPreNew as these terms were defined above. TDT data was used because this was the only 
variable to have shown an apparent precognitive effect. The values of biasb suggest that, as a 
conservative estimate, the difference between MeanPreOldT and MeanPreNew should be at least 
20 times the size of the apparent precognitive effect if the expectation bias is to offer a 
plausible explanation for the positive results of Experiment 1 and 4. It would also be of 
interest to establish whether expectation effects occurred in the experiments that generated 
null results. 
 
Table 20 shows the values of MeanOldT, MeanNew (or MeanNewT for Experiment 1 and 2 since 
the comparison was between fixed target items in the old and new condition), MeanPreOldT and 
MeanPreNew for each experiment. Means were calculated across individual participant means. 
The data shows that the difference between MeanPreOldT and MeanPreNew was relatively small 
compared to the difference between MeanOldT and MeanNew in all experiments. A significant 
expectation effect was found in both the full and trimmed dataset of Experiment 3B 
suggesting that participants spent less time fixating the array position occupied by the target 
on the previous trial: all data, t(49) = -2.60, p < 0.05, d = -0.50; 10% trimmed data, t(49) = -
2.32, p < 0.05, d = -0.46 (both tests Bonferroni corrected for two comparisons). However, no 
significant precognitive effect was found in Experiment 3B despite the presence of the 
expectation effect suggesting that an expectation effect of that magnitude was not sufficient 
to contribute to a significant expectation bias. Furthermore, no evidence for expectation 
effects was found in Experiments 1 and 4, both of which had obtained suggestive evidence 
for precognitive effects. Indeed, the difference between MeanPreOldT and MeanPreNew in both 
Experiments 1 and 4 was actually less than the difference between MeanOldT and MeanNew. In 
summary, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the results of Experiment 1 or 4 
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Table 20. An analysis of expectation effects in each of the experiments presented in the 
current thesis. * refers to effects with p-values less than 0.05. 
 
  
Other studies have also failed to find expectation effects in presentiment data. Broughton 
(2004) ran a standard presentiment experiment measuring pre-stimulus skin conductance 
response to calm and emotional stimuli and failed to observe either a presentiment effect or 
any kind of expectation effect. Radin (2004) combined the data from two of his presentiment 
studies in order to establish whether the expectation bias may account for his positive results. 
However, rather than looking at the pre-stimulus values of the dependent variable (skin 
conductance level) on trials that were preceded by calm versus emotional trials, Radin tested 
for a correlation between the pre-stimulus skin conductance level and the number of 
successively preceding calm trials for a subset of participants pre-selected for displaying 
strong presentiment effects. The resulting correlation was not significantly positive (as 
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would be predicted from the expectation hypothesis) and Radin concludes that the 
expectation bias is not a viable explanation for his results. 
 
However, drawing firm conclusions from simple models of expectation is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, as Dalkvist et al. (2002) point out, there are various expectation 
strategies that participants may adopt, all of which may lead to some degree of bias. There 
may also be more complex expectation functions that have not been considered here which 
lead to larger biases. In other words, the results of simulations and the conclusions that are 
drawn from them are dependent on the starting assumptions and there is no guarantee that 
the assumptions are appropriate for a particular dataset from a ‘real’ experiment. Different 
participants may also be adopting different expectation strategies which may complicate 
matters further.  
 
One could argue that, in general, it is better to run an experiment that rules out a particular 
bias by design rather than examining the data post-hoc in an effort to establish whether the 
bias had a significant effect on the results. This argument may be particularly relevant to 
parapsychological studies since most research hypotheses do not have a firm theoretical 
foundation. Based on the results on the above simulations, perhaps the best way to 
confidently rule out the influence of expectation effects is to randomise all experimental 
variables with replacement and calculate mean values across all trials. Unfortunately, 
randomisation with replacement may generate an unequal distribution of variables which 
may ultimately introduce unwanted noise into an experiment if an insufficient sample size is 
used. One also loses a certain degree of statistical power by averaging across all trials when a 
within-subjects analysis could be used instead. On the other hand, balancing variables across 
the experiment introduces statistical cues and results in larger estimates of biasa and biasb 
whether means are calculated across all trials or across individual participant means. 
However, the data presented here suggests that, in general, participants’ responses on current 
trials were not significantly influenced by the outcome of the previous trial and that when 
such behaviour did occur this did not lead to a bias in the comparison between conditions. 
Furthermore, when a balanced design was used in Experiment 4, the presence of statistical 
cues did not facilitate expectation effects. This suggests that the expectation bias does not 





Chapter 5: General Discussion and 
Conclusions 
 
Summary of the current series of experiments 
 
Seemingly prophetic experiences have been reported throughout history and continue to be 
interpreted in terms of a paranormal process by many people. For example, surveys show 
that about 25% of the population believes in the ability to predict the future by paranormal 
means (Moore, 2005). Such a widespread belief, coupled with case collections of ostensible 
precognition, provide an incentive to examine such experiences in a scientific manner. One 
approach, termed anomalistic psychology (Zusne & Jones, 1982) examines whether such 
experiences can be explained by perceptual and cognitive biases that cause an individual to 
believe that a paranormal event may have taken place when, in fact, it has not (Blagrove, 
French & Jones, 2006; French, 2003; French & Wilson, 2006; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 
1985; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). Another approach asks whether such experiences  may 
represent the result of an underlying process that has not yet been described by current 
scientific models of perception and cognition. The latter approach has been the one adopted 
in the current thesis.  
 
Numerous studies attempting to address this question in a controlled laboratory setting have 
reported evidence for apparently anomalous anticipatory responses to upcoming stimuli 
using a variety of methodologies. The dependent variable has comprised of behavioural 
measures such as forced choice and reaction time and physiological measures such as 
electrodermal activity, heart rate, brain electrical activity, BOLD response, pupil dilation and 
eye movements. The results from a number of these studies suggest that attentional processes 
may have been involved in the expression of the anticipatory effect (Don et al., 1998; 
McDonough et al., 2002; McRaty et al., 2004b; Warren et al., 1992a, 1992b). The current 
thesis was an attempt to build upon this research by testing for the presence of precognitive 
effects in the activity of the visual attention system using eye tracking techniques. Five 
empirical studies were carried out using a novel experimental paradigm designed for this 
purpose and an additional two studies modelled the potential impact of expectation artifacts 
on the data obtained from this paradigm. Each trial required participants to memorise an 
array of real-world objects while their eye movements were recorded and, after a brief 
retention interval, a probe stimulus was presented for a yes/no recognition test. Two 
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conditions were employed and were randomly determined. In the old condition, the probe 
was an item viewed during study, termed the target. In the new condition, the probe was a 
novel item. Experiments tested for the presence of precognition by examining whether there 
was a selective response to target items during the study phase of old trials. Two dependent 
variables were considered; the total dwell time (TDT) defined as the total time spent fixating 
an item over the recording period and the first fixation time (FFT) defined as the time taken 
to fixate an array item for the first time. 
 
Experiment 1 was designed as an initial test of the paradigm and obtained suggestive 
evidence in support of the precognitive hypothesis. Specifically, TDT was greater for target 
items when presented in the old condition compared to the new condition suggesting that 
targets held more attention when they were to be repeatedly presented in the future. 
However, a randomisation error resulted in a biased sequence of trials which brought the 
results of Experiment 1 into question. Nonetheless, no clear evidence for sequence learning 
could be found in the data, indicated by no increase in the effect over the course of 
individual participant sessions. Experiment 2 was an attempt to replicate the results of 
Experiment 1 using identical methods, except for a correction in the random assignment of 
conditions. Experiment 2 obtained null results, failing to replicate the apparent precognitive 
effect found in the initial study. A number of methodological changes were made in 
Experiments 3A and 3B. A more extensive randomisation procedure was implemented 
which involved the random selection of target items and their position in the array in order to 
further reduce the possibility of spurious effects. Experiment 3A was a further attempt to 
replicate the suggestive effect found in Experiment 1 but failed to find any evidence in 
support of the precognitive hypothesis. Experiment 3B was designed to explore the potential 
effect of encouraging participants to adopt a verbal encoding strategy during the study phase 
by presenting object names as probes in the recognition test. A significant effect was found 
in the FFT data but a trimming procedure nullified this result suggesting that it was likely 
caused by outliers. Experiment 4 introduced a balanced design in order to control for the 
confounding effects of differences in the salience of target items and their position in the 
array. The TDT data showed that participants spent less time fixating targets in the old 
condition compared to items in the new condition with the effect marginally failing to reach 
significance. However, the effect was significant after trimming the data to remove outliers 
and suggested that less attentional resources were allocated to targets. Experiment 4 also 
explored whether the apparent effect was related to normative variables associated with the 
experimental stimuli. The results of this exploratory analysis showed a weak and suggestive 
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correlation between the apparent precognitive effect and both the familiarity and complexity 
ratings for each item. In other words, participants tended to spend less time fixating target 
items that were relatively more familiar and more visually complex. Finally, Experiment 5A 
and 5B examined whether an expectation bias could account for the results of the current 
thesis. Using a simple model of expectation in a series of simulated experiments of 
comparable sample size to Experiment 4, it was found that the resulting bias was no greater 
than 2.5% of the size of the expectation effect built into the simulation. Furthermore, 
examining the actual data from Experiments 1 to 4 did not reveal any compelling evidence to 





Do the results of the current thesis, as a whole, provide evidence for the presence of 
precognitive effects in the activity of the visual attention system or are they more plausibly 
explained by known factors? Before this question is directly addressed, it may be helpful to 
discuss a number of related conceptual and methodological issues. Firstly, the analyses 
presented in the current thesis rely on the use of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). 
As Cohen (1994) points out, the null hypothesis is often formulated as a ‘nil’ hypothesis 
stating that the means of two groups are identical. This is the case in the current thesis where 
the null hypothesis states that mean measures of TDT and FFT are identical in the old and 
new conditions. The use of NHST has been criticised on a number of occasions. For 
example, Cohen (1990) states, 
 
A little thought reveals a fact widely understood among statisticians: The null 
hypothesis, taken literally (and that's the only way you can take it in formal 
hypothesis testing), is always false in the real world. It can only be true in the bowels 
of a computer processor running a Monte Carlo study (and even then a stray electron 
may make it false). If it is false, even to a tiny degree, it must be the case that a large 
enough sample will produce a significant result and lead to its rejection.  (p. 1308) 
 
Similarly, in discussing the precognition studies carried out by Bem (2011), LeBel and 
Peters (2011) criticise Bem’s use of the null hypothesis on the basis that “it is almost by 
definition false” (p. 4) and argue that observing a statistically significant difference between 
two groups is then dependent on a large enough sample size that will reveal this underlying 
difference above the level of statistical noise. Accordingly, LeBel and Peters (2011) suggest 
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that the small effect found in Bem’s (2011) Experiment 2, reported as a significant hit rate of 
51.7% where 50% was expected by chance, is an example of this inevitable principle. 
However, the question then arises; what processes could lead to the null hypothesis being 
false in Bem’s study? In experimental tests of precognition, the null (or nil) hypothesis is 
usually formulated on the basis that experimental conditions are randomly assigned. 
Therefore, in order to claim that the ‘null is always false’ in this context, one must postulate 
that the random assignment of experimental conditions deviates from true randomness. 
Brugger and Taylor (2003) point out that all forms of random event generation will contain 
some degree of bias. Although this is undoubtedly true, the degree of bias present in most 
modern software-based pseudo-RNGs is very small. For example, all of the experiments 
described in the current thesis used the Mersenne Twister algorithm to generate random 
events. The period (the number of random events generated by an RNG before its 
deterministic output is repeated) of the Mersenne Twister is 2
19937
 (Matsumoto & Nishimura, 
1998).
 9
 In experimental contexts, this clearly rules out the null being false on the basis of 
RNG periodicity. In addition, the Mersenne Twister passes several stringent tests of 
randomness (L’Ecuyer & Simard, 2007) including the Diehard battery of tests (Marsaglia, 
1985). Likewise, Bem (2011) reports that the range of RNGs used in his experiments all pass 
the Diehard tests of randomness. It is therefore implausible that the extremely small bias 
present in the output of these RNGs can be held responsible for the results of experiments 
where the total number of randomisation events (such as the random assignment of 
conditions or other stimulus parameters) is relatively low. Arguments that appeal to the 
ubiquitous falsity of the null (or nil) hypothesis in purely experimental contexts, although 
logically sound, are thus of little practical significance when randomisation is shown to be 
adequate. Indeed, such arguments can be safely ignored. In addition, a number of authors 
argue that the claim of the null hypothesis always being false is meant to apply to non-
experimental studies. For example, Cohen (1994) points out that, 
 
Most of the criticism of NHST in the literature has been for this special case where 
its use may be valid only for true experiments involving randomisation (e.g., 
controlled clinical trials) or when any departure from pure chance is meaningful (as 
in laboratory experiments on clairvoyance). (p. 1000) 
 
                                                          
9
 Although the Mersenne Twister was used to randomise the sequence of trials in Experiment 4, 




Similarly, Hagen (1997) suggests that frequently cited commentaries on this issue such as 
Cohen (1990) and Meehl (1978) are often taken out of context and that Meehl (1990) was 
clear on stating that the ubiquitous falsity of the null hypothesis did not apply to “pure 
experimental studies” (p. 204). Indeed, LeBel and Peters (2011) even acknowledge that “it 
might be argued that the use of a null hypothesis of no difference is theoretically appropriate 
in Bem’s tests for precognition” (p. 4), an admission that seems to undermine their critique 
of Bem’s use of NHST in this respect.  
 
A second related issue is that experiments purporting to be empirical tests of psi, including 
precognition, define the effect of interest somewhat negatively. With experimental tests of 
precognition, including the studies reported in the current thesis, the effect under test is 
defined as an anomalous correlation between responses in the present and the presentation of 
stimuli in the future. This definition means that in order for an observed result to qualify as a 
precognitive effect, known means by which such a correlation could come about have to be 
excluded; if it is assumed that such means have indeed been controlled for then a claim for 
an anomalous result can be made. One critical response to this general methodological 
rationale has been to argue that successfully ruling out known factors is problematic 
(Alcock, 2003; Hyman, 1994). Such concerns are bolstered by the fact that in certain cases, 
known factors have been identified post-hoc that could potentially explain positive results 
that were assumed to have been obtained under conditions where all known factors were 
ruled out (Dalkvist & Westerlund, 2006; Hyman, 1994). In other words, the extent to which 
known factors can be said to have been ruled out is dependent on the ingenuity of the 
experimenter or critic. Thus, whether or not the results of the current series of experiments 




Are the positive results due to known factors? 
 
Since the test stimuli in the current series of experiments were presented to participants at 
least one second after critical responses had been made and recorded, there was no 
possibility that sensory information from the test items was available to participants during 
the recording period. Such issues of sensory leakage are relevant to other categories of psi 
experiment where remote stimuli are presented contemporaneously, for example in ganzfeld 
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telepathy designs, but they are not applicable to precognition designs where the remote 
stimulus is presented after the response has been recorded. Therefore, discussion of known 
factors in the current paradigm will be limited to consideration of chance processes and the 
possibility that participants were able to obtain statistical information that biased their 
responses to target items.  
 
The first possibility that can be considered is that the null is true and that the significant 
results obtained from individual studies were false positives generated by random variation. 
At least two factors suggest that this may be the case. Firstly, the replication rate of the 
current paradigm was poor. Five experimental tests of the precognitive hypothesis were 
carried out in total, involving approximately 300 participants. Two studies obtained positive 
results that were marginally significant while the remaining three studies obtained null 
results. Secondly, the positive results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 were 
inconsistent. In Experiment 1, the results suggested that participants spent more time fixating 
targets yet in Experiment 4 the opposite was the case. Statistical noise would tend to produce 
low replicability and inconsistent, bidirectional false positive results. It should also be noted 
that significant results were only obtained in Experiment 4 when the data was trimmed post-
hoc, an improvement that may also have been due to chance.
10
 Some authors have used null 
results to argue that psi does not exist. For example, Moulton and Kosslyn (2008) ran an 
fMRI experiment attempting to test for selective brain activation to target stimuli and 
observed null results in the BOLD response data and in performance on their behavioural 
task. On the basis that no evidence for underlying brain activity in response to target stimuli 
was found, they conclude that psi does not exist. However, their conclusion may have been 
premature considering that they carried out only one study with relatively few participants. 
Furthermore, affirming the null is inherently problematic since a lack of positive findings 
can arguably be attributed to suboptimal testing conditions, especially if the claimed 
phenomenon does not have a firm theoretical foundation as is the case with psi effects in 
general.   
 
                                                          
10
 However, a Bonferroni correction for two comparisons was applied to each test of the precognitive 
hypothesis which can reduce the statistical power of the test and increase the likelihood of committing 





Another possible interpretation of the results from the current thesis is that the positive 
findings were due to various forms of bias. Indeed, the only significant results from 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 were observed when bias was likely to have been present, 
specifically in the randomisation of trial conditions and target positions. In Experiment 1, the 
RNG used to randomise the sequence of old and new trials produced a ratio of old to new 
trials of approximately 4:3 when 1:1 was expected by chance. In Experiment 4, the sequence 
of trial conditions and target positions was expected to contain structure due to the balanced 
design employed in that particular study. Each participant received the same number of trials 
in the old and new condition and was also presented with the same number of target items in 
each array position. Thus, the probability of a target item appearing in a particular array 
position on a given trial was not held constant, as would be the case using a method of 
randomisation with replacement. In a balanced design of this sort, the probability of a 
particular outcome on a given trial is dependent on the outcome of previous trials. For 
example, there may be occasions where the probability that a given trial will be in the old 
condition is greater than the probability that the trial will be in the new condition. A similar 
situation is expected to arise for the probabilities associated with target position within the 
array.  
 
There are a number of potential ways in which a bias in the sequence of trial conditions and 
target positions could have led to spurious results. Firstly, it is possible that participants’ eye 
movements were influenced by implicit learning of non-random patterns embedded in the 
trial sequence. Brugger and Taylor (2003) put forward implicit sequence learning as a 
mechanism that may account for the results of many positive findings in parapsychology 
where subjects are given feedback on their performance from trial to trial. For example, they 
refer to experiments carried out by Tart (1976) who hypothesised that participants could 
learn to use ESP in a forced choice guessing task by responding to internal cues that were 
reinforced by immediate feedback. Some of the results from Tart’s studies were highly 
significant but upon closer examination, Gatlin (1979) claimed to have identified significant 
non-random structure in the trial sequences from Tart’s data that may have been learned by 
participants. Nevertheless, in the current thesis, no evidence for implicit sequence learning 
was found when the data from Experiment 1 was examined; the TDT effect did not increase 
over the course of individual sessions but, on the contrary, tended to decrease although this 
negative relationship was non-significant. Similarly, no evidence for implicit learning was 
found in Experiment 4 where the effect also decreased as each session progressed, although 
again this was not a significant decline. This provides evidence against the implicit learning 
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hypothesis since it would predict an increase in the size of the effect over time as participants 
learn to respond to the structure embedded in the sequence of trials presented to them. It 
should also be noted that a previous psi study using a fully counterbalanced design failed to 
find a significant effect (Moulton & Kosslyn, 2008) despite this study involving a greater 
number of trials across which individual participants could have learned to respond to 
sequential bias compared to the present series of studies.   
 
In addition to implicit sequence learning, one could argue that the non-random structure 
contained in the sequence of trial conditions and target positions from Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 4 just happened to match participants’ inherent response biases. It is almost 
certain that participants will display response biases in any precognition study and the results 
of the present thesis were no exception. For example, participants tended to fixate items in a 
stereotypical clockwise manner with a greater degree of attention allocated to items located 
in the top left region of the array. If the assignment of experimental conditions and 
parameters is truly random then such biases will not inflate the rate of false positives above 
that expected by chance. However, if the sequence of trials contains an element of non-
random structure, then the likelihood of response biases matching this patterning is no longer 
solely based on random variation. Such an account has been put forward to explain the 
results of past psi studies. For example, Colwell, Schroder and Sladen (2000) report an 
experiment on ‘the sense of being stared at’ in which a receiver made a binary choice on a 
given trial as to whether they were being looked at by a remote observer. A feedback and a 
no-feedback condition were employed and the results showed that participants performed 
better than chance when they were given trial-by-trial feedback. Crucially, subsequent 
analysis showed that there were more alternations in the sequence of stare and no-stare trials 
than expected by chance but only in the feedback condition. Brugger (1997) points out that 
participants who are asked to produce random sequences by purely subjective means also 
tend to make more alternations than expected by chance, and on this basis Colwell et al. 
(2000) conclude that their results may have been due to a fortuitous match between the non-
random trial sequence and participants’ response biases. 
 
A number of simple models of the expectation bias were also explored in detail in Chapter 4 
but it was found that the artifactual effects from such models were trivial at best when 
considered in the context of the current series of experiments. For example, in order for an 
expectation bias to plausibly account for the results of Experiment 4, an expectation effect of 
at least 20 times the magnitude of the observed results would have to have been present in 
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the data. However, no evidence for an expectation effect was found for this experiment. 
Indeed, the one study that did reveal an expectation effect (Experiment 3B) did not show 
evidence for a precognitive effect suggesting that the presence of expectation effects of such 
magnitude were not sufficient to generate an artifactual result. 
 
In summary, no compelling evidence was obtained suggesting that expectation biases or 
implicit sequence learning were responsible for the positive results obtained in the current 
thesis. However, more complex models of expectation not considered here may be able to 
account for such results. Perhaps the most likely explanation for the results of Experiment 1 
and Experiment 4 in terms of known factors is that participant response biases fortuitously 
matched the bias present in the sequence of trial conditions and target positions generated in 
each experiment. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be entirely ruled out as an 
explanation for the results of the current thesis as a whole. Further replication attempts 
would be needed to resolve these issues. For example, successful replications would serve to 
lower the probability that the positive results obtained here were due to chance or a match 
between response bias and sequential bias. On other hand, if further replication attempts 
failed to reproduce the results of Experiment 1 or Experiment 4 then it would be more likely 
that the results from these studies were due to the known factors described above.  
 
 
Exploring the precognitive hypothesis 
 
The two-stage framework 
 
Even though the null hypothesis cannot be adequately ruled out in the current series of 
experiments, it may be useful to explore ways in which the positive results may be explained 
if they do indeed represent genuine precognitive effects. The most popular way of 
conceptualising extra-sensory effects has been to suggest that they occur according to a two-
stage process (Broughton, 2006; Irwin, 1979; Roll, 1966; Stanford 1974; Tyrell, 1946). In 
stage 1, a novel physical principle is thought to generate information about a normally 
inaccessible target event at some level, or levels, within an individual’s neuropsychological 
system. Subsequently, stage 2 is thought to involve established physical principles, as 
opposed to paranormal ones, whereby the information derived from stage 1 is processed by 
perceptual and cognitive systems appropriate to the locus, or loci, at which the information is 
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established. Two-stage models generally assume that information arising from stage 1 is 
generated at a level below conscious awareness and that processing of this information 
during stage 2 may result in a conscious experience or some form of behavioural response. 
 
A description of the range of models proposed as a basis for stage 1 is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, it should be noted that recent theoretical developments in the 
physics of retro-causation (e.g., Cramer, 2006; Sheehan, 2006) may offer a plausible 
framework upon which to model stage 1 processes involved in precognition and, more 
generally, retro-causal effects in the brain. Indeed, retro-causation has been suggested as a 
candidate stage 1 mechanism to account for the results of many precognitive effects 
described in Chapter 2 (Radin, 2006). Similarly, Bierman (2010) notes that the inherent 
time-symmetry of physical formalisms allows for so-called retarded and advanced solutions 
that “are identical but reflected in time” (p. 278) and suggests that this may provide a 
theoretical basis for precognition. Although it is normally assumed that ‘time-reversed’ 
solutions to the fundamental equations of physics are in some way prohibited in the observed 
universe, Bierman (2010) speculates that consciousness can function to partially restore this 
inherent time-symmetry which may result in the appearance of time-reversed effects in 
cognition. However, Bierman is clear to point out that his theory does not allow for the 
future to influence the past, but rather that “at any moment a signal has determinants that are 
from past as well as from future boundary conditions” (p. 283). Precisely how consciousness 
is able to restore time-symmetry is not discussed, although he does suggest that the degree to 
which this restoration occurs is proportional to the degree of coherence in the activity of the 
brain and proposes a number of testable predictions from his theory.  
 
Considering that such theorising is at a speculative stage and in the absence of a firm 
theoretical foundation for stage 1, theorists and experimentalists attempting to study 
potential stage 2 processes are forced to treat stage 1 as a necessary but unknown means by 
which information is generated within an individual’s neuropsychological system. 
Nevertheless, it is sometimes assumed that stage 1 at least involves some kind of information 
transfer from the environment to the percipient. For example, Bem (2011) defines psi as 
“anomalous processes of information or energy transfer that are currently unexplained in 
terms of known physical or biological mechanisms” (p. 407). Others are neutral with regard 
to the particular type of physical principle that may underlie stage 1. For example, 
Broughton (2006) stresses that although the character of extra-sensory experiences makes it 
appear as if information has been transferred from the environment to the percipient, it 
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should not be assumed from the outset that stage 1 necessarily involves information transfer. 
Similarly, Irwin (1979) uses the term ‘psi input’ to refer to the initial information generated 
from stage 1 but emphasises that, 
 
...psi input is defined to be within the system, and should not be regarded as an 
environmental stimulus. It may prove to have its origins in such as stimulus, or it 
may just ‘happen’ in the system, but in no way should use of the term psi input be 
taken in itself as an assumption of the former view in preference to the latter. (p.64) 
 
Irwin’s model of psi functioning does, however, propose a locus for the generation of 
information from stage 1. Specifically, he suggests that an anomalous process results in the 
activation of target-relevant representations held in memory. Other theorists have also 
suggested that memory may play a central role in the generation of extra-sensory effects 
(Broughton, 2006; Roll, 1966; Stanford, 1974). According to such models, psi is thought to 
directly activate target-relevant memory representations in the absence of any preceding 
signals from sensory or top-down pathways. Upon activation, these memory representations 
are then subject to further processing as if they had been triggered by sensory or higher-level 
signals. 
 
Irwin (1979) proposes that the most likely processing locus for stage 1 is the activation of 
memory representations coding for structural features of target stimuli. In support of this 
hypothesis, he cites evidence from a series of informal telepathic picture drawing 
experiments reported by Sinclair (1962) and Warcollier (1938) where ‘receivers’ were 
generally more successful at describing the structural features of target objects rather than 
identifying them by name or by describing semantic associations. For example, there were 
some occasions where the receiver accurately described the structural features of the target 
object but misidentified the target as a semantically unrelated object with similar physical 
characteristics. According to Irwin’s proposal, this may have occurred because the stage 1 
process directly activated stored structural representations for objects that had similar 
physical characteristics to the target but were semantically unrelated to it, leading to 
misidentifications. However, the results of these informal experiments are also compatible 
with the assumption that stage 1 information is initially generated within low level sensory 
analysis pathways where the pattern of activation corresponds to the structural features of the 
target. These presumably weak sensory signals may then have been processed in such a 
manner as to activate representations from long term memory which were admitted into 
conscious awareness in the form of visual imagery. According to this account, the apparent 
misidentification of targets reported in Sinclair (1962) and Warcollier (1938) may have been 
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due to weak psi-mediated signals from sensory pathways resulting in a relatively diffuse 
activation of stored structural descriptions with features common to a range of objects from 
different semantic categories. Irwin ultimately rejects such an account on the basis that 
activation of sensory pathways from stage 1 would predict a pattern of performance in psi 
tasks that is sensitive to parameters that affect normal sensory discriminability such as size, 
form or orientation, and claims that reviews of early card guessing experiments (Pratt, Rhine, 
Smith, Stuart & Greenwood, 1940) do not support this prediction.  However, Broughton 
(2006) argues that relatively little information may be generated by stage 1 and that this may 
account for an apparent lack of sensory processing characteristics. 
 
Therefore, although most theorists seem to agree that memory is likely to be involved in the 
expression of extra-sensory effects, it is unclear whether it is more appropriate to regard 
stage 1 as directly activating long term memories or whether the activation of target-relevant 
memory representations is an indirect result of stage 1 activity occurring elsewhere in the 
processing hierarchy. Regardless of which interpretation may turn out to be correct, two-
stage models assume that the information generated from stage 1 is made available for 
further processing and integration with ongoing cognitive and perceptual processes during 
stage 2. The current thesis examined the activity of one such ongoing process, that of visual 
attention. One of the main functions of attention is to select activated representations for 
more detailed processing, including those from long term memory. The activity of attention 
is therefore consistent with the proposed function of stage 2 in the two-stage framework and 
is particularly compatible with memory models of psi where stored representations activated 
by stage 1 would be available for selection and enhanced processing.  
 
 
Models of attentional selection 
 
One influential theory of attention, put forward by Broadbent (1958), proposed that selection 
occurs by means of a filter that is applied to all incoming sensory information at early levels 
of analysis and functions to prevent further processing of unattended input on the basis of the 
input’s representation of physical features. Input that does not match the filter’s parameters 
is prevented from being processed any further and is lost through decay. However, inputs 
matching the parameters of the filter are allowed to pass and can gain access to a limited 
capacity, serial processing system that Broadbent considered necessary for conscious 
awareness. A modification of Broadbent’s filter theory was proposed by Treisman (1964) 
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who suggested that the filter acts to attenuate inputs rather than block them out completely. 
Broadbent later adapted his original theory to take Treisman’s attenuator model into account 
(Broadbent, 1982). Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) proposed an alternative framework to filter 
theory which was motivated by evidence suggesting that complex information could pass 
through the filter on unattended channels (Moray, 1959). The model first supposes that all 
inputs achieve a high level of perceptual processing and are each given a weighting that 
represents that input’s importance to the individual. Selection then acts on these signals 
according to their relative weights by means of a ‘shifting reference standard’; the signal 
with the highest importance is the one that is selected. Deutsch and Deutsch’s theory 
essentially allows selection to occur on the basis of a signal’s meaning as well as its physical 
characteristics. Norman (1968) proposed a model of attention that emphasised the 
relationship between selection and memory. Like the model of Deutsch and Deutsch (1963), 
Norman’s model proposed that all sensory inputs automatically activate representations held 
in long term memory before any selection occurs. Once representations have been activated 
from long term memory, they are assigned ‘pertinence’ values that are based on the nature of 
the input and its context. Processing of these representations then proceeds and their 
pertinence values can change according to the level at which they are processed. In 
Norman’s model, selection is based on the representation with the highest pertinence value at 
any given time. Since pertinence values are continually being updated, selection can act on 
representations at various stages of processing. Attention is also regarded as an important 
component in models of working memory (Baddeley, 2007; Cowan, 1988, 1999). Cowan 
(1988, 1999) proposes an embedded process model of working memory whereby exogenous 
and endogenous inputs temporarily activate representations held in long term memory. A 
limited capacity focus of attention then selects representations from this temporarily 
activated pool and prevents their decay, thereby forming the basis of working memory 
content. Like in earlier models of attention, unattended representations are not subject to 
further processing and quickly decay.  
 
Recent models of attention have described selection as a competitive process (Desimone & 
Duncan 1995; Knudsen, 2007). Knudsen (2007) presents a model of visual attention where, 
at any given moment, a pool of activated representations are available for selection, 
including those originating from perceptual analysis, long term memory, motor control and 
higher level cognition (see figure 16). Activated representations compete for selection at 
various levels of processing (Desimone & Duncan 1995) and, at any given level, 
representations with the greatest signal strength are selected and undergo further processing 
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such as access to working memory and consciousness. Overt orienting of visual attention, via 
eye movements, is ultimately achieved by gaze control circuitry that directs the eyes to a 
portion of the visual field that has been selected for further processing. Gaze control circuitry 
receives input from both working memory and directly from the pool of activated 
representations that have won the competitive selection process. The former pathway 
corresponds to conscious and voluntary control of attention while the latter pathway 
represents involuntary and unconscious control. However, competitive selection of activated 
representations occurs in both cases. The signal strength of activated representations can be 
influenced by bottom-up or top-down pathways. In bottom-up pathways, filters are applied 
to incoming sensory information and function to increase the signal strength of 
representations encoding salient physical features of stimuli such as high contrast or spatial 
infrequency. In the current paradigm, array items that are physically salient are expected to 
attract attention and perhaps hold attention for longer periods on this basis. Top-down 
pathways involve higher-level signals that can bias the sensitivity of neural circuits 
underlying activated representations. In this way, activated representations that are important 
or relevant to an individual’s goals can be selected for further processing. In the current 
paradigm, top-down signals are likely to be involved in the selection of the next array item 
that requires encoding into short term memory once encoding of the currently fixated item 
has reached a threshold level.  
 
 
What kind of information processing may underlie the 
selective response to targets? 
 
If it is assumed that the positive results from the current thesis represent genuine 
precognitive effects, the model proposed by Knudsen (2007) can be used to speculate that 
during the study phase of old trials, an anomalous process generated target-relevant 
information somewhere in the processing scheme illustrated in figure 16 and that this 
information was subsequently able to affect gaze control. Lack of a theoretical basis for stage 
1 makes it difficult to predict a precise locus for the initial generation of target information. 
However, one possibility is that information generated by stage 1 directly or indirectly 
influenced either the strength of activated representations coding for target-relevant features 
or influenced the ease with which such representations were activated during the study 
phase. The model proposed by Knudsen (2007) would predict that an increase in the 
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activation strength of target-relevant representations would provide these representations 
with an advantage in the competitive selection processes which would more likely lead to an 




     
 
Figure 16. A model of overt visual attention (adapted from Knudsen (2007)). Bottom-up 
signals originating from sensory pathways and top down signals originating from higher level 
processes influence the strength of activated representations which then compete for 
selection. Once selected, representations can influence gaze control circuitry which 
determines the location and duration of eye fixations in the visual field. In addition, 
representations may enter working memory and feedback to sensitivity control which acts to 
bias the sensitivity of networks underlying currently activated representations.  
 
 
Thus, stage 1 may have exerted an influence on attentional control by directly increasing the 
activation strength of target-relevant representations or by facilitating the activation of such 
representations,  for example by lowering thresholds at which such representations become 
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activated by signals from bottom-up or top-down pathways. In the attention and memory 
literature there is evidence that memory for previously encoded items can affect the 
allocation of overt attention to those items when encountered for a second time. Chanon and 
Hopfinger (2008) initially presented participants with images of real-world objects in a task 
involving deep encoding where they were asked to make semantic judgements about each 
object. Subsequently, scenes were presented that either contained old objects encountered 
during the previous encoding phase or new objects and participants were required to study 
the scene in preparation for a memory test. It was found that participants spent more time 
fixating old objects compared to new objects even when they were explicitly encouraged to 
memorise the scene by allocating more attention to objects that they had not seen before, 
suggesting that the increase in dwell time for old items was an unintentional behaviour. 
Chanon and Hopfinger (2008) explain this finding by suggesting that more information was 
retrieved when old objects were fixated which resulted in greater pertinence values being 
assigned to these items and this consequently affected attentional disengagement. 
 
In Knudsen’s (2007) scheme, this could be interpreted as an example of top-down bias 
signals affecting the sensitivity of the networks underlying activated representations for old 
objects, thus increasing their probability of being selected which subsequently influenced 
gaze control. In the current thesis, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that targets were 
fixated for longer in the old condition (notwithstanding problems with randomisation 
discussed previously). Perhaps then, this result was due to the generation of top down 
biasing signals that attached pertinence values to target-relevant representations which 
subsequently affected the disengagement of attention from target items in a similar manner 
to the effects reported in the Chanon and Hopfinger (2008) study. 
 
However, this account is not consistent with the results of Experiment 4 which showed that 
less time was spent fixating targets in the old condition. This finding suggests that target 
stimuli may have been subject to more efficient processing during the study phase such that 
less time was needed to encode these items into short term memory. A multiple regression 
analysis on the data from Experiment 4 revealed a significant positive relationship between 
an item’s total dwell time and normative data on the time taken to name the item, suggesting 
that participants were naming items as they viewed the array. Theories of picture naming 
propose the involvement of three main stages of processing; object recognition, object 
comprehension and lexicalisation (Barry et al., 1997; Humphreys, Price & Riddoch, 1999). 
Firstly, sensory input is thought to activate an object’s stored structural description based on 
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how well the sensory input matches the stored description. This corresponds to the object 
recognition stage. The stored structural description then makes contact with the object’s 
associated semantic representations which allows the object to be comprehended. The final 
stage involves the use of semantic representations to activate information about the object’s 
name. Thus, if less time was spent fixating targets in the old condition, stage 1 could have 
functioned to facilitate one or more of these processing stages. The multiple regression 
analysis showed that naming time was not a significant predictor of the precognitive effect, 
suggesting that the locus of stage 1 influence was not at the level of lexicalisation. However, 
there were suggestive relationships between the precognitive effect and both item familiarity 
and complexity. That is, less time was spent fixating target items as they became more 
familiar and more visually complex. This suggests that the precognitive effect perhaps had 
an influence at processing stages earlier than lexicalisation.  
 
One possibility is that stage 1 exerted an influence at the stage of object recognition by 
decreasing recognition thresholds. There is considerable evidence that repeated stimuli are 
easier to perceive and recognise, an effect known as perceptual priming (Wiggs & Martin, 
1998). This is typically observed as faster or more accurate performance on perceptual 
identification tasks when stimuli are repeatedly presented. There is also evidence that 
perceptual priming involves implicit memory and can be dissociated from declarative 
memory since amnesic patients who display impairments in episodic memory tasks 
nonetheless display robust perceptual priming effects (Hamann & Squire, 1997). Perhaps 
then, the precognitive effect observed in Experiment 4 may be considered an instance of 
‘retro-active’ perceptual priming in that target items were processed more efficiently during 
the study phase of old trials compared to new trials, suggesting that their repeated 
presentation had a time-reversed effect. Experiments in cognitive neuroscience have also 
shown that the activity of individual neurons and cortical networks is reduced when a 
stimulus is repeatedly presented (Desimone, 1996; Henson, 2003). This phenomenon, termed 
repetition suppression, has been proposed as a neural basis for perceptual priming effects 
(Gotts, Chow & Martin, 2012; Wiggs & Martin, 1998) mainly on account of the similarities 
between the two types of effect and their co-occurrence. For example, both perceptual 
priming and repetition suppression are stimulus-specific, show cumulative effects with 
successive repetitions (Jiang, Haxby, Martin, Ungerleider, & Parasuraman, 2000; Miller, 
Gochin & Gross, 1991; Ostergaard, 1998; Wiggs, Martin & Sunderland, 1997) and are long 
lasting (Cave, 1997; van Turennout, Bielamowicz & Martin, 2003). Several neural-based 
theories have been proposed in an effort to link repetition suppression to the improved 
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performance seen in perceptual priming experiments (see Gots et al., 2012, for a review). 
The representational sharpening model offers a potential mechanism that may be able to 
account for the suggestive relationship between the precognitive effect and item ratings of 
visual complexity observed in Experiment 4. This model states that upon initial visual 
presentation of an object, an activated neural network will contain a certain proportion of 
neurons coding for features essential for object recognition. These neurons will show a 
robust response while other neurons coding for non-essential features will show a weak 
response. Repeated presentation of the stimulus results in both a reduction in the activity of 
neurons coding for non-essential features in object recognition and a weakening of the 
connections to and from these neurons to other neurons in the network. The result is a 
‘sharpened’ representation in that a greater proportion of neurons responding to the repeated 
presentation are those representing features essential for recognition of the object while those 
neurons that initially gave a weak response tend to drop out of the network (Desimone, 
1996). Thus, although less overall neural activity is observed in repetition suppression, the 
sharpening model provides an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of a representation 
that is more selective which results in an improved behavioural response. 
 
In order for the representational sharpening model to provide a basis for the relationship 
between the precognitive effect and item complexity, it must first be assumed that items 
rated as more visually complex tend to be comprised of a greater proportion of features not 
essential to object recognition compared to items rated as visually simple. This may be a 
reasonable assumption to make. For example, a picture of a butterfly from the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980) stimulus set is rated as more visually complex than a picture of an 
envelope (see figure 17). One could imagine that the butterfly can be recognised as such 
mainly from visual features corresponding to the outline of the wings and body. In other 
words, the detail contained in the wing pattern may be relatively unimportant in recognising 
that particular object as a butterfly. On the other hand, the pictorial representation of an 
envelope taken from the same stimulus set appears to be comprised mainly of essential 
features necessary to recognise the object as an envelope. If the precognitive effect in 
Experiment 4 was indeed an instance of ‘retro-active’ perceptual priming, objects rated as 
more visually complex may have tended to produce a larger precognitive effect because they 
were comprised of a greater proportion of features relatively unimportant in object 
recognition. In terms of repetition suppression, the proportion of weakly responding neurons 
dropping out of a network representing a complex object would tend to be larger than the 
proportion dropping out of a network representing a visually simple object. The degree of 
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representational sharpening (or here, ‘retro-active’ representational sharpening) would 
therefore tend to be greater for complex objects, leading to a greater increase in the 
efficiency of object recognition and a greater precognitive effect if based on this level of 
processing. Of course, this argument assumes that objects from the Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart (1980) picture set that are rated as more visually complex are, in fact, comprised 
of a relatively greater number of redundant features in object recognition. This assumption, 
as far as the author of the current thesis is aware, has not been tested in any systematic way. 
Neither does there appear to be any published studies attempting to test whether there is a 
positive relationship between repetition priming and ratings of object complexity. Future 






Figure 17. The representational sharpening model of repetition suppression (adapted from 
Wiggs & Martin, 1998). Black circles represent neurons coding for features essential to 
object recognition while grey circles represent neurons coding for non-essential features. 
Repeated presentation of stimuli results in a more selective (sharpened) representation. 
Hypothesised repetition suppression effects for a complex (A) and simple (B) pictorial object 





The results of the multiple regression analysis on the data from Experiment 4 also suggest a 
positive relationship between the precognitive effect and ratings of object familiarity. This 
trend might be explained if familiar objects are semantically processed at a more rapid rate. 
In the original Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) study (and the Barry et al. (1997) study 
from which the familiarity norms used in the current thesis were obtained), participants were 
asked to rate each item for familiarity defined as ‘the degree to which you come in contact 
with or think about the concept’. This measure of familiarity has been suggested as a 
pictorial analogue of word frequency (Karlsen & Snodgrass, 2004). It is well established that 
high frequency words are recognised at a faster rate (Forster & Chambers, 1973; 
Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977). Borowsky and Besner (1993) propose a 
multistage model of visual word recognition involving the initial activation of 
representations in the orthographic input lexicon which then make contact with associated 
representations in the semantic system. According to their model, high frequency words have 
a more efficient mapping between the orthographic input lexicon and the semantic system 
resulting in a more rapid activation of semantic representations compared to low frequency 
words. In other words, a given level of input from the orthographic processing stage has a 
greater effect on the activation of semantic representations for high frequency words 
compared to low frequency words. Similarly, more efficient mappings may exist between 
stored structural descriptions of familiar pictorial objects and their associated semantic 
representations. If so, this may go some way to explaining why the precognitive effect 
observed in Experiment 4 was also related to ratings of familiarity. As discussed, the 
relationship between the precognitive effect and ratings of complexity suggest that the 
activation of structural descriptions may have been facilitated on the basis of a ‘retro-causal’ 
perceptual priming effect. These representations may then have made contact with the 
semantic system with the activation strength of semantic representations being dependent on 
item familiarity. Thus, a more rapid activation of the semantic system for familiar objects 
would, according to models of picture naming (Alario et al., 2004; Barry et al., 1997), result 
in a further reduction in the time taken to name these objects. Since it is likely that 
participants were sub-vocally naming objects in the current set of experiments, this in turn 
may have contributed to a greater reduction in the time spent fixating familiar items during 





Suggestions for further work 
 
Replication attempts are critical in resolving whether the positive results observed in the 
current series of experiments are more likely to be explained by chance, known factors such 
as statistical cueing or genuine precognition. The accumulation of null results in replication 
attempts would suggest that the current results were due to statistical noise or a fortuitous 
match between the sequence of trial conditions and participants’ response biases. On the 
other hand, positive replications would serve to strengthen the case for a real effect since it is 
less likely that a fortuitous match between sequential bias and response bias would occur on 
repeated replication attempts. 
 
It is recommended that replications focus on Experiment 4 since two replication attempts of 
Experiment 1 have already been made in the current thesis and both failed to reject the null 
hypothesis. Strict replications of Experiment 4 that balance the frequency of experimental 
conditions and item positions will introduce statistical cues into the sequence of trials. 
Positive results from such replications would therefore be potentially explainable in such 
terms. However, the data could be examined for the presence of learning effects, as was done 
here. A cumulative lack of evidence for learning of sequential bias, indicated by the absence 
of an increase in effect size over the time course of individual participant sessions, would 
strengthen the case that the effect was not due to such factors. Alternatively, replications 
may employ randomisation with replacement on all experimental variables in order to rule 
out explanations based on statistical cueing. However, as discussed, this would introduce 
noise into the data due to unequal distributions of experimental conditions and item 
positions. One possible solution to this problem would be to implement randomisation with 
replacement as the experiment is run, but then randomly remove data post-hoc until the 
remaining dataset contained an equal number of items in each condition and array position 
for statistical analysis. This would avoid statistical cues being made available to participants 
and would reduce the amount of noise in the data. However, this technique would most 
likely result in discarding a large proportion of data and would therefore require a much 
larger number of participants than used in Experiment 4 in order to ensure that the remaining 
dataset had sufficient power to detect an effect.    
 
It is also recommended that replication attempts restrict the precognitive hypothesis to 
planned analyses of TDT while ignoring FFT as it was evident from the results of this thesis 
that participants displayed a strong tendency to fixate items in a clockwise pattern. Any 
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underlying precognitive effect would therefore need to be relatively strong if it were to 
influence that particular behaviour in a significant way. Clearly, if there is indeed a genuine 
precognitive effect in the data from the current thesis, it is small in magnitude. In addition, 
by limiting planned analyses to TDT, future studies could avoid using Bonferroni corrections 
for comparisons on both of these variables.    
 
Alternative experimental paradigms may also be explored on the basis of the results from 
Experiment 4 where, in addition to a main effect, there were suggestive relationships 
between the precognitive effect and item ratings of complexity and familiarity. As discussed 
above, these findings suggest that the effect occurred at the level of object recognition and 
may therefore conform to models of perceptual priming. It is therefore recommended that 
further studies more directly examine this possibility. For example, a more appropriate 
paradigm in which to test for this effect may be one that reverses the order of study and test 
in a standard perceptual priming experiment. In a picture naming study, Mitchell and Brown 
(1988) presented participants with items from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) stimulus 
set and asked them to name each picture as fast as possible. One week later, participants 
were again asked to name pictures that were either old or new and it was found that old 
pictures were named approximately 70ms faster. A ‘time-reversed’ version of such an 
experiment might employ two randomly determined conditions; a repetition condition where 
naming latency is measured to the initial presentation of a picture and is followed by the 
repeated presentation of the same picture in a related task; and a no-repetition condition 
where a picture is presented and named only once. A ‘retro-active’ perceptual priming 
hypothesis would predict a decrease in the time taken to name pictures on their initial 
presentation in the repetition condition compared to the no-repetition condition. An 
experiment of this sort would have the advantage of being able to examine the apparent 
effect observed in Experiment 4 more directly since the results here suggest the involvement 
of processes preceding that of the lexicalisation stage of picture naming such as object 
recognition and semantic activation. However, for theoretical reasons, it is not clear what the 
optimum inter-stimulus interval should be in such an experiment. Intuitively, a relatively 
short interval, perhaps on the order of seconds, between first and repeated presentation 
would seem to offer the best conditions under which observe a ‘retro-active’ priming effect 
since forward priming effects have been reported to decline somewhat over longer periods of 
time (Cave, 1997). Considering that the meta-analysis on forced choice precognition 
(Honorton & Ferrari, 1989) found the largest effect size for studies that selected targets 




In addition, future work using a standard perceptual priming paradigm (i.e., with cause and 
effect in the normal temporal order) might investigate whether more complex and more 
familiar pictures tend to generate a greater perceptual priming effect since, as far as the 
current author is aware, no such studies have yet been performed. The representational 
sharpening hypothesis outlined above might predict that objects rated as more visually 
complex would generate a greater perceptual priming effect because they comprise of 
relatively more visual features that are not essential for recognising the object compared to 
less complex objects. Similarly, more familiar objects might generate a greater priming 
effect because the more efficient mapping between the structural and semantic 
representations for these objects results in faster processing compared to less familiar 
objects. One strategy to test for the complexity relationship might be to use item ratings to 
control for familiarity while creating high complexity and low complexity stimulus groups 
from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) stimulus set. Alternatively, pictures could be 
edited, for example by removing intricate detail, to form ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ versions of 
the same objects allowing for a within-items analysis that would control for familiarity 
effects (see figure 18). Similarly, to isolate the effect of familiarity, complexity could be held 




Figure 18. Potential method to manipulate object complexity while controlling for familiarity in 
tests of ‘forward’ and ‘retro-active’ perceptual priming. 
 
 
In addition to running this ‘forward’ priming experiment, it would be of interest to observe 
whether a similar relationship between a ‘retro-active’ priming effect and ratings of item 
complexity and familiarity emerge, as suggested from the results of Experiment 4 of the 
current thesis. Confirmation of these relationships in both a ‘forward’ priming and ‘retro-
active’ version of the experiment would not only contribute to the priming and repetition 
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It is unclear whether the findings of the current thesis offer support for the precognitive 
hypothesis or whether known factors such as chance or statistical cueing can offer a more 
plausible explanation for the results. As suggested above, replication attempts may be able to 
resolve this question. However, if the null is indeed false in the current paradigm then the 
observed effect appears to suffer from poor replicability. Therefore, further work aimed at 
testing for precognition should also more directly examine the involvement of potential 
processing loci suggested by the results of the current thesis. An avenue of inquiry has been 
suggested to test for potential ‘retro-causal’ perceptual priming effects and it has been put 
forward that more visually complex and more familiar objects may produce stronger effects 
in such a paradigm. Indeed, if precognition represents a genuinely anomalous means to 
anticipate future events, the concept of ‘retro-causality’ may currently offer the most useful 
framework for making sense of these experiences and laboratory phenomena. Perhaps the 
clearest prediction from the ‘retro-causal’ account is that precognitive effects should occur 
during a wide range of perceptual and cognitive task conditions. This appears to be borne out 
in the range of laboratory methods and task conditions in which precognitive effects have 
been reported to occur as described in Chapter 2. However, a significant challenge for 
parapsychology remains in offering an experimental method that is able to produce a robust 
and replicable precognitive effect. If this challenge can be overcome, the next step would be 
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